Russia’s strategy amid Trump’s mediation breakthrough in the South Caucasus

The diplomatic impact of the joint statement by the leaders of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the US regarding the path towards peace has generated momentum for the South Caucasus. The statement signed on 8 August is an effective outcome of US mediation, which the Russians were uninterested in, and the EU was unable to achieve. This marks Donald Trump’s second achievement in facilitating peace deals after Israel and Iran’s agreement on a ceasefire following a 12-day military conflict in June. The US-backed signature of the trilateral statement reinforces a constructive tone in the dialogue between Yerevan and Baku. Although not legally binding, it facilitated the swift initialling of a peace agreement, whose text was made public on 11 August. Aside from providing a guarantee for the normalisation of bilateral relations, the trilateral statement also acts as a clear invitation for the US to take an active role in shaping the region’s future.

Before US participation, peace talks between Armenia and Azerbaijan were already progressing. Both sides depended on bilateral negotiations, dismissing third-party mediation because they believed this method to be more effective. Russia and the EU remained absent due to mistrust from Yerevan and Baku. Previously, the leaders’ dialogue was hosted by the UAE (July). Baku’s main demands were the change of the Armenian constitution to remove any territorial claims and the dissolution of the OSCE Minsk Group. Amending the constitution without causing domestic instability remains Armenia’s main challenge, especially as polls show that 40% (IRI, 2025 poll) of the population oppose a peace agreement. This has not prevented Yerevan from progressing with peace talks, including involving new external actors such as the US.

In de facto terms, the trilateral statement signed by Nikol Pashinyan, Ilham Aliyev, and Donald Trump signifies that American companies’ involvement in connectivity projects will be protected by a NATO member state. The so-called “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” (TRIPP) alleviates concerns that Baku aims to establish a “Zangezur Corridor” against Armenia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. It creates conditions that were unachievable through the US-Ukraine mineral deal (30 April), signed earlier this year, because, unlike Armenia, American companies will be able to operate only in roughly 80% of the territory Ukraine currently controls. The initial impression was that Russia and Iran are on the losing side of this “success story” of US mediation outside its traditional spheres of influence. Unlike the initial rejection of the trilateral statement, mainly due to Trump’s TRIPP initiative, Russia tried to maintain a composed stance.

Russia’s wait-and-see strategy

The trilateral joint statement aims to improve the situation on the ground. Practically, stabilising the region is meant to be achieved through cross-border connections and economic cooperation. However, until these steps take effect, Moscow is re-evaluating its positions. Instead of condemning the Pashinyan-Aliyev-Trump declaration of intent, the Russian official channels regarded the US contribution positively, emphasising, however, the direct mediation by Vladimir Putin from 2020 towards 2022. Under the current circumstances, the Russian side appears to be focused on larger stakes than merely contesting a ‘fait accompli’. The points gained by the US in the South Caucasus are unwelcome for Moscow, which continues to assert its central role in influencing regional security. However, at present, Russia is prioritising the exploitation of Trump’s eventual “trade-offs” agreed with Putin in Alaska. In any case, the new phase of Armenia-Azerbaijan rapprochement brokered by the US has fewer severe consequences for Russian influence than it might initially seem. Uncertainty arising from the Armenian domestic developments also explains why Russia has been lenient towards the trilateral agreement. Arguably, Pashinyan’s political longevity became more uncertain following the Appeal Court’s ruling on the illegality of the recent arrest of the Russian-Armenian oligarch Samvel Karapetyan, detained on 18 June under the allegations of inciting the overthrow of Pashinyan’s government (August). If released, Karapetyan, who enjoys the support of the Armenian Apostolic Church, could rally a protest vote against the Pashinyan government in the 2026 legislative elections.

In response to the Pashinyan-Aliyev-Trump statement, Moscow outlined three major ‘red lines’, as deduced from the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (8 August). 

Firstly, future solutions for peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan should be locally developed rather than imported from outside, which subtly suggests the US. In this context, the Russian position explicitly states the role that neighbouring powers should play. Iran and Turkey are included in Russia’s claim of exclusivity in the stabilisation process. As a negative example of the involvement of non-regional external actors, Russia cited the EU’s Mission in Armenia. Ironically, the lack of involvement from external powers is also reflected in the draft of the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace treaty, published simultaneously by the two countries on 11 August. Thus, Art. VII of the draft stipulates that the two parties “shall not deploy along their mutual border forces of any third party”. The EU Mission in Armenia has a civilian mandate, but its tasks since February 2023 have included monitoring the borders with Azerbaijan, among other tasks.

Secondly, Russia seeks to safeguard its interests through trilateral and bilateral agreements with Armenia and Azerbaijan. Its concerns seem logical considering its commitment to maintaining the current North-South gas pipeline and the future transport route connecting India with Russia via Iran and Azerbaijan. By including the TRIPP initiative, the South Caucasus becomes a vital crossroads for regional corridors where Russia and Iran (the North-South Corridor), China (“Belt and Road Initiative” and “Middle Corridor”), the EU (“Global Gateway”), and now, the US aim to play a role. If non-regional powers do not coordinate their initiatives, the competition could easily turn into a rivalry for dominance. An eventual militarisation of the interconnection projects could destabilise the region, where peace takes a long time to become a natural part of intra-regional cohabitation.

The third and final warning sign that Russia has issued concerns Armenia’s membership in the Eurasian Economic Union. By invoking Armenian obligations under the Eurasian Union’s transit-related provisions, Russia may try to use the organisation’s institutional framework to restrict Yerevan’s terrain of manoeuvre when implementing the TRIPP-related interconnection projects. Russia is aware that increased connectivity across the South Caucasus could lessen Armenia’s reliance on trade linkages with the Eurasian Union. To prevent this, Russia might attempt to bring future TRIPP-launched interconnection projects under the Eurasian Union’s regulatory framework.

Future challenges

The US’s presence in the South Caucasus might not significantly challenge Moscow during the Trump era of transactional foreign policy, which is marked by high volatility. However, in the long term, the US’s economic involvement in Armenian-Azerbaijani connectivity projects could become some of the foundations of a more assertive geopolitical strategy in the future. Strongly influenced by Russia over the past three decades, the South Caucasus is now open to the participation of more international actors. In fact, both Armenia and Azerbaijan have invited the US into a region where Russia still claims exclusive interests. Whether the US and Russia will choose cooperation rather than rivalry in the region remains uncertain. Until then, Russia will see the privileged position offered to Pashinyan and Aliyev by the US as direct competition.

The market access to the Eurasian Union (with a quarter of Armenian exports going to Russia), the monopoly on the supply of (inexpensive) gas (165 USD per 1,000 m3), military presence (102nd military base in Gyumri), and border supervision with Iran (since 1992) are among Moscow’s traditional methods of influence over Armenia. The hybrid influence of Russia on Armenia, in political and religious spheres, should also not be underestimated. Azerbaijan has the resources (political stability due to the autocratic-style governance and the petro-state characteristics with nearly 50% of GDP from the oil and gas sector) to act autonomously from Russia, which renders its behaviour more predictable for the materialisation of the Trump-brokered TRIPP initiatives.

Managing a region already congested with China’s and the EU’s efforts to secure transport routes to Central Asia will be a challenge for Russia. Any fundamental shift in the balance of power that introduces external actors with whom Moscow has no strategic partnerships will be contested. Consistent steps towards full normalisation and the enhancement of peace dialogue will be necessary from Yerevan and Baku to reduce the likelihood of confrontations. Such measures rely on domestic politics in both countries. The domestically driven democratisation of Azerbaijan and the depolarisation of Armenia are essential elements to minimise Russia’s role as the indispensable guarantor of the region’s stability.