Return of Lukashenka to Spotlight
On August 15 the whole world’s attention was focused on the President of the U.S. Donald Trump ahead of his meeting with Vladimir Putin in Alaska. Around the time Trump’s plane was in the sky on the way to Alaska, Telegram channel Pul Pervogo, also known as Lukashenka-affiliated page on the messenger, was the first to report that Trump had called Alyaksandr Lukashenka.[1] It is hard to say what was more surprising to political observers — the timing chosen for the call, or the chosen recipient. Since the 2020 unprecedented protests and their violent crackdown, Lukashenka has been largely isolated and disputed in the West as a head of state, as independent observers reported him losing the 2020 election to his rival Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya.[2] In addition to numerous human rights violations, Lukashenka has also been regarded as an accomplice in Russia’s war against Ukraine for allowing the Russian attack and providing infrastructure to its military forces,[3] and later playing a key role in displacement, indoctrination, and militarization of Ukrainian children.[4] Five years after the violent August 2020 crackdown, Lukashenka was once again back in the international media headlines.
The two sides similarly exchanged pleasantries but offered different agenda emphases when reporting on the substance of the call. Trump’s call elicited ambivalent reactions within democratic Belarusian discourse. First of all, for the first time in more than five years, Lukashenka was called “the highly respected President of Belarus”,[5] while just months ago U.S. officials had been denouncing the Lukashenka regime’s sham election using nearly the same wording.[6] On the other hand, Trump’s post on his media stressed that the call’s intention was to thank Lukashenka for the release of 16 [political] prisoners, highlighting that the release of another 1,300 was also discussed[7] — which has been one of the primary goals of the Belarusian democratic forces for five consecutive years. The latter were quick to react, expressing appreciation for the humanitarian effort, while at the same time calling for no change in policy until regime fully ends repressions,[8] and highlighting contacts with U.S. representatives on their end.[9] Belarusian analyst Valer Karbalevich labelled the call to Lukashenka and descriptors used by Trump as “a tremendous gift he [Lukashenka] likely has not even dreamt about”,[10] which is hard to disagree with considering the previous stance maintained by U.S. policymakers.
Divergent Emphases and Interpretations
Politicians and analysts were also quick to offer possible reasons for the call, ranging from the belief that Lukashenka’s knowledge of Putin might be useful for the administration prior to talks in Alaska[11] to allegations that the call might be connected to potential negotiations on the territory of Belarus.[12] Such explanations have certain rationale and reinforce the perception of Belarus as not entirely subsumed into Russia’s political orbit, though their plausibility is difficult to assess given the continued presence of Russian military on Belarusian soil and its diplomatic alignment with Russia. And while the full spectrum of motivations remains unknown, the discrepancy in reporting between the two callers was notable.
Lukashenka-linked Telegram initially did not report the subject of prisoners, instead remarking “issues in the bilateral agenda, regional topics and the situation in hot points, including Ukraine.”[13] Only around two hours later did it post a confirmation from Lukashenka’s press secretary that the political prisoner issue had also been discussed and that “work in this direction has been continuing.”[14] The same evening, Lukashenka held a conversation with Trump’s deputy special envoy John Coale, and while Lukashenka’s press service did not mention the political prisoner issue at all claiming that Lukashenka “repeatedly presented his point of view”,[15] Belarusian democratic media alleged that technicalities of the political prisoner release were discussed.[16] Notably, Trump’s message stressed the release of 1,300 political prisoners, later repeating this number again in another post[17] — not another dozens, which, leaving aside speculations on other possible intentions for the call — quite clearly suggests that Trump’s administration is setting as a goal not partial but a full release only which Trump’s administration could present as another achievement in conflict resolution.
The EU’s Inevitable Dilemma
Besides recognition and personal appraisal by the U.S. President, which undoubtedly bears high importance for autocrats, Belarusian authorities likely expect material dividends in exchange for the political prisoner release. Lukashenka personally, along with senior officials and state-linked entities, has been under U.S. sanctions since 2006. Subsequent U.S. presidents, including Donald Trump, consistently extended these measures. In the aftermath of the 2020 violent crackdown, the Trump administration expanded sanctions against Belarusian officials, with broader sectoral sanctions introduced later under the Biden administration. U.S. sanctions could be brought to the table to seek a decreased scope of imposition, arguably, the regime is more interested in reciprocal steps from European countries — particularly regarding the European airspace ban about which Minsk has hinted through its proxies. Prior to 2020, the EU was not only an important transit corridor for Belarus exports via Lithuanian (especially potash) and Latvian ports, but also remained one of the major trading partners even under deteriorated relations (the EU accounted for 10.5% of Belarus’ trade in 2024).[18] Thus, Lukashenka’s regime may be more concerned with European restrictions, using the U.S. call as part of that broader calculus.
The EU welcomed the recent release of political prisoners,[19] but member states maintained a hard line regarding talks about easing sanctions.[20] However, if or when the U.S. and Belarus move towards greater rapprochement in relations, the EU and the Baltic states in particular, as the ones who first restricted transit of Belarusian goods and who host Belarusian democratic leadership — will inevitably find themselves in a difficult dilemma: whether to continue pursuing a value-driven European approach backed by sanctions toward Belarus or to follow the U.S. direction should it take a significantly different shape and course, with the risk that current actions are not coordinated with European counterparts. While it might be tempting for some to draw parallels with the rapprochement of 2015–2019, which followed the release of six political prisoners prior to the 2015 presidential campaign, today’s situation differs drastically in terms of scope, nature, and the irreversible damage done to the democratically minded opponents of Lukashenka, making it particularly hard to turn a new page. Setting aside the context how the release of all political prisoners might be achieved, it would represent a humanitarian milestone. Yet the question remains whether the regime is ready for such a step, with or without European involvement, and whether it would truly mark a pause in repression.
Institutionalised Control and Repression
In the last five years, Belarusian human rights defenders have recorded more than 100,000 known cases of repression, including around 4,000 people recognised as political prisoners,[21] with today’s number remaining at approximately 1,200.[22] Many of those 4,000 have been freed only after serving the full sentences, with only less than 400 having been “pardoned” by Lukashenka. Eight political prisoners died in detention. [23] In this context, the achievement of release of any number of political prisoners is significant, but the question remains whether Lukashenka would be ready to release all remaining prisoners, and whether the repression machine built over decades and evolved in the last five years could be slowed down.
Against the hopes of those repressed and prosecuted, there have been no strong indications of the regime’s readiness to pause or limit repression. After the U.S.-backed release of Siarhei Tsikhanouski and others following the visit of the U.S. President’s special envoy Keith Kellogg in June, the next month, human rights defenders recorded 64 new cases of politically motivated repression, including new detentions.[24] On the contrary, the regime in recent years has institutionalized and “legalized” repression in the eyes of the domestic public — particularly among civil servants — by introducing laws and regulations proclaiming opponents and free media as “extremist,” conducting “trials in absentia,” liquidating almost 2,000 officially registered NGOs[25] and forcing to exile up to 200,000 Belarusians,[26] whose safe return back to Belarus is also unclear. All recent changes within the regime have elevated the role of law enforcement in the political structure of the state, and which likely would not serve as advocates for, as they say, “unscrewing nuts” (loosening control). The regime embraced political unpredictability in 2020 and is likely to continue exercising strict control moving forward in relation to any developments.
Arguably unexpectedly for the regime in 2020, the primary driving force was self-organized groups of protesters rather than politicians. Those groups were the last standing protesters, organizing local marches across Minsk and other cities when repression was peaking, and most political leaders had been forced into exile or imprisoned. In 2022, the second year of mass repression, there were still people who stood up against Russian aggression publicly or underground, including the so-called “railway partisans” and citizens reporting Russian military activity. The unexpected turn of events in 2020, and the self-organized, underground nature of regime opposition, likely continues to be perceived as a threat by the regime, primarily due to its unpredictability. In these circumstances, the regime is likely to continue exerting pressure so as not to create any signs of perceived weakness or windows of opportunity. This suggests why the authorities are unlikely to scale down the level of repression unless they establish new pillars to ensure broad and uncontested support for the regime and a viable succession strategy in the longer term — something they arguably designed but failed to achieve through the “constitutional referendum”.
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Whether all political prisoners will be released soon and at once — and whether the fiercest opponents will be included or released gradually — will depend largely on both the continued symbolic gestures and rhetoric of the U.S., along with possible material benefits proposed to Lukashenka, while this in turn will require coordination of U.S. actions with the EU and the democratic forces in exile. It is plausible that Lukashenka may agree to this step even without clear prospects of easing sanctions from the EU side, hoping that rapprochement with the U.S. alone would represent a significant change in the status quo of the past five years and could eventually influence at least some individual EU member states. At the same time, it would be naive to believe that the Kremlin would have no role to play or would remain a silent observer if such a release were to take place. Ultimately, the fate of Belarus’ political prisoners is likely to remain entangled with broader questions of power, legitimacy, and influence, shaped by the interplay of multiple actors.
