The Fusion of Centralization and De-centralization
Analyses of China’s governance often fixate on political centralization, portraying the system as a “one-man show” dominated by President Xi Jinping. Since taking office in 2012 and securing an unprecedented third term, Xi has consolidated exceptional decision-making authority and positioned himself as the chief architect of policy across nearly all strategic domains. A key tool in this consolidation has been the expansion of Leading Small Groups (LSGs) – informal yet highly influential coordination bodies within the Party-state apparatus. Under Xi’s leadership, at least 29 new LSGs have been created, some institutionalized as Party commissions, with the most consequential chaired directly by Xi.
Yet, Xi’s political dominance operates alongside a functional necessity of governing a vast nation: one that relies on ministries, provinces, and other bureaucratic actors to translate broad ideological slogans and strategic visions into concrete policies. In practice, these subnational and grassroots actors interpret central guidance, adapt it to local conditions, and execute it on the ground, revealing a more nuanced dimension of China’s system: selective decentralization in administration and economic management.
Before 2012, this balance was captured by economist Chenggang Xu’s concept of Regionally Decentralized Authoritarianism (RDA), in which a unified political hierarchy transmitted central directives vertically, while granting local governments economic autonomy. This structure created strong performance-based incentives for local officials, encouraging experimentation, adaptation, and region-specific policy design.
Since Xi’s rise, however, scholars, including Xu, argue that China has rebalanced sharply toward re-centralization in political and administrative spheres. The emerging model, which Xu terms Regionally Administered Totalitarianism (RADT), retains local governments as key implementers but narrows their autonomy through tighter ideological discipline, intensified oversight, and stricter central scrutiny. Decentralization persists as an operational necessity in governing a vast and diverse country, yet the room for local initiative, innovation, and discretionary adaptation has markedly contracted.
Dual Governance Tensions in China’s Biotech Ascent
Within this evolving governance framework, it is the biotechnology sector that has emerged not only as a beneficiary of Beijing’s centralized resource mobilization coupled with selective decentralization but also as a critical testing ground for the boundaries of local innovation. Guangdong province – especially Guangzhou’s Huangpu District, a foremost hub of China’s biotech industry – exemplifies the practical workings of this hybrid governance model. Here, the lingering regulatory, fiscal, and administrative autonomy traditionally associated with RDA endures, yet it increasingly functions within the tightening ideological and security constraints emblematic of RADT.
Under the RDA logic, Guangdong has adopted agile policies to expedite drug approvals and foster innovation, including the “White List” program, the Drug Registration Guidance Workstation, and “Green Channel” inspections. Fiscal autonomy has enabled dedicated investment funds, subsidies, and startup guarantees, nurturing a competitive biotech ecosystem that is both cost-effective and highly efficient. Administrative decentralization has further supported innovation through targeted talent recruitment, housing subsidies, and close collaboration between hospitals and industry – resulting in clinical trial and drug procurement timelines that outpace national averages and international standards.
Together, these advantages have propelled Chinese firms such as Legend Biotech, Akeso Biopharma, and 3Sbio to develop breakthrough therapies in oncology and cell treatment, achieving performance metrics that rival or even exceed global benchmarks. High-profile deals, such as Pfizer’s $1.25 billion partnership with 3Sbio, highlight the growing international recognition of China’s biotech capabilities, marking a shift from its image as a manufacturing base to that of an emerging innovation leader.
Yet, these local initiatives now function under stringent ideological scrutiny consistent with RADT. Guided by slogans such as “self-reliance in science and technology,” “dual circulation,” and “technological sovereignty,” they face heightened oversight and national security demands. Clinical approvals and foreign partnerships must comply with biosecurity mandates, data sovereignty laws, and intellectual property protections. Consequently, several international collaborations have stalled due to central concerns over genomic data sharing and cross-border risks.
This tightening of control is institutionalized through local branches of the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC), which oversee biotech data flows alongside broader internet governance. Provincial genomics databases are now subject to rigorous scrutiny under the 2021 Data Security Law and the Biosecurity Law, which restrict the export and third-party access to sensitive biological and health data. Biotech parks, once relatively autonomous in forging international partnerships, must now navigate a complex web of compliance requirements framed by often ambiguous national security thresholds.
Moreover, this increasing political oversight is reinforced by the intensified anti-corruption campaign under Xi Jinping. For example, in July 2024, Zhou Yawei, former Party secretary of Huangpu District, was investigated for serious disciplinary violations – highlighting that officials overseeing strategic innovation zones are now held to stringent standards. This crackdown on bureaucratic excess and administrative overreach reflects Beijing’s broader commitment to cultivating a disciplined, ideologically aligned cadre of local governance.
Conclusion: Navigating the Paradox
Guangdong’s biotech ascent encapsulates the core paradox of Xi-era governance: a system determined to consolidate political authority and enforce strict ideological discipline, yet still dependent on carefully managed decentralization to generate innovation from below. In theory, these imperatives can be mutually reinforcing. In practice, they often collide, producing tensions that risk hardening into structural constraints on China’s long-term capacity for high-tech advancement in strategic fields such as semiconductors, artificial intelligence, and biotechnology.
The drive for centralized discipline and oversight, already felt through sweeping regulatory crackdowns and shifting policy directives, has cast a chilling shadow over an increasingly fragile private sector. What once resembled a delicate balancing act is edging toward a sledgehammer approach, further eroding entrepreneurial confidence. This carries a double cost: the private sector is not only essential for producing technological breakthroughs in strategic technology domains, including biotechnology, but also for sustaining livelihoods – an especially urgent priority amid rising unemployment and slower economic growth.
How Beijing resolves this governance paradox will shape its ability to reduce reliance on foreign technology, secure global leadership in high-tech industries and leverage its dominance to influence global supply chains. At the same time, it will also determine the resilience of the social contract between state and society – one that hinges on the promise of both national strength and economic opportunity.
