“Talks Without Surrender”: Hennadiy Maksak on Ukraine’s Dual Strategy | LFPR Vol. 44, 2026

This text is excerpted from Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review, Vol. 44 (2026).

As 2025 closes, Ukraine lives with two parallel truths. Russian missiles and drones still pound cities and energy infrastructure. Diplomatically, Kyiv signals readiness for talks that might yield a stable ceasefire, even as Moscow shows no sign of softening its maximalist aims. Hennadiy Maksak, executive director of the Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism,” discusses the country’s mood, President Zelenskyy’s leadership test, manpower strains, the drone war, a more complex relationship with Washington, and Europe’s role. His message: Ukraine is open to negotiations, but equally prepared for a long, grinding fight. Questions by Linas Kojala.

Linas Kojala: What is the mood in Ukraine at the end of 2025?

Hennadiy Maksak: It’s twofold. In the media and among officials, the line is that Ukraine is ready to be involved in negotiations and can propose formats that lead to a stable ceasefire, a preface to a wider agreement, even if we cannot immediately regain most of the occupied territories. That sums up 2025.

At the same time, everyone realises this is a long-term issue. We must prepare to be more autonomous over time, regardless of what partners decide. This is a war of attrition; for now, Ukraine may not recover all occupied territory.

On the societal level there is no collapse of morale. Despite total war from Russia attacks on civilian infrastructure and steady casualties, society still stands strong. Some dynamics are weakening, yes. Polls show a larger share than in 2022 favour negotiations, but not at the expense of Ukraine’s core interests. You can hear that in President Zelenskyy’s speeches: more people want talks, but on our terms.

Editor’s note: Gallup, July 2025 – sixty-nine percent support beginning negotiations “as soon as possible,” up from twenty-two percent in 2022; support for “fight until victory” fell from seventy-three percent to twenty-four percent.

Linas Kojala: President Zelensky remains the face of Ukraine’s wartime leadership, but sustaining trust is harder as the war drags on. The Kyiv International Institute of Sociology puts public trust in him at about sixty percent as of October 2025 – down from over eighty percent in 2022 but steady this year. Does he still have the authority and public confidence to balance readiness for talks with the will to keep fighting?

Hennadiy Maksak: He’s still the leader to follow. He must show constant readiness to adapt to the war’s dynamics and match that with Ukraine’s economic recovery. He keeps seeking partner help, speaks about ceasefire options, and pushes to strengthen Ukraine’s defence capability. He also has to convince partners that domestic institutions are strong enough to continue reforms.

He must reflect society, while staying firm with partners and meeting public expectations.

Editor’s note: IMF baseline for 2025 projects plus two point zero percent GDP growth and twelve point six percent inflation, modest but positive under wartime conditions.

Linas Kojala: In Western discussions, manpower shortages come up constantly, often framed as a limit to Ukraine’s staying power. There’s also a moral dimension: Ukrainians are the ones fighting and dying. How do you see this debate, both in military terms and in how it’s perceived abroad?

Hennadiy Maksak: It’s an extremely difficult challenge. Only two countries in Europe truly know what large-scale mobilisation means today: Russia and Ukraine. Ukraine is adapting, but the situation is far from ideal.

Senior commanders are targeting different social groups, including eighteen- to twenty-four-year-olds who are not formally obliged to serve but can be included through targeted programmes. Volunteering isn’t at 2022 levels, yet people still enlist. One option is short-term service: one-year contracts with comparatively high pay and bonuses. For some frontline roles, infantry or FPV operators, one-off remuneration for eighteen- to twenty-four-year-olds can reach UAH 1,000,000 (approx. €23,500, Nov. 2025). Unlike others who serve three years or more with no clear end in sight, these contracts finish after a year, making them far more appealing.

Recruitment is evolving; there is no single fix. This issue will also surface across Europe: as hybrid threats rise and defence budgets grow, societies will have to confront manpower questions and the social contract behind them.

Linas Kojala: Many analysts point to drones and unmanned systems as decisive on the frontlines, FPV swarms, long-range loitering munitions and fibre-optic drones. Is the drone war now the key factor?

Hennadiy Maksak: It’s vital but not everything. Manpower remains core. Russia still faces enormous casualties, but it keeps a surplus of contract recruitment. Let’s be frank: we might be innovative, but Russia can scale up technologies faster. In drone kill zones, there’s a Russian zone too. Fiber-optic and other drones impose high costs on Ukraine.

We’ll need new approaches constantly to compensate – and manpower remains core. FPV drones still need crews: pilots and technical staff. These crews near the frontline are prime targets for Russia, because they know how important drone pilots are, sometimes even more than infantry. So both unmanned and manned are important.

Linas Kojala: Over the past year, Ukraine’s relationship with the U.S. has become more complex – shifting priorities in Washington, questions about long-term support. Yet U.S. backing remains crucial. How has the relationship evolved in 2025, and what can Washington realistically do to shape a ceasefire or peace process?

Hennadiy Maksak: We learned a lot. First, there’s no long-term policy that stays the same; things can change overnight. Even when a decision is announced, it may not be implemented. There were cases where high-level Ukrainian delegations came to Washington and were surprised by outcomes that didn’t match expectations. We’re still strategic partners, but we learned how to do more ourselves.

Second, focus on the triangle: no solution is possible without European partners. The NATO PURL project, which involves European funding for U.S. weaponry purchases, is a good example; even in a bilateral relationship, there’s a European component. After the Alaska meeting, President Zelenskyy immediately contacted European leaders, which facilitated a positive meeting at the White House.

But let’s be honest: without the U.S. we don’t have a real perspective for peace negotiations. To talk to Russia, you need an actor with big leverage. The U.S. is the only one today. Maybe China in the future, but not now. The U.S. has the toolkit to reach the Kremlin and bring them to a table in different formats – yes, sometimes with some hypocrisy or insufficient understanding of the Kremlin, but these attempts can yield results.

Linas Kojala: Much attention has focused on long-range strike systems, including Tomahawk missiles. Are Tomahawks the key ask from Washington?

Hennadiy Maksak: We face total war from Russia; they strike across all of Ukraine. Our strategy is two-way. First, protect civilians – for that we need sophisticated air defence. We lack batteries, interceptors, other equipment; we depend on the U.S. for that. They produce Patriot systems and components. Some European alternatives aren’t the same scale, even if very important. So air defence is essential.

Second, we need a long arm. We must hit strategic Russian sites – economic and military. We have Flamingo, Neptune and other missiles, but scale matters, also production pace, range, accuracy. Tomahawk is a tested technology, part of a deterrence system. Russia is signalling to the U.S. that it’s concerned about the Tomahawk debate; that’s a good sign. But even if a decision is announced, we need practical deliveries – we’ll see how it goes. That’s point two.

Three, other leverage should be used. U.S. sanctions on Rosneft and Lukoil were significant, done with European partners. They can have a tangible impact. It’s important Europeans and Americans coordinate to make sanctions more effective.

Linas Kojala: Europe has provided wide-ranging military, financial and humanitarian support. Where does it matter most now: the battlefield, sanctions and reconstruction, or shaping a political vision for a fair peace?

Hennadiy Maksak: Wartime diplomacy has many layers: sanctions, macro-financial support, military support, justice and war-crime prosecution, recovery, humanitarian aid. Put it all together and European partners are the biggest contributors across those issues. In dialogues, Americans tend to speak of “stable peace,” Europeans of “stable and fair peace.” It’s a broader view.

Many Russian crimes weren’t punished before – look at Georgia in 2008. We need a clear signal that all crimes will be prosecuted and that justice will be delivered.

Linas Kojala: Finally, the Baltics. If Ukraine is weakened or pushed into an unfavourable ceasefire, how immediate is the threat to the Baltics and Europe’s eastern flank?

Hennadiy Maksak: We view Russia through the same lens. Ukraine was first in line – aside from Georgia. If Ukraine falls because of insufficient allied solidarity, allies themselves will be second in line. The Baltics understand that perfectly. There are no illusions about the Kremlin – politically or militarily. The only question is timing, if deterrence fails.   

Read the full publication here.