Transatlantic Security

The Euro-Atlantic security architecture is currently navigating a geopolitical tipping point, characterized by the return of high-intensity conflict to the continent and the crumbling of the international rules-based order.

For the past three decades, since the decision to join NATO, the core of Lithuania’s national security outlook has been based on the strategic security partnership with the United States. For Lithuania, the United States has never been just another ally; it has been the ultimate security guarantor without which neither NATO’s Article 5 nor the broader deterrence architecture in the Baltic region (and Europe, in a broader geopolitical picture) would be credible.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation was formed to defend itself against what was seen as an impending Soviet invasion, quickly developing a strategy, which it then refined and implemented throughout the Cold War.

United States (US) President Donald Trump’s second term in office is already sending shockwaves throughout Europe. A tense February 2025 meeting in the Oval Office with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy quickly spiralled into a confrontation, underscoring a deepening transatlantic rift over the future of support for Ukraine in its war against Russia; Trump told the Ukrainian leader that he was “gambling with World War III.” At the same time, he repeatedly praised Russian President Vladimir Putin, calling him a “genius.” Trump also cast doubt on NATO commitments and warned that America would defend allies “only if they pay enough for their own defence.”

Leaders and guests of the 75-year-old NATO alliance met in Washington DC on 10-11 July. The NATO Washington Summit Declaration released by the leaders highlights reinforces collective defence, new instruments to coordinate assistance and training to Ukraine and pledges significant but unspecified long-term support related to Ukraine’s irreversible path towards NATO membership. The NATO summit outcome assessments are discussed by experts Henrik Larsen and Prof. Tomas Janeliūnas from the Eastern Europe Studies Centre.

Russian attacks and advances in Ukraine make it increasingly uncomfortable for NATO to stand passively on the sideline. NATO remains unlikely to take steps toward Ukraine’s accession but is now considering taking over the coordination of weapons supplies and training and creating a dedicated fund to sustain them long-term.

The policy debate about NATO’s burden sharing tends to focus on European members’ reluctance or failure to meet the two-percent-of-GDP minimum defense spending target. Redressing the transatlantic budgetary misbalance is indeed warranted because of the possibility of a re-election next year of Donald Trump or a like-minded Republican candidate, who would use Europe’s under-spending as an argument for reducing or withdrawing U.S. support for NATO and Ukraine.

The Index of Russia's Influence on Lithuania is the first of its kind to comprehensively assess Russia's influence on Lithuania and to identify areas where Russia's influence may still pose a risk and threat. A periodic fact-check would allow monitoring of the evolving factual situation and help to highlight the most sensitive areas.

An essential factor in this regard is Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. It’s an ongoing war, and the Chinese are studying at the tactical level.

In November 2021, Lithuania’s government agreed to establish a Taiwanese representative office in Vilnius; in August 2022, Nancy Pelosi, the US Speaker of the House, made a bold visit to Taiwan despite all the threatening rhetoric from the People’s Republic of China.

The effectiveness of Lithuania’s defence and the country’s defensibility directly depend on smooth and quick deployment of NATO Allies’ forces in our country.

Washington’s attention and support for Lithuania remains one of the most important tasks in ensuring Lithuania’s security.

The insights from the Minsk, London and Washington DC perspective are shared by three experts: Andrei Yahorau, Edward Lucas and Chris Miller.