Georgia-EU Relations: Between Eurosceptic Sovereignism and “Azerbaijani Model”

Introduction

Once on an advanced path towards EU accession, Georgia has changed course towards Eurosceptic sovereignism. As part of it, European integration is being treated narrowly through the prism of material benefits and less as a civilizational choice, which Georgia seeks to achieve unconditionally. Instead, Georgia’s state policies towards civil society, mass media, and opposition increasingly resemble those of the authoritarian neighbours – Russia and Azerbaijan. At the same time, the Georgian authorities treat EU influence as an existential risk to the regime’s political survival. In this sense, the diffusion of liberal values is being countered by a surge in discourse advocating full national sovereignty from the political-normative commitments to the EU.

At present, the EU accession of the former frontrunner in the Eastern Partnership region is uncertain. The government, run by the “Georgian Dream” political party and effectively controlled by the oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili, removed the EU accession talks from the political agenda, setting a date after 2028. In doing so, it argued that the Georgian state requires time to implement reforms and to be ready to join the EU by 2030. This came in response to the European Parliament’s resolution, which argued that the 2024 legislative elections “failed to meet democratic standards”. In theory, the change of the accession calendar helped the ruling party to change the focus of the domestic power contestation, as well as to detach Georgia from Ukraine’s and Moldova’s accession track. As a result of this tactic, the “Georgian Dream” could more easily navigate the highly polarised political context. While not ruling out EU accession entirely, the ruling party sought to avoid exacerbating alienation among the population, 74% of whom would vote for EU membership.  Amid the state’s attempts to discourage the mobilisation of civil society and the opposition, the anti-government protests have continued, surpassing 500 days as of mid-April. Despite the dedication of the pro-democracy civic and political forces, the level of public pressure is insufficient to compel the “Georgian Dream” to renounce its entire set of restrictive policies, which have an autocratizing effect, pushing the country away from the political criteria required for EU accession.

From an oligarchic regime to an authoritarian one

Despite diplomatic activity by the EU institutions and political actors from individual Member States, the pro-EU opposition political parties, divided into four electoral camps – “Coalition for Change”, Unity – National Movement, “Strong Georgia” and “Gakharia for Georgia” – won 61 of 150 seats. “Georgian Dream”, in charge of governing Georgia since 2012, has secured another 4-year mandate until 2028. Until then, it will not face political resistance in parliament due to the boycott by opposition parties, which the ruling party punished by removing their mandates. Such an exclusionary political system has aligned Georgia with Azerbaijan and Belarus among the Eastern Partnership countries in maintaining political power in the same hands for over 10 years. In its final post-election report in December 2024, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe highlighted multiple irregularities, including frequent amendments to electoral legislation, intimidation of certain categories of voters, disproportionate financial advantages for incumbent political forces, and the instrumentalisation of the private media for propaganda. The Council of Europe’s 2024 assessment provided similar evidence, raising concerns about “the correctness of the elections”.

In the meantime, the government’s actions are leading to a silent “de-Europeanization” of the country, putting Georgia at risk of moving closer to Russia and Azerbaijan, where the political and fundamental rights have little protection. The restrictive measures swiftly introduced into the Georgian legislation impede the proper functioning of civil society organisations and media outlets financed from abroad. Those who want to operate must submit information about foreign funds to the financial regulator and register as “agents of foreign influence”. Otherwise, they risk being fined and even being sentenced to prison. The academic sector is also threatened by strict funding rules. The shrinking space is also severely affecting the opposition political forces. If found to have links to the United National Movement (UNM), founded in 2001 by the jailed Mikhail Saakashvili, the opposition political parties, deemed to be “UNM satellites”, might be outlawed. This scenario could unfold as early as this year if the legal procedures initiated in late 2025 are approved by the Georgian Constitutional Court. In other words, civil society, non-governmental media, and opposition forces, which under normal circumstances help build a democratic political environment, have been gradually annihilated or weakened.

How did the chief Georgian oligarch trick the EU?

Although inconvenient to admit, the Georgian authorities used political deflection tactics to trick the EU. At the initial stage, the Georgian side postponed the adoption of the “law on transparency of foreign influence” in February 2023 and, shortly after, withdrew it in response to public protests and the EU’s criticism. It was not until the EU granted Georgia candidate status in December 2023 that the “Georgian Dream” resumed the legislative process on the problematic law. Reintroduced in April 2024 on the Parliament’s agenda, the draft bill was adopted swiftly in May. The law required NGOs to register as “foreign agents” if more than 20% of their funds came from abroad. In April 2025, the procedure was expanded to individuals, not only the institutions, under the Foreign Agents Registration Act. Those who don’t comply can be sentenced to up to six years in jail, marking the deterioration of conditions through the “criminalisation” of civil society organisations.

The EU had hesitated to revoke the candidate status and had only put it on ice for now. In June 2024, EU leaders admitted that unless the Georgian side undid the law on foreign influence, the accession process could be “de facto” halted. Only after the controversial legislative elections in October 2024, won by the “Georgian Dream”, did the EU announce it was freezing Georgia’s EU membership bid due to the democratic backsliding. In parallel, the “Georgian Dream” adopted its own decision to postpone EU accession, at least until 2028. While the EU stopped aid to the state and redirected funds to civil society, the Georgian authorities imposed strict control over the use of foreign funds by Georgian NGOs. As Amnesty International pointed out, foreign funds for political activism can be transferred to bank accounts in Georgia only if approved by the government. In consequence, political activism, analytical work, and consulting on human rights, etc. became rather endangered activities. In practice, the funds will not pass state approval if they are directed to civil society projects that seek to challenge government policies, including those related to EU integration. The law on “foreign funds”, passed in early March 2026, has two key goals. It is intended to criminalise the financing of protest activity, which is delegitimising the current government. Equally, the law aims to curb civic activism, which has been essential in mobilising the population to take to the streets.

All restrictive measures introduced by the Georgian authorities have already had a muzzling effect on the EU’s traditional partners in monitoring and supporting the reform agenda. The NGOs’ position on Georgian soil was weakened unless they registered as “foreign agents” with the state, accepted the stigma when receiving foreign funds, and refrained from political activity without prior government approval. To survive, the civic infrastructure will likely have to operate in exile in Europe until democracy returns.  Favourable legal conditions and financial resources in the European Member States are needed to sustain Georgian NGOs in exile, to expose the country’s autocratization to the Georgian public at home and in the diaspora, and to prevent the de-Europeanisation of Georgia. This implies that the EU Member States will have to manage the risks arising from frictions in their dialogue with Georgian authorities, which will likely qualify the EU’s support for Georgian NGOs, through circumventing repressive Georgian legislation, as interference in domestic affairs.

Who needs whom more – the EU or Georgia?

In its enlargement package evaluation of Georgia, the EU Commission highlighted that Georgia’s candidate status is “in name only”.  It was only in March 2026 that the EU suspended the visa-free travel for the holders of Georgian diplomatic passports. Georgian officials, politicians and diplomats need a visa to travel to the EU. If they try to use their ordinary passports, they risk receiving entry bans. This measure saved the rest of the population from turning into collateral victims of a generalised suspension of the visa-free regime. The EU has been carefully measuring its responses to avoid undermining pro-EU support among Georgians. Although the European Parliament has passed resolutions calling for targeted sanctions on Ivanishvili and his regime dating back to 2025, the EU has been postponing such measures. This could have been due to the pro-“Georgian Dream” lobby in the EU of the former Prime Minister of Hungary, Viktor Orbán, who has used the veto power extensively to delay sanctions on Russia and block Ukraine’s accession talks. With Orban’s defeat in the April elections, the imposition of potential sanctions against Ivanishvili obtains a second chance. This would align the EU with the US, which sanctioned Ivanishvili in December 2024. The “Georgian Dream” hopes to reanimate the US-Georgia relations in the coming weeks by offering investment deals to the circle linked to Donald Trump. This means that the EU has little time to implement its sanctions before the US sanctions are lifted. The EU’s sanctions policy could keep pressure on Ivanishvili as part of a broader strategy to support pro-EU forces.

Although the political dialogue is under strain, Georgia is using its status as a transit country and the EU’s dependence on Azerbaijan to keep European investment flowing into interconnection projects. This is already benefiting the undersea cable via the Black Sea, which is moving closer to materialisation following the Romania-Georgia memorandum, signed in February 2026. Azerbaijan’s role in pushing forward the Black Sea Green Energy Corridor, which was listed among the top energy transmission projects for 2026, is underestimated. However, if it were not for Baku’s strategic cooperation with the EU in the energy sector, Brussels would have had a hard time swallowing the idea of collaborating with the Georgian government, which is accused of rolling back democracy.

Georgia’s hidden cards

The EU needs to take Georgia’s potential to influence the Eastern Partnership’s enlargement process seriously.

Primarily, Georgia is grooming ties with the pro-Russian Socialists Party and Eurosceptic sovereignist forces (“Alternative Platform” and the “Democracy at Home” Party from Moldova), who were recently invited for a visit as part of the inter-parliamentary friendship group. This serves as yet another channel for circulating narratives about Georgia’s economic success and its investment in sovereignty, rather than aligning with the EU, which are frequently circulated in the Moldovan media space. Beyond being hostile to the EU, such narratives also strengthen Russia’s propagandistic efforts in the wider region. Moldova (and Ukraine) are used as an anti-model that Georgia rejects because these countries are associated with “territorial loss” or “statehood abolition” in exchange for EU accession.

Furthermore, Georgia, the most pro-EU country in the South Caucasus, is perceived by Armenia as a gateway to the EU. In his statement at the European Parliament in March 2026, the Prime Minister of Armenia, Nikol Pashinyan, underlined that Georgia’s candidate status made the same prospect for Armenia “more tangible”. This speaks volumes about what is at stake for the EU in Georgia, whose voluntary or forced withdrawal from the enlargement package will also isolate the Armenian bid. The interconnection projects between the South Caucasus and Europe run through Georgia. Even if Türkiye were to suddenly advance its own EU accession process and ties with Armenia were successfully normalised, Georgia would remain more consequential for Armenia’s integration into the EU market. In the absence of that, leaving the Russian and the Eurasian Economic Union’s customs union will be much more costly. Consequently, without Georgia, which continues the Europeanization, Armenia will be more susceptible to Russian influence.

To conclude, the evidence indicates that Georgia seeks to build symmetric relations with the EU, inspired by Azerbaijan’s model of dialogue with Brussels on equal footing. The difference is that Azerbaijan has no interest in joining the EU or even embracing European integration, whereas Georgia has long sought rapprochement with the EU. In such an unfriendly context, the EU has to be more proactive and redesign its strategy towards Georgia. The options, however, are limited: to engage with a Eurosceptic and sovereignist Georgia on pragmatic terms, replicating the Azerbaijani model, or to isolate the current Georgian political regime and support the pro-EU actors until political changes reverse the country’s autocratization witnessed today.