Analysing international policy processes and Lithuania’s role in them
Hot take Aug 10, 2026

Recap: The Emerging Global Security Environment: Implications for Europe and the Indo-Pacific. A view from Australia

Photo source: GSSC Archive
Summary

This is a summary of the discussion at the GSSC with Dr. Alan Dupont and Glenn Barry of the Cognoscenti Group, moderated by Simona Merkinaite, the Senior Area Manager at GSSC.

Dr. Alan Dupont AO is the founder and Chief Executive Officer of the Cognoscenti Group, a political and strategic risk consultancy. Dr. Dupont has held many board and advisory positions in government and the corporate sector including with the Commonwealth and Northern Territory governments, the Asia Society, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Outcomes Australia and CQS – a prominent UK based hedge fund. He has advised several Australian ministers of defence and foreign affairs.

Glenn Barry is a Senior Associate at the Cognoscenti Group, with expertise in Indo-Pacific region having served with the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) in the Australian embassies in Jakarta, Phnom Penh, Port Moresby and Suva. In the latter half of his diplomatic career, he developed considerable expertise in nuclear weapons non-proliferation culminating in a four-year posting to the Australian Embassy in Vienna where he worked in close collaboration with the International Atomic Energy Agency.

The international system is undergoing a profound transformation characterized by intensifying geopolitical competition, weakening confidence in established institutions, and growing uncertainty regarding the future role of the United States. The relative stability that defined much of the post-1945 period is increasingly giving way to a more fragmented and contested strategic environment.

Three interconnected developments are particularly significant. First, the erosion of the post-war order has accelerated as major powers increasingly challenge existing norms and institutions. Second, strategic competition between the United States and China is emerging as the defining feature of international politics. Third, regional security dynamics in Europe and the Indo-Pacific are becoming increasingly interconnected, requiring greater cooperation between allies and partners across both regions.

The implications of these trends are substantial. Countries can no longer assume that economic interdependence will guarantee stability, nor can they rely exclusively on traditional security arrangements. Strategic resilience, diversified partnerships, and enhanced defense preparedness are becoming essential elements of national security policy.

 

A More Fragmented International Order

The international order established after World War II rested on a combination of liberal democratic governance, open markets, international institutions, and U.S. strategic leadership. Although challenged periodically throughout the Cold War, the system maintained a relatively stable equilibrium and provided a predictable framework for global economic growth and security cooperation.

Current developments suggest a transition toward a more competitive and less predictable environment. Armed conflicts have increased, geopolitical rivalries have intensified, and the effectiveness of multilateral institutions has come under growing pressure. Rather than representing a temporary disruption, these trends may reflect a longer-term shift toward a more historically familiar pattern of great-power competition.

This transition is creating new uncertainties for both large and small states. The weakening of established norms and institutions increases the importance of national resilience, regional cooperation, and credible deterrence.

 

China and the Future of Strategic Competition

China’s rise represents the most significant structural challenge to the current international order. Over the past four decades, China has transformed itself into a major economic, technological, military, and industrial power. Its influence is increasingly visible across global supply chains, infrastructure networks, financial institutions, and regional security arrangements.

Unlike traditional revisionist powers, China has benefited substantially from the existing international system while simultaneously seeking to reshape it. Rather than pursuing outright replacement of current institutions, Beijing often seeks to modify rules and norms from within while advancing its own strategic interests.

Two broad objectives appear to guide Chinese strategy. The first is the establishment of Chinese primacy within Asia. The second is the gradual emergence of a more China-centered international order over the longer term.

These ambitions are supported by sustained investments in military modernization, technological innovation, industrial capacity, and critical supply chains. At the same time, economic leverage increasingly serves as a strategic instrument, creating vulnerabilities for countries with high levels of dependence on Chinese markets.

 

Taiwan as the Primary Strategic Flashpoint

Taiwan remains the most significant potential trigger for a major-power conflict in the coming decade. The issue carries strategic, political, and symbolic importance for Beijing and is closely linked to broader narratives of national rejuvenation and territorial integrity.

The risk of military confrontation is heightened by several factors. China’s military capabilities continue to improve, uncertainty persists regarding external intervention, and both coercive and hybrid measures are increasingly employed to influence political decision-making and public opinion within Taiwan.

The coming years may represent a particularly sensitive period. Strategic calculations in Beijing, perceptions of American resolve, and regional military balances will all influence the likelihood of escalation.

A conflict over Taiwan would almost certainly extend far beyond the immediate region. The economic, technological, and security consequences would affect Europe, North America, and the broader international system. Given Taiwan’s central role in global semiconductor production and regional supply chains, disruption would have worldwide repercussions.

 

Constrains on PRC power

Despite its growing influence, China faces significant internal challenges that could affect its long-term trajectory.

Demographic decline represents one of the most serious structural constraints. China’s population began shrinking in 2022 for the first time in six decades, and projections by the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs suggest that the country’s working-age population will continue to contract significantly in coming decades (World Population Prospects 2024). With ultra-low fertility rates, China is expected to record the largest absolute population loss in the world. This raises concerns about labour shortages, rising dependency ratios, and slower long-term economic growth.

Economic pressures are also becoming more pronounced. Structural headwinds—including weak domestic demand, declining productivity growth, and high levels of debt—are expected to constrain future expansion. As noted by the World Bank, China’s long-term challenge is not sustaining growth alone, but successfully managing the transition from an investment and export-led model to a more balanced and innovation-driven economy (World Bank (2025), China Economic Update: Unlocking Consumption (June 2025); World Bank (2025), China Economic Update: Advancing Reforms, Enhancing Prospects (December 2025).

In addition, questions surrounding political succession and elite cohesion remain important considerations in assessing long-term stability.

These factors suggest that China’s rise should not be viewed as inevitable or linear. Authoritarian systems often appear strong externally while hiding significant internal fragilities. China’s long-term trajectory therefore remains uncertain despite its impressive capabilities.While China will remain a major power, its future development will likely be shaped by a combination of external competition and domestic constraints.

 

Japan’s Strategic Transformation

One of the most significant developments in the Indo-Pacific is Japan’s gradual departure from its traditionally restrained security posture. For decades, Tokyo informally capped defense spending at approximately 1 percent of GDP and maintained a doctrine focused almost exclusively on homeland defense. Since the adoption of its 2022 National Security Strategy, however, Japan has committed to increasing security-related spending to 2 percent of GDP by 2027, representing the largest defense buildup in the country’s post-war history. The government plans to allocate approximately ¥43 trillion between FY2023 and FY2027, an increase of more than 50 percent compared with the previous five-year defense plan. At the same time, Japan has begun acquiring long-range counterstrike capabilities, including Tomahawk cruise missiles and domestically produced stand-off weapons, marking a significant departure from its longstanding emphasis on purely defensive capabilities.

Growing concerns regarding China’s military modernization, North Korea’s nuclear capabilities, and uncertainty surrounding future U.S. commitments have encouraged Tokyo to increase defense spending, expand military capabilities, and deepen security partnerships.

This transformation is likely to have long-term implications for regional security. Japan is emerging as a more active strategic actor, investing in defense-industrial cooperation, advanced military technologies, and broader international partnerships.

The debate regarding nuclear deterrence and long-term strategic autonomy is also becoming more prominent across parts of Northeast Asia, particularly as regional security risks intensify.

 

Australia’s Strategic Outlook and Regional Security Architectures

The Indo-Pacific is witnessing the development of new security frameworks designed to complement existing alliances.

Australia increasingly sees itself on the front line of Indo-Pacific competition. Although geographically distant from Europe, Australia faces many of the same strategic challenges:

  • Dependence on alliances.
  • Exposure to economic coercion.
  • Concerns about military preparedness.
  • The need to increase defense spending.

Initiatives such as AUKUS and the Quad reflect efforts to strengthen technological cooperation, defense-industrial integration, supply-chain security, and strategic coordination among like-minded states. While differing in scope and purpose, these arrangements demonstrate a broader trend toward networked security cooperation.

Such frameworks are unlikely to replace traditional alliances but will increasingly serve as important mechanisms for addressing complex security challenges that span multiple domains.

 

Conclusion

The strategic environment facing both Europe and the Indo-Pacific is becoming more challenging, interconnected, and uncertain. Competition among major powers, questions regarding the future of the international order, and growing regional security risks require a reassessment of longstanding assumptions.

The most important policy challenge is not the management of any single crisis, but adaptation to a prolonged period of geopolitical competition. Success will depend on resilience, preparedness, diversified partnerships, technological competitiveness, and credible deterrence.

The Geopolitics and Security Studies Center (GSSC) is an independent, non-profit think-tank operating in Vilnius since 2006, focusing on the analysis of international policy processes and Lithuania’s role in them. The GSSC brings together experts in various fields, publishes analytical material, organises events, and carries out international and national projects. The Centre’s founders are the Government of the Republic of Lithuania and Vilnius University.