Hungary’s Chance for Democratic Renewal: Expectations toward the Magyar Government

The scale of Tisza’s victory reflects not merely electoral turnover but a broader demand for regime change. Yet the incoming administration inherits a state whose institutions were systematically reshaped to preserve Fidesz influence even in the event of electoral defeat. Over the past decade and a half, Orbán’s governments entrenched loyalists in key institutions, including the Constitutional Court, the prosecutor’s office, state media, and regulatory agencies. Even with the constitutional majority Tisza secured, reversing this architecture will not be straightforward.

For this reason, the initial months of the Magyar government are expected to focus overwhelmingly on domestic institutional reforms. Magyar has already called on several key officeholders – including President Tamás Sulyok, the prosecutor general, the head of the State Audit Office, and members of the Constitutional Court – to resign voluntarily before the end of May. Their removal is politically important because these actors could obstruct the actions of the new government and hamper investigations, reforms, or legislation intended to dismantle parts of the Orbán system. However, these officials are under no legal obligation to resign, making institutional contestation almost inevitable in the coming months.

The government’s initial reform priorities will center primarily on anti-corruption and judicial independence. This focus is both symbolic and politically important as these reforms are essential for rebuilding public trust in state institutions after years of politicization and opaque governance. They also form the basis for investigations into abuses of power and corruption connected to the Orbán era. Already during the transition period, investigations and scrutiny surrounding figures linked to the former regime have reportedly intensified.

Furthermore, addressing these areas is economically indispensable. The European Commission froze billions of euros in 2022 in cohesion and recovery funds because of concerns regarding corruption, procurement irregularities, and the erosion of judicial independence under Orbán. Magyar has therefore pledged to join the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO), a move Orbán consistently resisted, and to establish a new National Asset Recovery and Protection Office tasked with investigating corruption and recovering public assets diverted during the previous era.

Given that Hungary faces an extremely tight timetable, negotiations between Magyar’s team and the European Commission began almost immediately after the election. If the new government does not meet the reform milestones set by the Commission by August, it risks losing access to roughly 10 billion euros in suspended recovery fund resources. Economically, the stakes are enormous. Since the Covid pandemic, Hungary’s economy has suffered from stagnation and high inflation. The release of frozen funds would provide badly needed fiscal space for Magyar’s socioeconomic agenda, including investments in healthcare, education, social policy, infrastructure, and administrative modernization.

The structure of the incoming cabinet with 16 ministries suggests that Magyar indeed intends to focus more dedicated attention on specific policy areas. The lineup of sectoral experts and experienced private sector managers gives the impression that he seeks to pursue a more technocratic style of governance than Orbán’s highly ideological system. Rather than the Orbán era’s highly centralized structures with super-ministries concentrating authority in a small cabinet, the proposed government structure restores dedicated ministries in areas such as healthcare, education, or environmental affairs, among others. Under this constellation, policy sectors will receive more attention but also more scrutiny.

Signs of a shift have also started to appearregarding the overall political culture during the transition period following the election. The incoming government has maintained unusually active communication with the public and shown responsiveness to criticism. One early example involved Rita Rubovszky, initially discussed as a possible education minister, whose nomination faced significant public backlash and was ultimately abandoned. Another concerned Márton Melléthei-Barna, Magyar’s original nominee for justice minister and his brother-in-law, who stepped back after criticism over the conflict-of-interest implications of the appointment. The retreat demonstrates a level of political responsiveness absent during the Orbán years.

Meanwhile, Fidesz itself appears increasingly fragmented. Several prominent politicians have not taken up their parliamentary mandates, internal criticism has become more visible, and the party’s communication has appeared unusually disorganized. The extensive pro-government media and propaganda ecosystem built over the past decade is also facing uncertainty. Some outlets and organizations face financial difficulties and layoffs as access to state advertising and public funds becomes uncertain. Megafon, an organization that spread Fidesz‘s propaganda on social media with annual budgets in the billions of Forints, for example, reportedly was left with resources suffiecient for a month to pay its staff. In another case, confronted with investigations for alledged financial crime and anticipating financial collapse, media and advertising mogul Gyula Balásy, whose companies worked closely with the Fidesz governments, offered to hand over his business empire and even some of his private assets to the state—an offer refused by Magyar. Such examples reflect the broader structural challenge for Orbán era networks that depended heavily on state resources and political protection and now begin to crumble or even face prosecution.

The Magyar government enters office with historic momentum and substantial public goodwill, both domestically and internationally. Days before the inaugural sitting of the new parliament, Tisza enjoys the support of 70 percent of voters. Still, the country’s democratic reconstruction remains far from guaranteed. Institutional reform alone will not automatically produce democratic consolidation. The Orbán era profoundly transformed the political culture, normalized polarization, and weakened trust in public institutions and independent media. Rebuilding a pluralist public sphere capable of sustaining democratic competition will therefore require long-term political commitment, institutional restraint, and continued societal engagement.