On 25 December, another suspected Russian sabotage action against the infrastructure linking NATO countries took place, when the Estlink 2 electricity cable between Estonia and Finland was cut. This is not the first incident in recent years involving submarine infrastructure in the Baltic Sea. In November 2024, internet connections between Germany and Finland, between Lithuania and Sweden were disrupted, and in October 2023, the Balticconnector gas pipeline, also connecting Estonia and Finland, was damaged. Damaging communications and transmission infrastructure, likely carried out at the behest of the Kremlin, has become a trend in the region in recent years, raising questions: What are Russia’s possible aspirations and what are the implications for the Baltic Sea region?
Ships and anchors: is the Baltic Sea becoming a silent front in the Russia’s war against Ukraine

Gas pipeline and internet cables breaches
Apart from blowing up the Nord Stream 1 and 2 gas pipelines in October 2022, the first in a series of incidents involving communications infrastructure in the Baltic Sea was recorded on 8 October 2023. The Balticconnector, the only pipeline connecting Finland and Estonia at that time, was disrupted, as later confirmed by Chinese officials themselves, when the Chinese (Hong Kong)-registered ship Newnew Polar Bear sailed past and dragged its anchor across the gas pipeline. According to Beijing, this was an accident caused by a storm, not a deliberately committed act of sabotage. After the incident, the pipeline was under repair until April 2024, so it could not be used to transport gas to Finland during the winter season, which is the most sensitive period for gas supplies. During this period, Finland’s gas supply was helped by the liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminal recently commissioned in the country.
Photos: An anchor found and pulled out near the Balticconnector pipeline; pipeline damage. Sources: Finnish National Bureau of Investigation and Finnish Border Guard
The following two incidents in the Baltic Sea were recorded more than a year later, when on 17–18 November 2024, two telecommunications (internet) optical connections were disrupted during the incident: the BCS East West Interlink linking Lithuania and Sweden (Gotland Island) and the C-lion1 cable connecting Finland and Germany. As reported by Telia Lietuva and the companies Cinia, the cables had already been fixed by 28 November. It is suspected that the breach was caused by the Chinese-registered merchant ship Yi Peng 3, which dragged its anchor over two objects located approximately 100 km apart. The vessel was only temporarily stopped in Danish waters and it was only a month later that officials from Germany, Denmark, Sweden and Finland were allowed to board the vessel for observation while the Chinese officials who arrived together with them carried out an investigation that lasted several hours. A few days after this inspection, the Yi Peng 3 continued its voyage towards its destination in Egypt.
Damage to the Estlink 2 cable
The most recent incident occurred on 25 December 2024, when the tanker Eagle S, according to the currently prevailing version, also dropped its anchor and dragged it through the Estlink 2 power link, thereby disrupting it. The ship is registered in the Cook Islands, a country that, along with countries such as Panama and Liberia, is considered a flag of convenience country. Such countries have, for example, lower taxes, less strict safety and other regulatory standards, which makes it beneficial for companies to register their vessels there. The vessel itself is formally owned by a company operating in India, Peninsular Maritime India, which provides ship and crew charter services.
Unofficially, the Eagle S is suspected of belonging to the Russian “Shadow Fleet”. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the European Union and the United States imposed sanctions on Russian oil exports, and Moscow has taken steps to circumvent them. According to the European Parliamentary Research Service, Russia operates the shadow fleet by obscuring the true details of its crew, ownership, management and other details as intricately as possible. This is done to conceal the true origin of oil cargoes, while using practices such as transferring oil from sanctioned vessels to unsanctioned ones at sea, falsifying the position and data of vessels, and other methods. The most common features of the shadow fleet are mainly old, technically unsound, poorly maintained vessels which, due to their age and inadequate maintenance, are themselves a maritime safety hazard. This is why these vessels are registered in convenience flag countries that have lower safety requirements.
Map: Map of NATO countries’ submarine communications infrastructure in the Baltic Sea and damage caused to it during the last two years. Compiled by the author based on the following sources: submarine cables, telecommunications cables, gas pipelines
Note: Due to the often high concentration of telecommunications (internet) cables in one place, the map shows their approximate, essential routes.
The Baltic Sea is a convenient place for causing damage
What do all these incidents have in common? First of all, they all are related to the dropping of ship anchors in areas with submarine infrastructure. Typically, when a vessel drops its anchor, these anchors reach the bottom of the sea on a long chain, potentially several hundred metres long. Once dropped, the anchors drag on the bottom of the sea until they are sufficiently to penetrate the seabed to stop the vessel’s movement. It is recommended that ships drop anchors in waters up to about 80 metres deep, as deeper waters pose greater risks. Although the chains themselves are considerably longer, the extra length of the chains is not to reach greater depths, but to maintain the stability of the vessel’s position.
The Baltic Sea is relatively shallow, with an average depth of just 52 metres, making most of its bottom suitable for anchoring large ships, at least in terms of depth. Accordingly, while this may mean easier infrastructure installation compared to other seas around the world, the submarine infrastructure in the Baltic Sea is also more easily accessible and vulnerable to external factors.
Secondly, all the incidents involve the use of namely merchant vessels, on quite frequently used routes. At the same time, these vessels are not directly linked to Russia in any way: none of them is registered in Russia or directly owned by a Russian company. Certain circumstances suggest links, such as the fact that all the vessels were sailing from Russian ports at the time of the incidents, that some of the vessels had Russian citizens on their crews or, as in the case of the latter incident, that the vessel is linked to the Russian shadow fleet.
Between war and peace: the “grey zone” conflict
Assuming that all or at least some of these incidents did not take place without the Kremlin’s interference, such events fit well into the definition of “grey zone” conflicts. This describes a transient situation in state competition that occurs between peace and armed conflict. This type of conflict is characterised by a high degree of uncertainty, limited attribution of responsibility, and the use of various unconventional means of warfare. A simple example of grey zone conflicts would be cyberattacks carried out by non-state actors with the indirect support of some country. In the case of damage to the infrastructure in the Baltic Sea, it is the use of third countries to cause damage to Western infrastructure without provoking an overwhelming, clearly attributable negative response.
However, finding clear blame in a grey zone is difficult. Technically, in the case of all the three vessels, it might have been an unintentional incident – the ships were simply anchoring in shallow seas with high shipping activity. With such cover, it is doubtful that Russia would not directly or indirectly admit its involvement, as this would expose it to risk a greater response. The challenge for the West, therefore, is to claim and attribute blame to one side or another. However, the above circumstances indicating the vessels’ links to Russia do not allow regarding these as merely inadvertent incidents. Furthermore, the location, frequency and timing: Can it be all viewed as a mere coincidence that merchant ships are dropping anchor exactly in the place of critical infrastructure, that they disrupt communications of countries with which Russia is in conflict over its invasion of Ukraine, and that they have been occurring frequently, although such incidents had not virtually happened in the Baltic Sea ever before?
What is the impact of these incidents on the region?
Assuming Russia’s involvement in these incidents, one may ask what is the benefit to Moscow? In general, direct damage to the infrastructure is not necessarily severe, and in some cases (as in the case of the internet cables in November) can be repaired fairly quickly. However, repairing damage to gas and electricity infrastructure may take longer and be more expensive, while the indirect economic damage is even greater. For example, it has already been mentioned above that the interruption of the Balticconnector gas pipeline prevented Finland from securing its natural gas supply through the Baltic countries in the winter. This had an impact on gas prices: according to the GET Baltic gas exchange, in September 2023, the gas price on the Lithuanian trading floor was EUR 41.31/MWh, while that in Finland was EUR 42.85/MWh (that is EUR 1.54/MWh higher). In December of the same year, already after the pipeline was damaged, the gas price in Lithuania was EUR 39.45/MWh, while that in Finland was EUR 59.72/MWh (that is EUR 20.27/MWh higher). In January 2024, the gas price in Finland was almost twice as high as in Lithuania. After the pipeline was repaired, from May 2024 onwards, the prices levelled off again, with differences between the countries of just about EUR 1/MWh to EUR 2/MWh.
Another important impact is the economic-social one: although it is difficult to fully attribute Russia as the culprit based on the evidence in the public domain, this is often considered to be the main scenario. It is not necessary for the Kremlin to confirm or deny itself as the culprit, but this already poses a threat and causes panic for part of the public in Western countries. The impact of fear, insecurity and other uncertainties on the economy can be difficult to measure directly. However, this does affect, for example, consumer confidence, credit ratings and the willingness of businesses to invest in the region. The effect of the war in Ukraine alone caused the international credit agency S&P Global Ratings to downgrade Lithuania’s credit rating from A+ to A this year, with similar downgrades for Latvia and Estonia. The rationale behind these downgrades is that the war presents a geopolitical risk to the region in the medium term and is expected to impact public finances, economic growth, and competitiveness in the affected countries. Cable cuts in the region, even without a clearly identified culprit, can create the impression of an insecure, war-affected area for outsiders and may heighten feelings of insecurity and helplessness among the populations of the Baltic Sea countries themselves.
The effect of the breach of Estlink 2 and the challenges ahead
The impact on the countries in the region following the recent breach of the Estlink 2 cable can be anticipated by examining the case of Balticconnector. Only in this case, the resource that will be growing in price for one side will be electricity, and the three Baltic countries are swapping places with Finland as the price of electricity could rise in Lithuania, Latvia and especially Estonia due to the fact that these countries are still under-supplied with domestic electricity compared to their neighbours to the north. An illustrative example would be from 2024, when the same Estlink 2 cable was out of service for seven months, from the end of January to September, due to a simple technical fault. Although it is difficult to say what impact the fault had on electricity prices in the Baltic countries in general compared to Finland, it is possible to see the impact on Estonian prices compared to those of Lithuania and Latvia. According to the Nord Pool electricity exchange, throughout 2023, when the interconnection with Finland was operational, electricity prices in Estonia were either the lowest or at least on a par with the other Baltic countries (primarily due to the cheap electricity imports from Finland). By contrast, in 2024, when the cable was out of operation for most of the year, electricity prices in Estonia were higher than those in Lithuania and Latvia during nearly every month. Prices in Estonia only returned to being the lowest in the region in the final months of the year, following the repair of the interconnector.
In the Baltic Sea, growing uncertainty and questions about NATO and the EU’s planned actions in response to the situation are posing a significant challenge. Currently, the affected countries are increasing their maritime patrols and the visibility of military ships on their own initiative. This may deter further provocations, especially if the ships that caused the damage are promptly arrested, as was the case after the breach of Estlink 2. However, the presence of more NATO forces (including naval forces) from the major alliance members in the region may contribute to greater stability and security. This would allow for a faster response to such incidents, demonstrate solidarity, and enhance the ability to address newly emerging challenges through which third countries may indirectly impact regional stability.
Russia does not yet seem to be taking the risk of more overt provocations against Western countries supporting Ukraine. However, in many major NATO countries such as the US, Germany, France or even Canada, in times of political turmoil or a change of power, such grey-area actions become good tools to use in a situation where the resolve to take retaliatory action may be weaker among allies. At the same time, acts of sabotage in Europe can be seen as key tactics employed by Russia to extend the war in Ukraine beyond its borders, further destabilising the entire region.