The Aftermath of the Hungarian Elections

On April 12, the opposition Tisza party achieved a landslide victory in the Hungarian elections, granting it a solid two-thirds majority in the new Hungarian parliament. As of now, it holds 136 of the 199 mandates, but once the votes cast at foreign representations are processed later in the week, Tisza is expected to gain an additional 2–3 mandates, as these votes are overwhelmingly cast for the opposition. Tisza received more than one million more votes than the governing Fidesz party, but due to the peculiarities of the electoral system – intentionally designed by Fidesz to heavily favor the winner – the difference in mandates is even more striking: as of now, Fidesz is set to receive merely 57 seats in parliament. Voter turnout also reached an all-time record in Hungarian history, approaching nearly 80%.

Despite uncertainty until the very last moment about whether the ruling Fidesz government would accept the election results – not least because, during election day, the pro-government media and Orbán himself began building a narrative about electoral fraud and alleged violent provocations by Tisza at polling stations – Viktor Orbán called Tisza’s prime ministerial candidate, Péter Magyar, to congratulate once the party’s victory became evident on election night. Whatever plans the Orbán government might have had, the record turnout seen during the day might have convinced the leadership not to go against the will of the people. A remark by Gergely Gulyás, Minister of the Prime Minister’s Office, just after the closing of the ballot stations stating on stage that the record-high voter turnout would guarantee unprecedented legitimacy for whoever wins the election, had already foreshadowed that the government would accept the outcome.

The clash of domestic and foreign policy agenda

Tisza consciously chose to largely ignore the question of foreign policy and instead focus on down-to-earth domestic political issues: the poor conditions of the Hungarian healthcare system and public services, economic stagnation, and the staggering level of corruption within the ruling elite, including Orbán and his close family.

Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Fidesz’s chosen domain has been foreign policy, particularly as, following the economic downturn caused by COVID-19, the Hungarian economy failed to bounce back. Orbán’s personal preferences likely also played a role. Orbán has gone to great lengths analyzing the changing world order in his regular summer university speeches in Băile Tușnad. For years, insiders have noted that the prime minister has outgrown the playing field of Hungarian domestic politics, increasingly finding it boring, and has set his sights on European politics. This probably also contributed to underestimating the opposition’s chances of winning the election in a system that heavily favored the ruling Fidesz party. He labeled Tisza as merely a digital political movement as recently as last summer, whereas in reality Péter Magyar has done tremendous legwork, personally touring every electoral district in Hungary and visiting small countryside towns and villages.

The return of Donald Trump to the presidency was celebrated by Fidesz almost as if it were their own victory. While the launch of Russia’s war against Ukraine initially surprised the Hungarian government, Orbán quickly recognized the opportunity in it. Although Fidesz would most likely have won the 2022 elections regardless, the campaign narrative warning that Hungary could be “dragged into the war” helped secure another two-thirds majority.

Orbán likely also saw something more in the war: another “2015 moment,” when he had anticipated that mass migration would cause serious societal tensions in Europe. Similarly, he appears to have expected that the prolongation of the war in Ukraine would lead to fatigue in the West. He seized the opportunity in 2024 to launch a “self-proclaim peace mission,” likely not because he believed in the prospects of peace, but rather to position himself as a peacemaker for the Hungarian electorate and potentially beyond. The turbulent international environment, combined with Trump’s return, created an opportunity to project competence in international politics in the absence of tangible domestic progress. This was reflected in Fidesz’s campaign slogan, “a safe choice,” which essentially reduced the election to a binary choice between war and peace, arguing that if Tisza were to win, Hungary – together with Europe – would sleepwalk into a war with Russia.

Foreign interference: alleged and actual

Toward the end of the campaign, the Orbán government not only depicted Ukraine as a threat and accused Kyiv of meddling in the Hungarian elections, but also appeared to actively provoke the Ukrainian leadership. The raid involving two Ukrainian armored vehicles was intended to build a case for alleged illegal Ukrainian support for Tisza, as well as to trigger a reaction from Volodymyr Zelensky that could provide a “grain of truth” to validate the narrative of a “Ukrainian threat.” The latter was achieved when Zelensky implicitly threatened Orbán over blocking the EU aid.

At the same time, more and more information emerged suggesting that Russia had plans to help keep Orbán in power, including providing informational support and potentially even organizing false-flag operations to tip the balance in his favor. While the extent of Russian interference remains unclear, it seems likely that early public warnings by former members of the Hungarian intelligence services and investigative journalists played a role in altering the calculus of Russian services by exposing actual or plausible plans. Among these, Russia expert András Rácz’s Facebook post about a hypothetical Russian false-flag operation targeting the TurkStream gas pipeline in Serbia proved strikingly prescient in light of the later uncovering of a plot against the pipeline. While the exact details remain unclear, the Serbian leadership reportedly showed little willingness to support a narrative of Ukrainian sabotage, instead quickly pointing out that the explosive device found was of American origin and that the perpetrators were of migrant background.

Meanwhile, the leaking of intercepted phone conversations between Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and his Hungarian counterpart Péter Szijjártó exposed the depth of Russia’s penetration into the Hungarian political elite, portraying Szijjártó as a loyal subordinate of Russian interests. This – independently of Tisza’s campaign – brought foreign policy to the forefront in the weeks preceding the elections, simplifying the stakes into a choice between East and West, Russia or Europe. The leak of these phone calls by Western intelligence services – an unprecedented move – also indicated that European allies had run out of patience with the Orbán government, and that repairing the relationship might be beyond the point of no return. The perceived likelihood that European allies might seek to deprive Hungary of its voting rights in the EU – potentially leading to a “Huxit” – alarmed even leading businessmen, who had good relationships with the Orbán government before, prompting them to publicly support Tisza in the last days of campaign.

Foreign policy will be high on the agenda

Despite Tisza’s focus on domestic issues during the campaign, the international significance of the Hungarian elections will require immediate action from Péter Magyar. One of the most pressing issues is the EU’s €90 billion loan package for Ukraine. In his first international press conference the day after the election, Magyar made it clear that his government would unblock the disbursement of the aid, but would not be willing to revise the opt-out negotiated by the Orbán government regarding Hungary’s contribution. As securing access to EU funds was a core campaign promise, Magyar will need to urgently negotiate the relevant conditions. To this end, he emphasized that his third foreign visit will be to Brussels, following visits to Warsaw and Vienna. The new government also appears interested in reviving cooperation within the Visegrád Group format, potentially even expanding it.

Magyar has also expressed openness to improving relations with Ukraine, firmly standing up for Kyiv’s sovereignty, rejecting calls for Ukraine to cede territory. At the same time, he conditioned deeper cooperation on resolving minority-related disputes. He is also expected to take a firm stance toward the Slovak government over the Beneš Decrees and the recent criminalization of their criticism.

More broadly, Magyar has pledged to break with the Orbán government’s foreign policy approach of cultivating personal ties and prioritizing regime interests and instead return to a more traditional diplomatic practice centered on representing Hungarian national interests, regardless of ideological sympathy or antipathy toward partners. This could result in a more predictable Hungarian foreign policy. At the same time, he has indicated continuity with the Orbán government’s stance on migration. With Russia, Magyar will seek pragmatic relations based on the geographical realities and Hungary’s dependency on oil and gas, but he has openly labeled Russia a security threat.

A rocky road back to competitive democracy

The main challenge for the new Magyar government will be dismantling the political system built by Orbán over the past sixteen years and creating the conditions for the return of genuine pluralistic multi-party democracy. The two-thirds majority provides the necessary legal means for such reforms. Magyar has already stated that they intend to introduce a limit of eight years for serving as prime minister, effectively preventing Orbán from returning to office. In his victory speech, he also called on the president to resign after inviting him to form the government, along with the president of the Supreme Court (Kúria), the head of the National Office for the Judiciary (OBH), the Prosecutor General, the president of the Constitutional Court, as well as the heads of the media authority, the State Audit Office (ÁSZ), and the Competition Authority (GVH). At the same time, Tisza will need to maintain the support of its highly heterogeneous voter base, while Fidesz is likely to preserve a more cohesive core electorate over the next four years. Ensuring the conditions for a stable return to competitive parliamentary democracy – rather than cyclical regime change every four years – will be a particularly difficult task after sixteen years of Orbán’s hybrid regime.