Analysing international policy processes and Lithuania’s role in them
Hot take Aug 06, 2026

Recap: U.S.–Russia Relations: Competition, Dialogue, or a Deal

Photo source: GSSC archive
Summary

This is the summary of a discussion with Michael Kimmage, a Board member of GSSC Vilnius Forum, currently the director of the Kennan Institute. He is a professor of history at the Catholic University of America and has had think-tank appointments at the German Marshall Fund and the Center for Strategic and International Studies. From 2014 to 2016, he served on the Secretary’s Policy Planning Staff at the U.S. Department of State, where he held the Russia/Ukraine portfolio. He is the author, among other books, of The Conservative Turn: Lionel Trilling, Whittaker Chambers and the Lessons of Anti-Communism (Harvard University Press, 2009), The Abandonment of the West: The History of an Idea in American Foreign Policy (Basic Books, 2020) and Collisions: The War in Ukraine and the Origins of the New Global Instability (Oxford University Press, 2024). The discussion was moderated by Vytautas Leškevičius, Chief Foreign Policy Advisor at the GSSC.

The discussion illustrates that U.S.-Russia relations have entered a period in which neither confrontation nor cooperation alone adequately describes reality. Strategic competition will remain the defining feature of the relationship, yet dialogue, deterrence, and selective cooperation (particularly on nuclear issues) will continue to be necessary.

Perhaps the most enduring lesson is that containment remains relevant, but no longer sufficient. Future European security will depend not only on limiting Russian aggression but also on strengthening Europe’s own strategic capacity and ensuring Ukraine’s long-term integration into the European political and security order. Rather than seeking a quick diplomatic breakthrough, policymakers should prepare for a prolonged period of competition that requires patience, resilience, institutional adaptation, and sustained transatlantic coordination.

 

The Limits of Ceasefire Diplomacy

While a ceasefire could provide temporary humanitarian relief and operational advantages for Ukraine, it should not be mistaken for a durable political settlement.

The experience of the Minsk agreements remains highly relevant. Previous negotiations demonstrated that Russia was willing to use diplomacy as a mechanism for delaying rather than resolving conflict. Agreements created opportunities to consolidate military gains while postponing more fundamental political questions. Consequently, any future ceasefire should be evaluated not only by its immediate military effects but also by whether it changes the strategic calculations driving Russian policy.

It can be argued that Vladimir Putin’s objectives have, if anything, become more ambitious since 2014. Under these circumstances, diplomacy cannot be assessed solely through signed agreements or political declarations. The decisive question is whether Russian strategic objectives themselves have fundamentally changed. Without such change, negotiations risk becoming another phase of the conflict rather than its conclusion.

 

Containment Requires a Twenty-First Century Update

George Kennan’s doctrine of containment remains an influential concept in American foreign policy. However, the discussion argues that contemporary Europe requires an updated version of this strategy.

Traditional containment focused on preventing further Soviet expansion while accepting existing geopolitical realities. It was designed for a relatively stable division of Europe, where the primary objective was preventing military escalation across fixed frontiers.

Today’s security environment differs considerably. Russia remains a nuclear power that cannot realistically be defeated through conventional military means alone, making containment relevant as a strategy of limiting further aggression. At the same time, Ukraine is embedded in a far more fluid political and military space than Cold War Europe.

Successful containment must now include two complementary objectives. First, Europe must continue preventing additional Russian territorial expansion. Second, Ukraine must be gradually integrated into European political, economic, and security institutions. Military assistance alone cannot achieve lasting security, long-term institutional integration has become equally important. This represents perhaps the most significant evolution beyond Kennan’s original framework.

 

Europe’s Growing Strategic Responsibility

Europe’s growing capacity and capabilities to ensure the continent’s conventional defence and strengthen security across its neighbourhood has become a strategic necessity.

Historically, American military presence formed the backbone of European deterrence. During the Cold War, containment depended upon substantial U.S. military deployments alongside extensive political and economic commitments. Today’s strategic environment is markedly different.

From the perspective presented in the discussion, the Trump administration increasingly views Europe as possessing sufficient economic capacity, technological capability, and industrial resources to assume primary responsibility for its own defense. Although the United States is expected to remain engaged, European governments are increasingly expected to provide the majority of conventional military capabilities.

This shift creates both opportunity and uncertainty. On one hand, Europe has significantly expanded defense production, strengthened military cooperation with Ukraine, and improved defense industrial integration. On the other hand, uncertainty regarding future American military commitments complicates long-term planning.

 

The Trump Administration and a Different Strategic Logic

An important reflection emerging from the discussion concerns the changing nature of American foreign policy under President Trump.

Rather than emphasizing traditional alliance management, the administration appears motivated by limiting U.S. involvement in prolonged international crises. Ukraine is viewed less as a defining geopolitical struggle and more as one among several competing foreign policy challenges.

This perspective helps explain the administration’s emphasis on dialogue with Moscow. The objective appears less focused on achieving an ideal political settlement than on reducing the immediate burden of managing the conflict.

However, the dialogue alone cannot substitute for strategic alignment. Effective negotiations require close coordination with Ukraine and European allies before engaging Russia. Reversing this sequence risks weakening Western cohesion while producing limited diplomatic progress.

The broader implication is that successful diplomacy depends as much on allied unity as on direct engagement with Moscow.

 

Arms Control and Nuclear Stability

Despite the intensity of the conventional war, nuclear stability remains an essential component of U.S.-Russia relations.

Strategic dialogue has diminished, while nuclear rhetoric has become increasingly integrated into Russia’s broader political messaging. Nevertheless, both countries retain a shared interest in avoiding uncontrolled escalation. Arms control should therefore be understood not as a concession but as a mutual necessity arising from the catastrophic consequences of nuclear conflict.

The discussion however needs to place the arms control issue within a broader international context. Emerging nuclear challenges involving China, Iran, and questions of non-proliferation complicate future negotiations, suggesting that strategic stability can no longer be viewed solely as a bilateral U.S.-Russia issue.

 

Hybrid Conflict and the New Nature of Competition

Military confrontation between Russia and the West increasingly extends beyond conventional battlefields. Hybrid operations, including cyber attacks, sabotage, political influence campaigns, and disinformation, have become persistent features of the current strategic environment. Rather than replacing conventional warfare, these methods supplement it by imposing costs while remaining below the threshold of direct military confrontation.

This growing reliance on hybrid tactics is evidence of Russia’s limitations rather than its strength. As Russian political influence across Europe has declined, non-conventional methods have become relatively more attractive.

At the same time, Europe’s overall containment strategy has achieved notable success. Russia has been prevented from expanding the war beyond Ukraine despite sustained pressure on NATO’s eastern flank. Hybrid activities therefore represent an ongoing challenge but not necessarily evidence of strategic success for Moscow.

 

Looking Beyond the War

Russia faces a strategic dilemma. Even if territorial gains were formally recognized, Ukraine has become significantly more integrated with Europe than before 2022. Militarily, economically, and politically, the war has accelerated precisely the outcome Russia originally sought to prevent.

This creates a paradox. Russia may retain occupied territory while simultaneously losing broader influence over Ukraine’s future orientation. In this sense, military gains do not automatically translate into political success.

For Europe and the United States, the long-term objective should therefore extend beyond ending hostilities. Sustainable security will depend upon constructing a durable European security architecture that incorporates Ukraine, strengthens deterrence, preserves alliance cohesion, and maintains channels for strategic dialogue where mutual interests continue to exist.

The Geopolitics and Security Studies Center (GSSC) is an independent, non-profit think-tank operating in Vilnius since 2006, focusing on the analysis of international policy processes and Lithuania’s role in them. The GSSC brings together experts in various fields, publishes analytical material, organises events, and carries out international and national projects. The Centre’s founders are the Government of the Republic of Lithuania and Vilnius University.