The History of NATO’s New Defence Plans (2014–Present): SACEUR and the Strategy Gap

Introduction

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation was formed to defend itself against what was seen as an impending Soviet invasion,[1] quickly developing a strategy, which it then refined and implemented throughout the Cold War. At the end of the Cold War, NATO abandoned any cohesive strategy and instead became a reactive alliance, slowing its decision-making processes to reflect the focus on “Crisis Management” and counter-terrorism rather than defending against an existential threat. The increasingly aggressive behavior of Russia throughout the post-Cold War era – at first ignored by the Alliance – became impossible to ignore once it initiated the massive and sustained war of aggression against Ukraine. Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 is the turning point, with 2022 as an acceleration point, forcing NATO to return to strategy to defend itself against a rising Russian threat.

Part 1: A Quick History

Forging a Strategy Under Attack (1949-1991)

At the end of World War II, the United States sought to organize the European countries outside of Soviet control under a Trans-Atlantic alliance – NATO – on 4 April 1949. NATO swiftly developed and agreed to a Strategic Concept to defend itself, including with “all types of weapons,” (i.e., US atomic bombardment) on 1 December 1949.[2] NATO set about to develop its strategic guidance[3] to refine its Strategic Concept[4] and longer term implementation plans.[5] Despite honing its defensive strategy, NATO could not overcome its conventonal shortcomings and increased its dependence on nuclear weapons to deter the Soviets[6], eventually developing a nuclear tripwire with forward-deployed nuclear weapons to be operated by Allies in a conflict, backed by medium-range missiles under SACEUR’s control and “external support” from the United States and UK, later joined by France.[7]

NATO’s strategy continued to evolve, including increased Allies’ say in nuclear consultation[8] and planning through the 1960s.[9] This evolution resulted in a new Strategic Concept, known as “Flexible Response,” replacing the idea of immediate and total escalation to nuclear bombardment with a tailored and flexible deterrence strategy.[10] This more flexible strategy of escalation to deter the Soviets remained in place, with refinements, though to the end of the Cold War. The central bargain of the Alliance remained that the US and Canada would defend the Europe with forward based troops while Allies deployed their forces alongside, together, for a common purpose of deterring the USSR. However, the end of the Cold War in 1991 led to Allies stopping this process of military refinement of the NATO Strategic Concept and its implementation, ending the period of NATO strategy and ushering in the period of Crisis Management.

The Death of Strategy (1991–2013)

With the end of the Cold War, NATO began the long process of eliminating its defensive capability guided by the abandonment of strategic thinking as the cornerstone of Alliance security. It de-integrated its nuclear and conventional planning and began distancing itself on the need for nuclear weapons – or integrated defence planning – to maintain security. This process was enshrined within the first NATO non-military strategic concept,[11] followed by the second Strategic Concept in 1999 which centered Crisis Management as a means to handle threats that were seen as smaller, slower, and not existential.[12] With this approach, Allied responses to threats became discretionary, slow to move, and often understrength, which subsequently led to a staggering reduction in the numbers, types, and readiness of NATO’s nuclear and conventional forces in Europe.

The Al-Qaeda attack on the United States in 2001 gave NATO a new focus, but in the absence of strategy, the Alliance continued to drift. In the meantime, Russia used the vast increase in oil prices to rearum itself, while consistently eroding European security – brutally attacking Chechnya for attempting to leave the Russian Federation, backing the Serbs throughout the Yugoslavian conflicts in the 1990s, refusing to remove its occupying troops from Moldova and Georgia, invading and dismembering Georgia, and increasing its threats against its neighbors while seeking to re-write the European security order to preserve Russian hegemony over its near abroad.

NATO continued to ignore the growing threat, despite several rounds of enlargement, culminating in the farcical 2010 Strategic Concept signalling a complete abandonment by the Alliance of any strategic thinking to defend Allied interests.[13] Despite its increasing size, defence spending in NATO Europe dropped precipitously as the Allies eliminated their defensive capabilities and strategic habits. The military processes of planning had devolved entirely, with no standing defence plans for the European area, and massive capability shortfalls. Indeed, the Crisis Management approach to conflict meant that a crisis must emerge first, then Allies decide how they should react, agree on strategic objectives, and then plan, organize, and agree to employ NATO’s instruments of power to achieve those objectives. NATO’s Crisis Management system required numerous meetings across multiple weeks to agree on deployments – with inadqueate policies and understrength or absent forces to deal with contingencies in isolation – and ignored any overarching strategy.

The Cold War processes of developing and implementing defence strategy were replaced by the Military Committee implementation of the public Strategic Concepts (MC 400) and the Defence Planning Process – and both were detached from reality.[14] These new processes became increasingly fraught with some Allies concerned about the threats posed by Russia, leading to drawn-out processes. The 2010 Strategic Concept led to such a divisive MC 400 process that Allies had to initiate a new defence review process to attempt to paper over the differences.[15] In the meantime, NATO’s nuclear deterrent in Europe dropped from a peak of more than 7,000 weapons by 1966[16] to fewer than 200 by 2013, and from more than 6,000 US battle tanks based in Europe to zero by 18 March 2013.[17] By 2014, NATO was a much larger, but outside the United States, a hollow force.

Part 2: Crimea and the Revenge of History

Despite the obvious signs of rising Russian aggressive intent, NATO’s Wales Summit of 2014 was prepared to decide on a policy of reinforcement only, focusing on counter-terror, piracy, instability, Afghanistan, and missile defence.[18] Russia had other plans, invading and illegally annexing Crimea from Ukraine in February-March 2014, fundamentally challenging NATO’s strategy, and signalling the unignorable return of great power competition. Instead, the Wales Summit pivoted to agree on a NATO Readiness Action Plan (RAP),[19] but disagreements over Russian policy limited change. The NATO political deficit on how to handle Russia – whether it would return to good behavior if properly incentivised – persisted, and NATO struggled to adapt its Crisis Management system to handle a new era of conflict. Russia understood that the Alliance’s weaknesses were divisions on Russia policy and a slowness of decision-making, and sought to exploit these weaknesses.

NATO’s political deficit in policy and decision-making was initially mirrored among NATO’s military representatives, but the differences within the MC eroded far faster than in the political sphere. Recognising this, Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg postponed revision of the 2010 Strategic Concept, focusing instead on implementing the RAP and other Wales decisions. SACEUR also had more than enough work to adapt the military from a purely reactive posture, underfunded and understaffed, with no coherent strategy, than to worry about a new Strategic Concept, at least at first. However, as SACEUR made progress towards more proactive processes and posture from 2014-2022, the lack of strategic guidance would eventually become a limiting factor.

From Wales to Warsaw: NATO Reborn, but Is It Enough? (No.)

The Wales RAP decision included the establishment of a Very Ready Joint Task Force (a small spearhead force to precede the NATO Response Force) as well NATO Force Integration Units (permanent logistical teams on the territory of each of the Easter Allies to facilitate deployements),[20] and work on six Graduated Response Plans (regional scenario-based plans – more than contingency plans, but not standing defence plans), which were agreed in 2015.[21] The Allies agreed at the Warsaw Summit to establish enhanced Forward Presence (eFP, battalion-sized forces in the northeast) and tailored Forward Presence (tFP in the southeast) to build a tripwire of joint Allied forces based on the territory of the Eastern Allies and increased the size and speed of the NATO Response Force (NRF) development and deployment.[22]

SACEUR Breedlove exercised the RAP to test NATO’s procedures and illustrate the shortcomings in the adaptation to date, and while he accomplished an extraordinary amount during his tenure (2013-2016), the NRF was still considered too small and too slow to mobilize, the VJTF could be denied access to contested areas too easily, and eFP forces were too small (battalion size) to deny Russia the opportunity to seize Allied territory – demonstrating presence, but not purpose. The GRPs as well remained too sectoral and isolated, and each had several phases requiring Council decisions, slowing the ability to respond to a crisis.[23]

The political debate at NATO stalled, with Allies avoiding defining clear, strategic objectives for Euro-Atlantic defence, and many continuing to oscillate between accommodating Russia and standing up for Allied interests. The nuclear debate also remained stalled, with some Allies still seeking to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons, while others recognised their central role in deterring Russia. SACEURs thus became increasingly frustrated by the ‘strategy gap,’ where Russia had a clear strategy to divide Allies and consolidate the post-Soviet space under its control, while Allies remained without a strategy, focusing instead on incremental gains.

Table: NATO’s Defence Plans Timeline

• 2017: ACT Strategic Foresight Analysis (SFA)
• 2018: SACEUR’s Strategic Thoughts, Framework for Future Alliance Operations (FFAO)
• 2019: Military Strategy: Comprehensive Defence, Shared Response (CDSR)
• 2020: Concept for Deterrence & Defence in the Euro-Atlantic Area (DDA)
• 2021: SACEUR’s Strategic Directive on Peacetime Vigilance and AOR Management (SSD)
• 2022: SACEUR’s AOR-wide Strategic Plan (SASP) (defence), NATO Force Model (NFM), Strategic Concept, Forward Defence/Not One Inch
• 2023: Regional Plans (replacing the GRPs), supported by Subordinate Strategic Plans (SSPs)
• 2024: New Nuclear Policy

From Strategic Thoughts to Military Strategy

With the lack of political consensus at NATO, SACEUR took the lead, driving the Alliance toward a strategy-centred military posture. NATO Allied Command Transformation produced an updated Strategic Foresight Analysis (SFA) in 2017,[24] providing a starting point for strategic planning. SFA recentered great power competition and Russia’s actions as a primary threat (the 2013 document does not mention Russia). Building on this work, SACEUR began the process of revising NATO’s military strategy, starting with a document called “SACEUR’s Strategic Thoughts.”

SACEUR Curtis Scaparotti delivered his Strategic Thoughts, subtitled “Comprehensive Defence and Shared Responsibility,”[25] in December 2018. SACEUR’s Strategic Thoughts described the threat posed by Russia, including its aspiration to dominate the land domain through surface-to-surface fires and the need to respond in kind.[26] He challenged the Allies to be “competitive in short of war to be competitive in war,” requiring the conduct of operations across a much wider Implementation Area (defining a wider SACEUR Area of Responsibility),[27] striking deep, fighting the close fight, and securing the NATO rear area.[28] Allies, he continued, must place the credible deterrence of Russia at the centre of Allied defence planning[29] by delivering lethality, responsiveness and resilience.[30] Scarparotti’s Strategic Thoughts also described the new NATO Command Structure-Adapted (NCS-A) and Joint Command and Control Capability (J2C2) (to improve interoperability in NATO’s command and control systems), successfully leading the way to the new military strategy.[31]

Allies agreed on the new NATO Military Strategy: Comprehensive Defence, Shared Response (CDSR), on 22 May 2019,[32] setting down the first real military strategy for NATO since Flexible Response. It focuses Allies’ attention on geostrategic competition in an age of instability and shocks, identifies Russia as a strategic threat, and moves beyond Crisis Management.[33] CDSR shifts NATO from a reactive posture to a deliberate strategy for force deployment and employment to contest and counter threats across all three phases of time: peacetime, crisis, and conflict. CDSR also addresses the weaknesses of the previous planning, such as the eFP and GRPs by designing a theatre-wide approach to provide horizontal escalation options. The Strategy creates a seamless, integrated approach across the Euro-Atlantic area, discarding the compartmentalisation of the previous approach, and facilitates the movement of NATO forces across the AOR rapidly to prevent Russia from seizing NATO territory.[34]

Dawn of the DDA

The next SACEUR, Tod Wolters created a new concept to achieve the strategic and operational intent of the CDSR: the Concept for the Deterrence and Defence of the Euro-Atlantic Area (DDA). The DDA was approved in 2020 by the NATO Defence Ministers, providing coherent framework and approach to tactical, operational, and strategic planning and warfighting, cementing the definition of Russia’s threat, defining its strategy, aims, and organization, and uniting Allies in common purpose and agreed strategic deterrence objectives.[35] The DDA united the earlier MC14 and MC48 documents into a single framework – the strategic concept and the implementation of the concept – allowing NATO to fulfil the CDSR strategy.

The DDA provides the framework for developing solid defense plans, seeking to deny Russia’s advantage of speed of action by describing how to interdict rolling start maneuvers that Russia uses to initiate attacks across the AOR. The DDA’s operational demands require that the speed of decision-making accelerates exponentially, requiring new sensors and analysis to support far more rapid decision-making. As in the Cold War, this opens the question of delegation of authority to SACEUR and his subordinate operational commanders earlier in developing crises, requiring a significant change in NATO’s old and slow Crisis Management culture to outpace the speed of the adversary.[36]

The next stage of DDA development was the creation of two plans – one for peacetime management and one for crisis and conflict. The first is SACEUR’s Strategic Director (SSD) for Peacetime Vigilance and AOR Management, agreed in 2020.[37] The SSD provides the framework for enhanced Vigilance Activities,[38] which will be discussed later in this paper. The second is SACEUR’s AOR-wide Strategic Plan (SASP), which was finalized in 2021, and the development of a family of defence plans nested benath it. This stage also included the creation of the NATO Warfighting Cornerstone Concept (NWCC), which emphasizes cognitive superiority and integrated multi-domain defence. Under the SASP, SACEUR then can create the standing defence plans to allow NATO to deal with several concurrent crisis in different geographic directions[39] – the first NATO standing defence plans since 1991. These plans comprise of three subordinate Regional Plans (which replace the Graduated Response Plans), and were agreed in 2023 at the NATO Vilnius Summit:[40]

1) Atlantic/North, subordinated to Joint Force Command Norfolk,

2) Central, subordinated to Allied Joint Force Command Brunssum, and

3) South-East, subordinated to Allied Joint Force Command Naples.[41]

All NATO defence plans include a number of Subordinate Strategic Plans (SSPs). There are seven SSPs: 1) air, 2) land, 3) maritime, 4) space, 5) special operations forces, 6) cyber, and 7) reinforcement. The SSPs are included in defence plans as needed – not all plans require support across each domain. The SASP and these suborindate plans further allow NATO to develop a set of requirements at the national level and the NATO level, that better serve the interest of generating peace in competition crisis and conflict from this point forward.[42] The DDA Multi-Domain Architechture made up of eight elements: AOR-wide high readiness and resilience; effective integration of indications and warnings; joint forces forward and throughout the AOR; joint fires forward and from the depths of the Alliance; integrated air and missile defence (IAMD); cyber; command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I); electronic warfare; space capabilities.[43] NATO also agreed to a new NATO nuclear policy in 2024, which, while classified, includes expanding participation in NATO nuclear sharing, basing, and dispersal. However, nuclear-conventional re-integration is not evident, yet, and enhanced nuclear posture and public-facing policy declarations will be important to strengthening deterrence. Sweden’s (2024) and Finland’s (2023) membership in NATO also has vastly increased NATO security, esepcially in the defence and deterrence of the High North, Nordic, and Baltic regions.[44]

The New NATO Force Model

However, Allies also recognized the current requirement shortfalls included available forces to fulfil existing plans. The shock of Russia’s brutal invasion and occupation of Ukraine in February 2022 sent shockwaves across the Alliance and facilitated agreement on a new Strategic Concept at the NATO Madrid Summit, naming as “the most significant and direct threat” to the Alliance, declaring a return to Forward Defence, declaring that Allies would “defend every inch” of NATO territory.[45] This declaration marks a signficant change in requirements, including changes to NATO’s standing force posture from a tripwire and deterrence by punishment posture to a deterrence by denial posture, including rapid reinforcements prior to combat to deter and defeat direct attack.

These requirement changes drove adoption of new systems for readiness, force generation, and deployments. NATO had begun a long process of evolving these structures, including the NATO Readiness Initiative at the Brussels Summit in 2018.[46] The NRI provded Allies with new targets, including generating 30 heavy or medium manouver battalions, 30 air squadrons, an 30 major naval vessels within 30 days. Allies eventually renamed NRI as the NATO Readiness Process to facilitate faster force generation to meet the ambitions set in the new NATO Force Model (NFM), agreed at Madrid. NFM includes the Atlantic Response Force (agreed at the Vilnius Summit and established in July 2024[47]) to replace the old NRF. The ARF transforms the theoretical ability to deploy 40,000 NRF troops in a matter of weeks into a commitment for NATO to deploy 100,000 troops in no more than ten days, 200,000 in thirty days, and 500,000 within 180 days.

At the Madrid 2022 Summit, NATO renamed the eFPs to Forward Land Forces (FLF) and subsequently increased the size of the Baltic FLFs (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland) to in-country brigades backed by the rest of a full division for reinforcement.  In furtherance of the Madrid decisions, NATO also agreed to establish eFP battlegroups in Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia.[48] This shift from merely an established presence to presence with purpose enhances deterrence.

Allies also have reformed the entire NATO command structure, establishing the Joint Support and Enabling Command (JSEC) in Ulm to secure lines of communication and enable transatlantic reinforcement, as well as creating Multinational Commands across the Alliance to command FLFs and prepare for large-scale deployments. JSEC reached full operating capability in Setpember 2025. This will facilitate rapid mobilization, but nations still must fulfil their capabilities targets for troops and capabilities both at scale and at the speed of relevance.

Next Step: Enhanced Vigilance Posture

The DDA and its family of plans have enabled SACEUR rapidly to take on an enhanced vigilance posture across the enitre AOR before crises emerges through the SSD on Peacetime Vigilance and AOR Management.[49] The new SSD moves away from the previous concept of Baseline Activities and Current Operations (BACO), which were much harder and slower to modify in face of emerging threats. The enhanced Vigilance posture allows for rapid changes towards emerging threats and the ability to interrupt adversary actions before they can execute attacks on NATO. For instance, when Russian forces began massing on Ukraine’s border a the end of 2021, SACEUR was able to double the deployed NATO land, air, and maritime power in Europe, building on existing GRPs and the NRF. When Russian threats increased further, SACEUR executed enhanced Vigilance Activity (EVA) “EASTERN SHIELD” in October and November 2023, including increased deployments and exercises aross the region.[50]

NATO executed EVA BALTIC SENTRY in January 2025 to safeguard NATO critical undersea infrastructure after a series of hybrid attacks. When Russian drones and aircraft crossed into NATO airpsace in September 2025, SACEUR was able to execute EVA EASTERN SENTRY within days.[51] NEPTUNE STRIKE 25-3 also was launched in September 2025 to demonstrate power projection capabilities across the naval and air domains across the Mediterranean and Baltic Seas.[52]

Now NATO is acting through the DDA with the speed of relevance, at scale, and effectively, shaping Russia’s perception and limiting or raising the costs of their options to escalate.[53] While this met current challenges and deterred direct attack on Allies, Russia has continued to evolve its posture and threats to find and exploit NATO weaknesses. Eternal vigilance and aptation will remain a requirement.

Conclusion

NATO is in a new strategic era – defined by not a crisis, but a war conducted by Russia, with help from others, to overthrow the current global system. Therefore, NATO requires a new strategic concept, as currently embodied in the CDSR and DDA, to interdict attacks on the global system. The steps NATO has taken to date are only the beginning. Rather, NATO must work tirelessly to defeat this systematic threat.

Enduring Challenges

SACEUR’s persistent effort and the successful execution of the DDA and its family of plans have resulted in a credible and dynamic deterrence posture. The DDA enables NATO to execute at scale and with the speed of relevance. However, three main challenges remain: 1) Capability Shortfalls; 2) Political Cohesion; and 3) Command Authority.

On capability shortfalls, Allies face significant gaps in the ability to staff and execute the Regional Plans. Previously, the NATO Defense Capability Development process allowed Allies considerable leeway to avoid their responsibilities. Standing defense plans will illustrate starkly the gaps and raise the political costs of not fulfilling them. Most Allies now are addressing issues such as hiring, training, and retaining forces, as well as addressing military industrial shortfalls and innovation gaps, but solving this issue will require enduring commitments that will have societal costs and impose strains on Allies that will endure. Nations must deliver and avoid the free rider temptations.

On political cohesion, most Allies are under tremendous internal and external pressure due to the current political and global security context. At the same time, man allies are distracted due to interests and threats from other theatres, including the Middle East, North Africa, and the Pacific. These are not new pressures, but the acute increase and conversion of these pressures – internal and external – on Allies can have dangerous and unpredictable effects. Concerns about US inattention or distraction is forcing a reinvigoration of Europe’s defence capabilities, which may have long-term benefits, but also may see a longer-term divergence between Europe and North America to the detriment of both.

On command authority, one of the sharpest disagreements during the Cold War was the delegation of authority to NATO SACEUR to initiate combat operations and use nuclear weapons – especially in the face of a Soviet surprise attack. Questions on early use of nuclear weapons also will remain a difficult question, especially as NATO modernizes its nuclear policy and European Allies contemplate the possibility of divided US deterrence requirements. Across all of these challenges, NATO must find a way to provide and maintain a coherent framework to contest, deter, and defend against Russian and other threats in a multi-domain environment.

In Closing

Addressing these challenges will aid Allies in meeting current challenges, but NATO’s adversaries will continue to evolve their postures and threats to find and exploit weaknesses. Eternal vigilance – including presence and purpose – and constant adaptation will remain consistent requirements for the foreseeable future.