Lithuania on the Front Line. Conversation with Foreign Minister Budrys | LFPR Vol. 44, 2026

This text is excerpted from Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review, Vol. 44 (2026).

In this conversation with Linas Kojala, he explains why 0.25% of GDP for Kyiv is only a baseline, what a permanent German brigade and NATO’s 5% pledge mean in practice, how Nordic–Baltic cooperation and the transatlantic bond must evolve, and why there can be no illusions about Minsk or Moscow as Lithuania looks ahead to its 2027 EU Council presidency.

Linas Kojala: You took office as Minister a year ago. Looking back, what have been your main priorities during this period?

Kęstutis Budrys: It is evident that the position of Minister of Foreign Affairs involves a vast array of responsibilities and the necessity to confront immediate challenges and complexities in multiple areas. Nevertheless, should I summarize the main objectives into three key areas, they would be safeguarding Lithuania’s national security in a challenging geopolitical environment, affirming NATO’s role as the foundation of transatlantic security, and garnering steadfast support for Ukraine, which today is the first line of defence against Russian aggression. At the same time, my particular responsibility is to ensure that Lithuania’s voice in Europe continues to be strong, pushing forward collective defence priorities, deepening EU–NATO cooperation, and ensuring Lithuania’s role in shaping European security policy. Strengthening strategic partnerships with the United States, Germany, Poland and our Nordic–Baltic neighbours are vital for all these tasks.

Linas Kojala: Lithuania is among the leading European countries in supporting Ukraine, exceeding the target of 0.25% of GDP per year. Yet there are still doubts about Europe’s long-term commitment to Ukraine. How do you view these discussions?

Kęstutis Budrys: I can assure you that Lithuania will not tire in its support for Ukraine. Our commitment of 0.25% of GDP is at least for the upcoming decade. We understand very clearly that today Ukraine is the first line of defence against Russian aggression. This aggression is directed not only at Ukraine’s sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity, but also at the security of Europe as a whole. Russia made it more than clear that its primary aim is to weaken NATO and restore its spheres of influence. Thinking that Russia would stop after defeating Ukraine would be dangerously naïve.

Some countries in Europe may feel that distance from Russia makes them more secure from Russian threats than frontline states. But this is a false sense of security – Russia’s goals go far beyond Ukraine, and we already see Russian hybrid activities on European soil, testing our resilience and resolve to respond.

Europe has provided significant financial and military support to Ukraine so far. It is natural that questions arise about how long this support will be needed, especially as domestic issues overwhelm national agendas in democratic cycles. But we must remind ourselves: even if there is a ceasefire or some form of peace deal, the entire European security architecture will continue to depend on a strong Ukraine.

That means a Ukraine with 800,000 well-equipped armed forces, with stable institutions, and with social cohesion intact, anchored firmly in the EU.

Therefore, any debates on supporting Ukraine must entail planning for long-term military and financial support. It is a duty and responsibility of politicians to explain that to societies and to mobilise the necessary political will, especially when the instruments are already available.

We should use NATO’s PURL program for urgent military assistance; the EU’s SAFE for strengthening Ukraine’s defence industry and integrating it into European supply chains; a reparation loan, based on Russian frozen assets, for long-term financial support.

And finally, we must begin accession negotiations. Both the EU and Ukraine must work seriously to make Ukraine a member of the European Union by 2030.

Last but not least – there is no greater security guarantee for Ukraine and Europe than Ukraine’s membership in NATO – this objective must remain on the table.

Linas Kojala: There have been many concerns about the future of the transatlantic relationship. Even if President Trump reaffirms his commitment to NATO, how would you assess the broader U.S.–Europe relationship, and the Lithuania–U.S. partnership in particular? What should be done next year to make it stronger?

Kęstutis Budrys: The transatlantic relationship remains the foundation of our collective security and the backbone of NATO’s strength. While certain political dynamics on either side of the Atlantic may sometimes cause uncertainty, I am confident that the strategic bond between Europe and the United States will remain strong. It is built not just on shared interests, but on common values and a deep sense of solidarity that has stood the test of time.

For Lithuania, the partnership with the United States is vital and continues to grow. American troops on Lithuanian soil, joint exercises, close cooperation in defence, economy, and energy security clearly demonstrate that this relationship is real and tangible.

The presence of U.S. troops in Europe remains essential. With upcoming adjustments to U.S. deployments, Europe must redouble its efforts to build robust defence capabilities.

On the other hand, it is encouraging that Europe is waking up and taking greater responsibility for its own security. The NATO agreement in The Hague to increase defence spending to 5% of GDP by 2035 was a big step forward. However, we no longer have 10 years to prepare.

We must act as quickly and effectively as possible – strengthen Europe’s military capabilities, invest in Ukraine’s defence industry, improve EU–NATO coordination, and be a reliable partner for the United States.

Looking ahead, we should focus on keeping the U.S. engaged in Europe. This means more cooperation in defence industry projects, expanding transatlantic trade and investment, and maintaining active political dialogue at all levels – from governments and parliaments to private sector and civil society.

The transatlantic bond is not something we can take for granted. It requires continuous effort and investment from both sides. Lithuania will continue to be a strong advocate for a close and united transatlantic community, because we know – our security and our future depend on it.

Linas Kojala: Germany is preparing to deploy a brigade to Lithuania – about 5,000 troops and their families – for a permanent presence. The project is expected to be completed by the end of 2027. How is the process progressing? What are the main challenges?

Kęstutis Budrys: The deployment of Germany’s 45th Armoured Brigade to Lithuania is a historic step for both our nations and for NATO’s forward defence posture. It shows much-needed leadership and determination to take more responsibility for European security.

The preparations are ongoing according to plan; Lithuanian institutions are in constant and close coordination with our German partners. Both sides are fully committed to ensuring that the brigade reaches its full operational capability by the end of 2027.

This is an ambitious, complex and multi-layered project. It requires not only military planning, but also the rapid development of infrastructure and support systems for service members and their families. We are working intensively to make sure that Lithuania provides everything that is needed – the military facilities, training areas, educational institutions and overall host-nation support.

Naturally, there are challenges, which are mainly related to construction timelines and coordination among different institutions, but they are being managed efficiently. What matters most is that the political and strategic commitment is clear and firm on both sides.

Once the German brigade is fully in place, it will mark a fundamental shift: Lithuania will host a permanently stationed Allied force of significant scale, demonstrating NATO’s readiness and the strength of the transatlantic bond in very practical terms.

Linas Kojala: Beyond the brigade deployment, what else binds Lithuania and Germany? Which areas do you see as offering the most potential for future cooperation?

Kęstutis Budrys: From a security perspective, Lithuania and Germany are connected by much more than the deployment of the German brigade. A particularly significant example is our growing defence-industrial cooperation. In November, construction began in Lithuania on a production facility by the German defence company Rheinmetall, which will manufacture 155 mm artillery ammunition. By far, this marks the largest defence investment in the country’s history. It is more than an industrial project – it signals the “Zeitenwende”, strengthens our deterrence and deepens partnership between Lithuania and Germany.

Also, we are firmly committed to expanding cooperation with Germany across politics, business, science, education, and culture. A good example of this is a Lithuanian Season in Germany, which could further enrich and deepen our bilateral relationship. We also place great value on cooperation at the societal level, including partnerships between twin towns as well as the role of civil society and NGOs. Lithuania seeks to strengthen ties not only with federal institutions, but also with German federal states (Bundesländer). In this respect, the establishment of the Consulate General of the Republic of Lithuania in Munich is expected to further advance bilateral economic, political, and cultural cooperation.

Germany is also one of Lithuania’s main economic partners and remains the largest foreign investor in the country, and this economic dimension could offer significant potential for further expansion.

At the same time, the potential for future cooperation is far from exhausted. Promising avenues include further defence-industrial collaboration, strengthening resilience against hybrid and cyber threats, and cooperation in the fields of energy security and military mobility. What matters most now is translating shared commitments into concrete, practical outcomes – building a partnership that delivers real capabilities, not just statements.

Linas Kojala: Nordic–Baltic cooperation is one of the pillars of regional security, as well as economic and energy collaboration. What are the main advantages of this partnership? Do the countries speak with one voice? What more should be done to strengthen it?

Kęstutis Budrys: The Nordic–Baltic cooperation began as Nordic support for the Baltic States in building their newly regained independence. Over the past 25 years, this cooperation has evolved into a genuine partnership of equals and has become a benchmark for effective regional coordination. The main advantage of this partnership is our ability to act quickly and in a coordinated manner – to share information, reinforce one another politically and militarily, and respond to emerging challenges with unity and determination. This significantly strengthens our shared security.

The recent accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO has further reinforced this cooperation. With all Nordic countries now part of the Alliance, the Baltic Sea region has effectively become a NATO stronghold, significantly enhancing deterrence and responsiveness.

NB8 is united by shared values, common interests, and common responsibilities, which are leadership in support of Ukraine, security of the Baltic Sea region, protection of the EU/NATO external border, being the first to counter Russia’s hybrid attacks, including the shadow fleet, and working together to harmonize the implementation of sanctions.

No country can defend itself in isolation. That is why we must continue to deepen our Nordic–Baltic partnership. We must focus on strengthening deterrence, improving interoperability, countering hybrid threats, and creating strategic dilemmas for a potential aggressor.

In essence, our goal is not only to speak with one voice, but to act together in a way that meaningfully strengthens the security of our region and the Alliance as a whole. But we are also interested in the NB8 regional format bringing our countries together not only in foreign affairs and defence, but also in other areas such as the economy, education, healthcare, etc.

Linas Kojala: Many initiatives are underway to strengthen NATO’s eastern flank – from the so-called “drone wall” to on-the-ground fortifications. How is cooperation with our neighbours – Poland, Latvia, Estonia, and the Nordic countries – developing in this regard? Can we deliver integrated regional solutions rather than acting separately?

Kęstutis Budrys: The eastern flank remains the most exposed to threats coming from our aggressive neighbours, which makes its reinforcement both natural and necessary. The level of escalation from Russia and Belarus continues to grow. We have observed numerous examples – from military-grade drones and fighter jets violating our airspace, to sabotage, disinformation, cyber incidents and other hybrid attacks. We cannot change our geography, but what we can do is strengthen our resilience and deterrence, so that when/if the time comes, we are ready.

There are three important elements to this. First, boosting national defence spending, as agreed at the NATO Summit in The Hague. Second, our actions at the EU level. And third, NATO. All these avenues are deeply interconnected – higher national defence spending brings funding, which, together with EU instruments and NATO regional plans, is transformed into real defence capabilities. In the end, both the EU and NATO become stronger.

At the EU level, we already have a plan, which was approved by the European Council in October – to strengthen our joint defence readiness by working together on priority capability areas, with concrete projects to be launched in the first half of 2026. This includes two key initiatives for our region – the Eastern Flank Watch and the European Drone Defence Initiative. Once operational, they will complement our national initiatives such as the Baltic Defence Line and Eastern Shield, developed together with the other two Baltic states and Poland.

In short, cooperation with Poland, Latvia, Estonia and the Nordic countries is not only ongoing, but also becoming more coordinated and capability-driven. We are moving from separate national projects to integrated regional solutions. It is important that all initiatives are designed to work together, aligning our approaches and reinforcing each other. The goal is clear: not parallel efforts, but a connected, mutually strengthening regional defence architecture.

At the NATO level, two enhanced vigilance activities are successfully ongoing since 2025 – Baltic Sentry, increasing critical infrastructure security in the Baltic Sea, and Eastern Sentry, enhancing NATO’s presence along its eastern flank. I don’t think it is a coincidence that disruption of undersea cables and incursions by drones into NATO airspace has ceased for the moment. These concrete examples show that joint work and close cooperation are already well underway at the national, EU and NATO levels.

Linas Kojala: The United States is exploring limited engagement with the Lukashenko regime in Belarus. What is Lithuania’s position on this? And what role do Belarusian civil society and the opposition play in Lithuania today?

Kęstutis Budrys: Lithuania is closely following the United States’ considerations regarding possible limited engagement with the Belarusian regime and supports their goal to make Lukashenka release the political prisoners. While we acknowledge that international diplomacy sometimes requires flexible approaches, we firmly believe that any contact with the authorities in Belarus must be guided by clear principles and conditions. We once again are witnessing another Lukashenka charm-offensive round, but since we saw it in the past, we remain sceptical – his modus operandi does not change.

In addition to all hybrid attacks against neighbouring countries, including intentional smuggling using meteorological balloons that violates our airspace and halts air traffic, the Lukashenka regime continues to systematically violate human rights, restrict civil liberties, and act as an instrument of Russia’s aggression. Therefore, any engagement should be explicitly linked to tangible progress – such as improvements in the human rights situation, strengthening of the rule of law, and the release of all political prisoners.

A few recent releases do not signal real change. Without structural reforms, each release simply makes room for new political prisoners. By easing sanctions without such preconditions, we will have nothing left to pressure Lukashenka to ease pressure on his own people, to stop harassing us with hybrid activities, and to cease helping Russia in its war against Ukraine.

Lithuania has consistently supported Belarusian civil society and the democratic opposition. Their presence in Lithuania is not only solidarity – it is an investment in the future of a democratic Belarus. We believe that the European Union and the international community must continue to support them as the true representatives of Belarusian society, ensuring that their voices remain central in any international dialogue concerning Belarus.

Linas Kojala: Churchill once said that “crisis should not be wasted as an opportunity.” The European Union is facing headwinds but also momentum for reform. What are Lithuania’s priorities going forward? Which EU-level decisions or reforms would you most like to see?

Kęstutis Budrys: The European Union is indeed facing headwinds, especially for its security. There are other important challenges of global competitiveness, demography and innovation.

In this context, I would like to make four points:

First, the EU needs to do more on security and defence. We welcome recent initiatives on this, including by the European Commission on the EU’s Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030. We need to reinvigorate the European defence industry, pool necessary resources, work closely with Ukraine and other like-minded countries. Also, we must invest in priority defence capabilities, military mobility, protection of critical infrastructure, especially on the EU eastern flank, bordering aggressor states. Of course, it is important to co-ordinate closely with NATO. This will be a major contribution to our security and deterrence.

Second, EU enlargement is the most powerful EU policy for promoting positive change in the neighbourhood and strengthening the Union’s global role. Enlargement is the best investment in the security and prosperity of Ukraine, Moldova, the Western Balkans and the EU itself. Russia’s ongoing aggression against Ukraine, the country’s swift integration into the EU has become even more pressing – as I said before, for the sake of European security, we need a strong Ukraine, with stable institutions, anchored firmly within the EU. The European Commission’s assessment shows that Ukraine is making significant progress on reforms, even under conditions of war, and therefore has the potential to become an EU member by 2030.

Lithuania has always been a staunch supporter of unanimity in EU common foreign and security policy, but having witnessed how some EU member states misuse their vote for purely national interests and systematically disrupt EU unity, we are open to explore ways to make the processes work. The EU enlargement is the first area to explore possibilities of QMV.

Third, Europe needs to mobilize to secure its long-term competitiveness, together with putting more efforts to ensure economic security, eradicating vulnerabilities in strategic sectors and investing in safety of supply chains. We see the untapped potential of the EU single market. We must make good use of it by removing remaining barriers, notably in the services sector, cutting red tape and pushing legislative simplification. It is also critical to create favourable conditions for research and innovation, technological advancement and start-ups.

Fourth, we have now entered strategic discussion on the EU’s next Multiannual Financial Framework. The outcome of this debate will set the direction of EU development for the long term. Therefore, we need a budget that addresses overlapping challenges in security and economy. Adequate financing of defence and competitiveness, including cohesion and CAP, contributes to strengthening the EU’s global role and strategic resilience.

These previously mentioned points also reflect Lithuania’s priorities for its upcoming Presidency of the Council of the EU in 2027. Our main focus will be to strengthen support for Ukraine and European security, advance EU enlargement, including a good progress on the finalisation of negotiations with Ukraine, boost Europe’s defence industrial capacity, and enhance the Union’s economic competitiveness.

In addition, we will place emphasis on reinforcing internal security, managing migration and countering disinformation, while also strengthening social resilience and addressing demographic challenges. And of course, the next EU budget must reflect these priorities. If we want Europe to remain secure, prosperous, and influential, we need to align our political ambitions with real resources and practical action.

Read the full publication here.