Analysing international policy processes and Lithuania’s role in them
Bulletin Nov 16, 2026

Unshaken By Wind and Storm? The Shifting Limits of the China–Russia Partnership

Photo source: suttirat wiriyanon / Shutterstock

In Beijing’s official statements, the strength of the China–Russia “no-limits partnership” is never in doubt: in March 2026, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi affirmed that bilateral relations remain “as steady as a mountain, unshaken by wind and storm” (风雨不动安如山). The relationship, he said, rests on equality, high political trust and close strategic cooperation. Yet in June 2025 a leaked internal document of Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB), obtained by The New York Times, revealed a far less idyllic side of these ties. The document identifies China as an “enemy” in a counter-intelligence context and describes suspected attempts by Chinese intelligence to recruit Russian officials and scientists to acquire sensitive military technology and gather information on the war in Ukraine. Even more telling was the FSB’s instruction to its officers: to counter Chinese intelligence activity without damaging bilateral political relations.

That said, it would be a mistake to dismiss the China–Russia rapprochement as mere diplomatic theatre. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the two countries have significantly strengthened their political, economic and military ties. In the face of Western sanctions, China has become one of Russia’s most important economic lifelines, while Russia remains a significant partner for Beijing in energy, security and foreign policy. Closer ties, however, have not dispelled long-standing mistrust or differences of interest. On the contrary, Russia’s growing dependence on China throws their unequal positions into even sharper relief: for Moscow, cooperation with Beijing is becoming ever harder to replace, while China retains far more freedom to decide not only how far it engages with Russia, but also on what terms.

Why, then, do China and Russia maintain a close partnership, even as mistrust persists and their relationship grows increasingly unequal? Shared strategic interests give both countries reason enough to keep cooperating even where their priorities diverge. This dynamic is evident in economic and technological cooperation, in developments in the Russian Far East, and in Chinese and Russian interests in Central Asia and the Arctic. Examining these cases helps us assess how China and Russia reconcile close cooperation with their own interests, and how growing asymmetry is changing their ability to set the terms of that cooperation.

 

WHEN AN ECONOMIC LIFELINE BECOMES BARGAINING LEVERAGE

After 2022, Russia’s “pivot to the East” accelerated sharply. This helped partly offset the loss of economic ties with the West but also deepened Russia’s dependence on China. In 2025, for example, China accounted for around 27% of Russia’s exports and 36% of its imports, whereas Russia made up just 2.7% of China’s exports and 4.8% of its imports. That year, bilateral trade fell for the first time in five years, by 6.9% to $228.1 billion. This was partly due to the lower value of China’s imports of Russian energy and a steep drop in Chinese car exports to Russia, which were also hit by Moscow’s own import restrictions. Yet these fluctuations in trade volumes do little to alter the entrenched structural asymmetry. Russia mainly supplies China with energy and raw materials, which Beijing can source from a range of partners, while China increasingly supplies Russia with industrial equipment, electronics, vehicles and other products for which alternatives have become much harder to find following the imposition of Western sanctions and the withdrawal of foreign companies. The exit of Western manufacturers has also opened up more opportunities for Chinese companies in Russia’s consumer goods market, particularly in household appliances and electronics. The scale of economic dependence is therefore better gauged today by looking beyond overall trade volumes to what it would cost each country to lose that trade and look for alternatives.

Growing dependence and trade asymmetry do not mean that Moscow has given up defending its economic interests. In 2024, after Chinese manufacturers captured almost 60% of Russia’s new passenger car market (compared with about 9% in 2021), Russia sharply raised the recycling fee on imported cars and began to push harder for localised production. In the first half of 2025, Chinese passenger car exports to Russia fell by 59%, while supplies of certain car components increased. Falling demand also played a part in these shifts, but Moscow’s decisions point to a broader aim: to tap into China’s industrial capacity while limiting dependence on imports of finished products.

In the defence industry, technological dependence on China is a particularly sensitive issue for Moscow. According to a 2026 study by the Kiel Institute for the World Economy, China’s share of Russia’s imports of high-priority dual-use goods rose from roughly a quarter before the full-scale invasion to more than 80% in 2025. These goods include electronic components, computer numerical control (CNC) machine tools, and telecommunications and optical equipment. More importantly, China’s role is not limited to supplying its own technology products and components: During March 2022–December 2023, 76% of Russia’s microprocessor imports by value were shipped from China, even though Western brands still accounted for around 97% of these imports. Ukrainian military intelligence also found that in 2023–2024 the Russian tank manufacturer Uralvagonzavod acquired Chinese machine tools fitted with control systems from the German and Japanese firms Siemens, Heidenhain and Fanuc.

Russia’s partial technological dependence on the West, then, does not necessarily disappear even when direct trade ties shrink: some of that dependence is channelled through supply chains in which China, along with other countries friendly to Moscow, acts as producer or intermediary. This allows Moscow to sustain its defence-industrial capacity, but also constrains its efforts to secure independent access to key technologies. The dominance of Chinese suppliers stems not only from China’s industrial strength, but also from Russia’s shrinking ability to source goods from other markets since 2022. Moreover, specific supply decisions are shaped by more than Beijing’s political calculations. The commercial interests of Chinese companies, export control requirements and the risk of Western sanctions also weigh heavily. Even without direct political pressure, however, growing dependence narrows Moscow’s choice of alternative suppliers and strengthens China’s bargaining position in bilateral economic relations.

In finance, this shift in dependence is even clearer. According to official data, more than 95% of bilateral trade is now settled in the two countries’ national currencies. In Russia’s financial system, the yuan has gone from a niche currency to the main foreign currency available, used not only in commercial settlements but also in managing public finances. The Bank of Russia’s 2024 annual report states that the yuan plays the leading role in its foreign currency mix and that yuan operations serve to smooth swings in oil and gas revenues and to manage the National Wealth Fund’s assets. The bank also acknowledges that its options for investing in foreign financial instruments are limited. This shift has undoubtedly helped Moscow blunt the impact of Western financial sanctions, but de-dollarisation has not in itself translated into greater financial autonomy. Having abandoned part of the Western financial infrastructure, Russia has become more dependent on the yuan and on settlement channels whose operating conditions it does not control. Foreign banks can face restricted access to the US financial system over certain transactions with sanctioned Russian entities, even if the payments are not made in dollars. As the threat of US secondary sanctions grew, major Chinese banks began to restrict Russia-related payments, and in 2024 intermediary costs for some transactions reached as much as 12%. Russia has tried to adapt to these constraints: in 2025, Reuters revealed “China Track”, a mechanism set up by major Russian banks that routes payments to and from China through intermediaries registered in third countries, bypassing Western banking infrastructure. Fees for using the mechanism were around 1% for import deals and 0.5% for export deals, but according to bankers interviewed by Reuters, it could be used only for non-sanctioned goods and counterparties registered in 11 designated Chinese provinces. Moscow is thus finding alternative ways to settle payments, but these workarounds do not remove the fundamental constraint: Russia can abandon the dollar as a settlement currency, but it cannot force Chinese banks to risk their access to the US financial system.

The imbalance in Moscow’s and Beijing’s bargaining positions is especially stark in energy. The Power of Siberia 2 gas pipeline, planned for over a decade, is strategically important to Moscow as a way of diverting to China some of the West Siberian gas once destined for Europe. In September 2026, Russia’s energy minister presented it under a new name: Power of Baikal. Yet the protracted negotiations show that political rapprochement does not guarantee Moscow more favourable commercial terms. Despite Russian officials’ claims of progress, on 1 September 2026 China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs gave no concrete answer, confining itself to a general statement about deepening energy cooperation on the basis of “mutual respect and mutual benefit”. Citing sources close to the talks, the South China Morning Postreported that the talks remain deadlocked over a wide gap between Moscow’s asking price and the price Beijing is willing to pay. This does not mean that China has no need for Russian gas. On the contrary, overland supplies contribute to Beijing’s energy security and import diversification. But China has more alternative suppliers, while Russia’s ability to quickly find another buyer on this scale after losing the European market is particularly limited. The key question in the negotiations is therefore not whether both sides are interested in the project, but how long each can afford to wait.

 

THE RUSSIAN FAR EAST: CHINA’S ECONOMIC PULL

Moscow’s efforts to develop the economy of the Far East are hampered by vast distances, a sparse population and weak links with the country’s main economic centres. The Far Eastern Federal District covers more than 40% of Russia’s territory but is home to just 5.4% of its population, and between 2018 and 2025 the region’s population fell by 3.4%. Moscow therefore faces a persistent challenge: attracting capital, developing infrastructure and creating economic incentives for businesses and residents. Proximity to China offers the region important economic opportunities. This is particularly evident in Amur Oblast, whose administrative centre, Blagoveshchensk, is separated from the Chinese city of Heihe only by the Amur River. The two cities are already linked by a road bridge opened in 2022, and a cross-border passenger cableway, described as the world’s first of its kind, is now scheduled to open in May 2027. Infrastructure development also reflects rapidly expanding economic ties: in the first nine months of 2025, China accounted for as much as 76% of Amur Oblast’s total foreign trade. Yet cross-border economic ties are not as one-sided as they might seem. Trade with Russia, for instance, is also vital for China’s border province of Heilongjiang: in 2025, Russia accounted for 76.3% of the province’s total foreign trade and around 87% of its imports, in which Russian oil, natural gas and other resources feature prominently.

China’s role is especially prominent in Primorsky Krai. In 2025, China accounted for more than 70% of the region’s foreign trade, and trade with China reached around $8 billion. By early 2026, Chinese investors had put around 6.2 billion roubles into the region – almost half of all foreign investment made there – and 66 Chinese-funded projects were operating under preferential investment regimes. Chinese companies are particularly visible in agriculture. According to 2024 figures from the Primorye authorities, Chinese companies were using up to a fifth of the region’s arable land, and the local authorities were prepared to offer Chinese investors around 30,000 additional hectares for growing rice.

Yet China’s expanding economic activity in the Russian Far East also has a sensitive historical backdrop. Russia has long harboured fears of possible Chinese expansion, and there have been repeated public warnings of the “colonisation of Siberia” through Chinese companies’ activities and mass Chinese migration. Such fears, however, have not always matched the real extent of Chinese involvement. As early as 2020, Viktor Larin of the Russian Academy of Sciences revealed a wide gap between forecasts of Chinese expansion and actual conditions and trends. Although economic ties have strengthened noticeably since 2022, data from Khabarovsk, at least, show no mass settlement of Chinese citizens: a 2025 migration study notes that in 2023 they made up only about 0.08% of the city’s population.

Fears of Chinese expansion are not confined to migration; they are amplified by the two countries’ complicated border history. A good illustration is Bolshoy Ussuriysky Island near Khabarovsk, whose division was agreed only in 2004, with the settlement of the entire border completed in 2008. Today the island has become a shared economic development project: a joint China–Russia statement of May 2026 provides for speeding up construction of a new border crossing, while acknowledging that negotiations on regulating navigation around the island have yet to be concluded. Still, the formal settlement of territorial disputes has not erased historical memory or nationalist sentiment. In Chinese public discourse, the territories ceded to the Russian Empire under the 19th-century Treaties of Aigun and Peking are still associated with the era of “national humiliation”. Such sentiment surfaced again in 2026, when the participation of Chinese schoolchildren in Victory Day events in Vladivostok drew criticism on Chinese social media, with some commentators recalling Russia’s role in China’s historical territorial losses. These issues are sensitive on the Russian side too: in 2025, Primorye Governor Oleg Kozhemyako publicly criticised what he described as a historical narrative circulating in China, which holds that present-day Primorsky Krai belonged to China until the 1860 Treaty of Peking, regarded in China as unjust, and called for a stronger Russian narrative of the region’s history.

Interestingly, historical grievances do not mean that attitudes towards China in the Far East are purely negative. On the contrary, a Levada Center survey shows that Far Eastern residents view China even more favourably than people in many other Russian regions. Closer direct contact may contribute to this: according to the survey, almost half of the region’s residents have visited China, compared with about 6% of Russians nationwide. However, the survey again highlighted widespread public concerns about the risk of Russia becoming China’s “raw-materials appendage”, unfavourable terms for energy exports and China’s limited willingness to share advanced technology. Fears of possible territorial claims also persist, fuelled by historical memory and the obvious gap between the two countries’ economic and demographic weight. This mix of favourable attitudes and anxiety about dependence also comes through in Levada Center focus groups: some participants worry that if Russia fails to develop its own industry and technology, China could come to dictate the terms of cooperation and turn Russia into a “vassal”.

The region’s growing economic dependence on China is also driven by Moscow’s own decisions on developing the Far East. The regime for international advanced development territories, in force since 2026, offers foreign investors long-term tax breaks, more favourable operating conditions and guarantees of regulatory stability for up to 15 years. Investors’ commercial information also enjoys special protection. Speaking to Xinhua in January 2026, Alexei Chekunkov, Russia’s Minister for the Development of the Far East and Arctic, said that China was the leading foreign investor in projects implemented under the region’s preferential investment regimes and encouraged Chinese companies to take advantage of the new incentives. Among the planned projects is a joint agricultural demonstration zone in Primorye being developed by the Chinese company Jiabei Agriculture. The project focuses not only on growing crops but also on developing processing, storage and logistics facilities near the port of Sukhodol, with the output intended for export to Japan, South Korea and Southeast Asia. At the same time, Wu Demin, China’s Consul General in Vladivostok, stressed in September 2026 that Chinese companies expect a more stable regulatory environment, greater transparency and more efficient administrative services from Russia. This reveals mutual interests, but also where the two sides diverge: Russia seeks to harness Chinese capital and technology for its regional development, while Chinese companies seek to use Russia’s territory, resources and infrastructure for broader commercial operations. Such projects could help Russia generate more added value, but could also draw the local economy into supply and export chains in which the key commercial decisions are made outside Russia.

Despite growing trade and Moscow’s efforts to attract Chinese investment, industrial and infrastructure integration is not keeping pace. In a study published in 2026, Larin concluded that the rapid growth in trade after 2022 was driven mainly by new openings in the Russian market, while the scale of investment and industrial cooperation remains modest. In his assessment, there has also been no significant progress in implementing the previously planned Primorye-1 and Primorye-2 transport corridors. Chinese researchers also see Russia’s approach to regional security as an obstacle to deeper integration. A 2026 study in a Chinese academic journal cited one such obstacle to the development of transport networks: the mindset, long prevalent in the Russian Far East, that “security matters more than development” (安全重于发展). This highlights a key tension in Moscow’s policy: while seeking Chinese investment to develop the region, Russia must also balance its economic interests against security priorities and its aim of retaining control over strategically important infrastructure.

 

CHINA’S GROWING CLOUT FROM CENTRAL ASIA TO THE ARCTIC

China’s growing role in Central Asia and the Arctic affects Russia’s position in different ways. In Central Asia, Beijing is expanding direct economic, political and security ties with the states of the region, eroding some of the traditional advantages underpinning Moscow’s influence. The Arctic is a different story: Russia retains control over key infrastructure, but its drive to develop energy and transport projects is giving China more opportunities to gain a foothold in the region.

Central Asia: China takes root

In Central Asia, this shift is visible above all in trade and institutional cooperation. In 2025, China’s trade with the five countries of the region exceeded $100 billion for the first time, reaching $106.3 billion, and China became the region’s largest trading partner. Kazakhstan clearly shows how the structure of economic ties has changed: in 2025, China accounted for 19.2% of the country’s exports and Russia for 10.3%, while their shares of imports almost converged, at 29.2% and 29.7% respectively. An even more significant shift is under way at the institutional level. Between the first China–Central Asia summit in Xi’an in May 2023 and the second in Astana in June 2025, the cooperation format became significantly more institutionalised: its secretariat became fully operational, and 13 ministerial-level cooperation platforms were established. In Astana in 2025, China and the five Central Asian states signed the Treaty of Permanent Good-Neighbourliness and Friendly Cooperation, and their joint agenda now covers not only trade and transport but also strategic minerals, digital infrastructure, law enforcement and security.

For a long time, China’s and Russia’s roles in Central Asia could be summed up simply: Beijing focused primarily on economic ties, while Moscow retained the leading role in security. Today this characterisation is becoming less and less accurate. Russia still has significant military, political and institutional advantages in the region, including military bases in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, the Collective Security Treaty Organization and close ties with local political elites. But China no longer confines itself to financing economic projects. A 2026 study by the French Institute of International Relations (IFRI) shows that in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan Beijing is actively expanding cooperation with security institutions, strengthening ties with ruling elites and supplying technological and administrative solutions for border control, internal security and governance. There is no clear basis for claiming that China seeks to replace Russia, but Beijing is evidently stepping up the development of its own instruments of security influence, moving into areas where Moscow has traditionally held considerable sway.

Ambitious transport infrastructure projects are also reinforcing this process. The China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway, discussed for decades, finally moved into the construction phase at the end of 2024, and in summer 2026 work in Kyrgyzstan was already under way on a large scale. China is also backing the development of the Trans-Caspian transport corridor, which allows cargo to move between China and Europe, bypassing Russian territory. China’s National Development and Reform Commission presents these changes as transforming Central Asia from a geographically isolated region into a major Eurasian transport crossroads. Such projects are not inherently directed against Moscow: they primarily serve the economic interests of the region’s states themselves. Over time, however, the development of such alternatives could weaken one of Russia’s most important historical levers of influence – its role and clout along the main Eurasian transport routes.

It would be an oversimplification to see China’s growing role in Central Asia merely as a deliberate strategy of squeezing Russia out. The countries of the region are not passive spectators of competition between Beijing and Moscow: they themselves are expanding ties with China, Turkey, the EU and other partners in pursuit of greater economic and political freedom of choice. Russia still has considerable means of exerting political and security influence in the region, but Beijing’s direct ties with the Central Asian states and the development of alternative transport routes are eroding the exclusivity Moscow once enjoyed. Nevertheless, this competition has yet to escalate into a wider confrontation between China and Russia: the two countries remain bound by strategic interests, especially the aim of maintaining regional stability and limiting Western influence.

The Arctic: Russia still controls the gates, but Beijing is stepping ever further in

China–Russia relations play out differently in the Arctic. Moscow retains the decisive role in administering the Northern Sea Route along Russia’s Arctic coast, controls the key coastal infrastructure and operates the world’s largest fleet of nuclear-powered icebreakers. China, for its part, defined itself as a “near-Arctic state” (近北极国家) as early as its 2018 Arctic policy paper and introduced the Polar Silk Road initiative, seeking broader involvement in the region’s economy and governance. The two sides’ interests have never fully coincided. One fundamental difference concerns their visions of the Arctic’s future. Beijing seeks broader international participation in governing the region and using its transport routes, while Moscow sees the Northern Sea Route primarily as a national strategic corridor it is unwilling to lose control of. For Russia, then, China’s deeper involvement brings both extra economic opportunities and the need to control how much autonomy Beijing can gain in a strategically sensitive region.

Western sanctions and the financing and technological difficulties facing Russia’s Arctic projects are, however, gradually shifting this balance. In 2024, China and Russia set up a dedicated subcommittee on Northern Sea Route cooperation, which held its third meeting in August 2026. It oversees working groups on shipping development, navigation safety, and polar shipbuilding and technology. At a meeting with Russian presidential aide Nikolai Patrushev on 12 October 2026, Wang Yi stressed that the development goals of China’s Polar Silk Road and Russia’s Northern Sea Route were compatible, while underlining respect for the sovereignty and security of coastal states. This diplomatic approach allows both countries to highlight joint projects without giving up their differing priorities for Arctic governance. In 2026, for example, the Chinese company Sea Legend Shipping launched seasonal scheduled container services between China and Europe via the Northern Sea Route. By the end of September, all eight planned voyages had set sail. According to Rosatom, the volume of cargo transported between Chinese and Russian ports already reached around 5.4 million tonnes in 2025, or almost 15% of all Northern Sea Route cargo traffic. These developments show China moving from isolated shipping trials towards more organised involvement, though no permanent, year-round transport system exists yet.

At the same time, the economic prospects of the Northern Sea Route should not be overstated, at least for now. Although there has been much talk in recent years of the Arctic route potentially competing with the Suez Canal, in 2025 the Northern Sea Route as a whole carried around 37 million tonnes of cargo, of which only 3.2 million tonnes was transit between Asia and Europe. The rest consisted mainly of Russian domestic and export flows. The route also remains seasonal, costly and dependent on ice conditions and geopolitical circumstances. In an analysis published by Carnegie in September 2026, Mikhail Korostikov pointed out that the route’s current appeal stems partly from disruptions to other international routes rather than from any fundamental improvement in its economic competitiveness. For China, therefore, the Northern Sea Route is not yet a reliable alternative to the main trade routes.

The sanctioned Russian Arctic LNG 2 project shows how the terms of economic relations have changed. US and EU restrictions have severely hampered its financing, the supply of technology and sales of liquefied natural gas (LNG). These restrictions also hit Chinese companies themselves: at the end of 2023, Reuters reported that China’s CNPC and CNOOC, each holding a 10% stake in the project, had suspended their financing and offtake commitments because of the sanctions. China did not withdraw entirely, however: in 2025, it received 21 LNG cargoes from the project, and Russia’s Novatek reportedly offered Chinese buyers discounts of 30–40%. China’s importance went beyond buying the output: in July 2026, Chinese-made process modules needed to expand the project’s infrastructure arrived on Russia’s Kola Peninsula. The sanctions have not so much ended China’s involvement in the project as changed its form: some companies have suspended their commitments, while others continue to buy Russian gas at a discount or supply the equipment the project needs. Cooperation with China is becoming increasingly important for Moscow, but the terms of specific deals are shaped not only by the two countries’ strategic interests, but also by Chinese companies’ assessments of commercial benefit and sanctions risk.

China’s expanding role is also evident in security, an area traditionally far more sensitive for Moscow. The groundwork for security cooperation was being laid as early as 2023, when the China Coast Guard and the Border Service of Russia’s FSB signed a memorandum on cooperation in maritime law enforcement. In 2024, China Coast Guard vessels, operating together with Russian forces, entered the Arctic Ocean for the first time in the Coast Guard’s history. In their National Threat Assessment 2026, Lithuania’s State Security Department (VSD) and Defence Intelligence and Security Service (AOTD) note that by allowing Chinese military and coast guard vessels to operate in the Arctic, Russia is most likely making concessions to Beijing, while China seeks to strengthen its long-term military presence in the region. Although this does not yet amount to an independent or permanent Chinese military presence in the Russian Arctic, what matters is that Moscow has decided to give Beijing greater scope to operate in a region where Russia once tightly restricted the role of external security actors.

Central Asia and the Arctic show two different ways in which China’s role is growing. In the first case, Russia’s exclusivity is being eroded by Beijing’s independent cooperation with the states of the region and by the decisions of those states themselves. In the second, it is Moscow’s own economic and strategic needs that are opening up greater opportunities for China. In both cases, Russia retains considerable influence, and differences of interest have not so far developed into open confrontation. But the exclusive positions Russia once held are increasingly difficult to take for granted.

 

CONCLUSIONS: THE LIMITS OF THE PARTNERSHIP AND THEIR UNEQUAL COST

The FSB’s instruction to counter Chinese intelligence activity without damaging bilateral relations reveals an important feature of this partnership: even serious mutual mistrust need not prevent cooperation in a range of areas. China’s market, technology and financial channels help Moscow adapt to Western sanctions, while Beijing values Russia not only as an energy supplier but also as a significant military and diplomatic partner in its competition with the US. Both countries share an interest in curbing the influence of the US and its allies in international politics. As a result, disagreements over specific projects and their terms have yet to outweigh both countries’ interest in preserving the partnership.

Yet the benefits of cooperation do not mean that both countries depend equally on its continuation. Russia still has some room to defend its economic interests, but as its access to alternative markets and supply channels has diminished considerably since 2022, its bargaining power in many areas has become more limited. China, for its part, can weigh the benefits of specific projects and the risk of sanctions more cautiously without losing its overall strategic interest in relations with Moscow. This inequality does not necessarily imply direct pressure from Beijing: it is deepened both by Russia’s own international position and by the commercial decisions of companies in both countries. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to conclude that a broader disruption of economic ties with China would hurt Moscow far more than Beijing.

Nor do the cases examined in this analysis justify equating China’s growing role with the systematic ousting of Russia. In the Far East, Moscow itself is seeking Chinese investment, although deeper economic cooperation is held back not only by practical obstacles but also by Russia’s security priorities and a lingering sense of mistrust. In Central Asia, Beijing is independently expanding ties with the states of the region, which in turn seek to reduce their dependence on any single partner. In the Arctic, China’s involvement is growing through close cooperation with Russia, which retains control over key infrastructure but increasingly relies on Chinese companies, investment and technological solutions for its energy and transport projects. China’s expanding influence is not driven by Beijing’s initiatives alone: in some areas, Moscow itself is giving China more room, as it finds its own plans and ambitions ever harder to realise without China’s market, capital or technology.

Individual disagreements have yet to trigger a wider political confrontation, but this does not mean that Beijing is prepared to cooperate with Moscow on any terms. Growing dependence pushes Moscow to maintain stable relations with Beijing, while China’s ability to pick and choose areas of cooperation allows it to avoid some unwanted commitments and to cooperate where doing so brings both political and economic benefits. What matters for Lithuania and Europe is that China, for all its caution over sanctions and its reluctance to back Moscow unconditionally, still plays a significant role in supplying Russia’s defence industry with the goods and technology it needs and in providing a market for Russian energy. The China–Russia partnership is not “unshaken by wind and storm”, but even with its clear limits it remains an important economic and technological lifeline that helps Moscow continue its war against Ukraine.

GSSC Associate Expert and Chief Policy Analyst at the Government Strategic Analysis Center (STRATA). Since 2021, he has been a PhD candidate at the Institute of International Relations and Political Science, Vilnius University. In 2023, Boruta was a visiting fellow at National Chengchi University in Taiwan under the Taiwan Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Taiwan Fellowship programme. He holds an MA in International Relations from Sichuan University, China, and a BA in East Asian Studies with a focus on China from the University of Central Lancashire, United Kingdom. His research focuses on the foreign and domestic policies of China and Taiwan, as well as cross-Strait relations, with particular attention to the dynamics of China–ASEAN relations and the strategic competition between Beijing and Taipei in Central and Eastern Europe.