Post-electoral Armenia: Navigating Peace, European Integration, and Relations with Russia

Armenia has entered a distinct domestic and external context following the 7 June legislative elections. Voters again supported Nikol Pashinyan, although by a smaller margin than in the previous elections. About half of the 1.4 million Armenians who cast their votes opted for a political platform centred on closer ties with the West and reducing Russian influence. The opposition faced investigations and arrests for vote-buying prior to election day. Other opposition representatives were charged with treason-related offences, according to the Armenian authorities. The Armenian opposition speculated that the authorities were replicating the so-called “Moldovan scenario”, in which various parties (Bloc “Victory”, “Great Moldova” and “Heart of Moldova”) were excluded from elections on accusations of Russian interference or illegal financing. A more appropriate comparison with Moldova lies in the contrasting instruments employed by Russia and the EU vis-à-vis the Armenian government. The EU sought to help the Armenian authorities counter Russian pressures, which ranged from trade embargoes to massive disinformation campaigns. Conversely, Moscow counted on Russia-oriented businessmen seeking to seize power, allegedly using substantial financing for electoral campaigns. Given the geopolitical significance of the elections, Moscow views Pashinyan’s electoral score as yet another defeat, following the September 2025 elections in Moldova and the April 2026 elections in Hungary.

Another electoral victory for Pashinyan

Against the backdrop of a 58.9% turnout, 49.7% of voters chose Nikol Pashinyan’s “Civil Contract” Party. This enabled him to secure 64 seats in parliament, which, following these elections, account for 105 seats. This is their third victory in the last three electoral cycles, but each time the number of seats declines: from 88 in 2018 to 71 in 2021 to 65 in 2026. As in the previous iterations, only two opposition parties passed the threshold. In 2026, these are a newly formed “Strong Armenia” established by the oligarch Samvel Karapetyan and the former Armenian president Robert Kocharyan’s “Armenia Alliance”. Karapetyan’s party gained 29 seats with 23.3% of the vote, while Kocharyan’s party gained 12 seats (9.95%). This outcome gives Pashinyan a stable majority in parliament, but not a constitutional majority of 70 seats needed to amend the constitution unimpeded. Such a result keeps the disruptive opposition outside the decision-making process. It prevents Pashinyan, however, from easily unblocking the path to durable peace by removing constitutional provisions that Azerbaijan claims can be invoked in the future territorial claims by the Armenian side.

The opposition remains firm in its position, contesting the election results. Apart from that, there are three other fronts on which the opposition is confronting Pashinyan: the constitutional provisions, the Armenian Apostolic Church, and the fate of the arrested opposition representatives, whom they portray as “political prisoners”. The major battleground in the post-electoral political landscape centres on constitutional reform. In its absence, the prospects for a comprehensive peace agreement remain limited, leaving Armenia’s transition to a more post-conflict state transformation hanging by a thin thread. In early July, the opposition failed to overturn the election results at the Constitutional Court, which ultimately validated the victory of “Civic Contract”. Nevertheless, the representatives of the largest opposition force – “Strong Armenia” – made it clear that street protests would be among the principal instruments used against the government in the time to come.

Geopolitical considerations

Armenia emerged from the legislative elections determined to advance the peace process by normalising relations with its Turkic neighbours and deepening European integration. This vision implies a clear departure from post-Soviet territorial claims against Azerbaijan and a significantly revised policy towards Russia.

The winning forces, led by Nikol Pashinyan, relied heavily on the US and the EU in the lead-up to the elections. These external actors are seen as instrumental in building good neighbourly relations with Baku and Ankara, as well as in easing the consequences of the recalibration of Armenia-Russia relations. At the same time, the US and the EU showed readiness to support Pashinyan and his “Civil Contract” Party. The US Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s visit to Armenia two weeks ahead of the elections, preceded by the 8^th European Political Community summit, showed alignment between the US and the EU, which, against the backdrop of their confrontational relations, is rather unique.

The elections were also geopolitically charged because Russia sought to sway the vote towards opposition forces that promoted a Moscow-friendly foreign and domestic policy. They built their electoral campaign around a restorationist agenda. It included insulating the Armenian church from political interference by Pashinyan’s reformist agenda, mobilising nationalist identity politics through renewed territorial claims vis-à-vis Azerbaijan, and refusing to switch from the Eurasian Economic Union to a pro-EU accession trajectory. Under these considerations, Russia delayed the official recognition of the election outcome for over one month, a period during which the opposition appealed to the country’s Constitutional Court to annul the electoral results. Pashinyan sought to use his official visit to Russia on 6 July to set the record straight with Moscow and to legitimise himself in the eyes of the opposition’s voters at home by meeting with Russian officials.

Pivoting towards the EU, forcefully detached from the Eurasian Union by Russia

Before the elections, the “Civic Contract” majority had already adopted a law in March, at the request of a public petition, which inserted the EU accession objective into the national legal framework. This can still be a temporary measure unless this goal is enshrined in the constitution, because a future legislative majority could adopt a law to cancel EU integration. Therefore, the inclusion of EU accession in the constitution, as in the cases of Ukraine, Georgia and finally Moldova, could become an avenue that Pashinyan might use to change Armenia’s supreme law, if he finds a constitutional majority or another legal means to propose a new version of the constitution to a public referendum.

In the meantime, Armenia must navigate its way out of the economic coercion that Russia has incessantly demonstrated in the run-up to the elections. Traditionally, Armenia has been skilfully applying a multi-vector foreign policy to reap benefits from close cooperation with the East and the West. Such an opportunity seems to becoming increasingly constrained because of the choice of a straightforward direction towards the EU. Russian food safety and phytosanitary regulators – Rosselkhoznadzor and Rospotrebnadzor – in unison adopted restrictions on Armenian flowers, fish, vegetables and beverages, including the Armenian brandy. Initially, they appeared intended to change the minds of Armenians ahead of the vote. However, after seeing the winners of the elections, which Moscow had not yet officially recognised, the trade embargoes did not just stop but were expanded to include other food categories. Notably, Russia banned these categories not only from the Russian market but from the Eurasian Economic Union as a whole. This is a signal that Russia will not tolerate Armenia’s EU integration by offering a period of grace until Armenia’s attachment to the EU is finalised. To cope with the loss of the Eurasian Union’s market, the Armenian government adopted various support programs for farmers, consisting of subsidising export diversification and covering transportation costs.

While remaining in power, Pashinyan’s political party places its hopes on EU support to manage both the post-electoral political storm and the growing economic consequences of the fallout with Russia. During his first official visit as reappointed Prime Minister, Nikol Pashinyan met with the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen. In Brussels, the EU pledged an additional 80 million euros in financial assistance, in addition to the 34 million disbursed in mid-June, not long after the elections. However, these are temporary measures that do not provide a systemic solution to Armenia’s structural dependence on Russia, in both trade and energy supplies. Other aspects, such as the Armenian workers in Russia, estimated at about 70,000, seem less urgent as of now.

The strategic solutions already made public by the EU include the adoption of autonomous trade measures. They are conceptually and operationally similar to what the EU offered to Ukraine following the Russian invasion in February 2022. Under such a mechanism, within agreed-upon timeframes, Armenian goods that meet food safety criteria would be permitted for export to the EU market. This could cover up to 80% of Armenian exports, gradually substituting the Eurasian Union’s market in the medium to long term. To establish a proper foundation for liberalised trade with the EU, Armenia will need to establish a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area, which Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia have built with the EU since 2014. To assist Armenia in diversifying its gas supplies, the EU has emphasised the role of the Middle Corridor, which is part of the EU’s Global Gateway framework for the South Caucasus. This could include building East-West energy interconnections with Azerbaijan and Türkiye through southern Armenian territory, thereby making Armenia a second transit country in the region after Georgia. To this end, however, the peace process should be finalised. Such a settlement could create the political conditions for future pipeline projects that involve the Azerbaijani gas network to and through Armenia, directly supplying the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic with Caspian gas while simultaneously supplying Armenia. Gas pricing would remain a central issue in bilateral negotiations between Yerevan and Baku, possibly incorporating preferential pricing arrangements as part of a broader peace settlement. Azerbaijan has previously demonstrated its ability to supply natural gas at competitive prices. It has been selling cheap gas, competing with subsidised Russian gas sold to Armenia so far (177,50 USD per 1,000 m3), as shown by Georgia, which imports almost 90% of its gas needs from Azerbaijan at favourable prices.

What’s next

After the elections, Armenia remains politically manageable, with a stable parliamentary majority in place. However, leaving Russia’s geopolitical orbit comes at an economic cost for both the Armenian state and its population. Despite losing the opportunity to restore its influence through the electoral process, Russia is unlikely to abandon efforts to amplify the Armenian opposition’s allegations that the election results were shaped by Western interference. Failure to mitigate the consequences of reduced access to Russian markets and energy supplies is likely to further erode Pashinyan’s political capital. In this context, closer rapprochement with the EU could provide a crucial response to the looming economic and potential energy challenges. This will be essential for preserving social cohesion, thereby enabling Pashinyan’s government to address Azerbaijan’s preconditions for a comprehensive settlement of bilateral disputes and the establishment of a durable peace.