“Europe Must Lead, Ukraine Must Endure”: An Interview with Benedetta Berti | LFPR Vol. 44, 2026

As Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine grinds on, NATO governments face twin imperatives: help Kyiv today and shape a security order that deters aggression tomorrow. Benedetta Berti, Secretary General of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, argues that the stakes extend far beyond Europe’s borders — to the credibility of the rules-based order and the message sent to other authoritarian actors.

In this conversation with Linas Kojala, she outlines why Allies must maintain military aid at a high level, “at speed, at scale;” how defence-industrial cooperation with Ukraine can strengthen European and transatlantic security, and what a recalibrated transatlantic bargain should look like: a strong U.S. commitment within a NATO where European Allies and Canada lead on conventional deterrence and defence.

Linas Kojala: From your perspective, what are the stakes of Russia’s war against Ukraine, and how do you see NATO’s role in supporting a just and lasting peace?

Benedetta Berti: Russia is not just an existential threat for Ukraine, but it was also really part of a larger vision to redraw the rules of European security, to redraw borders and to re-establish spheres of influence aided and abetted by countries like North Korea, Iran and the People’s Republic of China. So I think from the beginning it was clear what the stakes were and also there was an impact not just for regional and European security but also for global security and for the rules-based international order. I believe that point of view remains strong.

I believe that we continue to see that the stakes are incredibly high and that’s why all NATO allies support a long-lasting and just peace in Ukraine — and that means a peace that ensures that Ukraine is a sovereign, free and secure country; that ensures that aggression is not rewarded, because that would also send very worrisome signals to other authoritarian competitors and adversaries and have a very direct negative impact on the international rules-based order.

From the NATO perspective, there has been a clear, immediate focus on providing assistance to Ukraine here and now. The situation on the battlefield remains complicated; Russia’s aggression has continued to escalate and continues to target Ukrainian civil infrastructure and civilians as part of its broader strategy to try to cripple Ukraine’s will to fight. But this strategy is failing because Ukraine remains steadfast in its ability to respond to aggression.

The first priority has been to provide the military support that Ukraine needs to fight this war and defend itself. NATO allies continue to provide roughly 99 percent of all military assistance to Ukraine, meaning that more than the vast majority comes from NATO allies.

In 2024, 50 billion euros were mobilized in military assistance to Ukraine, 60 percent of which came from European countries and Canada – also showing that Europeans are doing more in a context of shifting burden-sharing between our American friends and Europeans, where Europeans are taking more responsibility for the conventional deterrence and defence of Europe and for European security writ large.

In the first half of 2025, we added over $35 billion again for security and defence cooperation to Ukraine. Now NATO is focusing on the PURL (Prioritized Ukraine Requirements List); more than 2 billion euros have already been mobilised. This is a crucial mechanism to ensure that urgently needed equipment is purchased from the United States and delivered to Ukraine at speed and scale, enabling them to remain in the fight.

NATO also has its own mechanism, which involves security assistance and training for Ukraine. This mechanism works in conjunction with PURL, ensuring coordination between the assistance provided by all allies to support Ukraine at scale, speed, and with what it needs.

Another aspect is the support for political measures aimed at putting pressure on Russia to dry up its sources of support for the war. That’s why there has been support for sanctions; the shadow fleet, for instance, an important source of income that should be absolutely targeted in my view. And then, of course, also looking at how to dry up the coffers of Putin’s war machine and the support he receives from third parties outside the Euro-Atlantic area, including China.

The second priority, in addition to supporting Ukraine today, is to look to the future – how we can contribute to ensuring that there is a modern, effective, and agile Ukrainian defence force that will be able to continue to deter and defend the country the day after a political settlement. This is more of a long-term transformation of the Ukrainian armed forces, enhancing interoperability with NATO standards and improving its own effectiveness and agility.

However, I must be very clear: it’s a two-way street. Ukraine is teaching us as much as we are teaching them; this is a real partnership. When NATO countries work with Ukraine’s industry and innovation ecosystem, the benefits go beyond Ukraine’s own defense – they also strengthen our forces and our security. Ukraine’s defense-industrial base is among the most effective in Europe. It truly runs both ways. That’s another priority: not only securing a just, long-lasting peace today, but also preparing for the day after a political settlement, so Ukraine can deter and defend itself. This is the second – and equally important – line of effort from a NATO perspective.

Linas Kojala: You mentioned the defence industry. Do you see under-explored opportunities where the business community can bring agility and know-how to help governments and NATO respond to the changing nature of war?

Benedetta Berti: NATO and Ukraine set up actually a joint training and lessons-learned centre, JATEC, in Poland, where these conversations are happening daily. There are a lot of exchanges at the civil and military level, and of course also around defence-industrial cooperation.

NATO is undertaking the largest reinforcement of our collective defence in generations. That brings many challenges. One is sustaining higher defence spending – and we are doing so. At the last NATO summit, allies backed a plan to move toward spending five percent of GDP on defence: 3.5 percent for core defence requirements and 1.5 percent for security-related expenses.

However, the key point is to convert additional capital into the capabilities our militaries require to enhance output. We also require a much stronger defence-industrial base on both sides of the Atlantic, particularly in Europe. There are real opportunities to work with our Ukrainian friends. Over the past few years they have shown what an innovative, cutting-edge, responsive defence-industrial ecosystem looks like – procurement, integration of new technologies into equipment, and fielding that equipment at speed.

There is so much we can learn from our Ukrainian counterparts. Looking ahead, there is a huge opportunity to increase and strengthen defence cooperation. This is not only beneficial for Ukraine’s security; it is equally advantageous for European and NATO security, as we would be learning – especially on issues like drone warfare – from the best. It is essential to view this cooperation not as a one-way street, but as a partnership that strengthens us all.

Linas Kojala: There’s a recurring argument – especially outside the Euro-Atlantic area – that the West should have brought Russia fully into Europe’s security architecture, even NATO. Would that have solved today’s problems?

Benedetta Berti: If you look at NATO allies’ relations with the Russian Federation after the end of the Cold War, you can really see – especially in the 90s – that there was a concerted effort to bring Russia much closer to us from a political dialogue perspective and from practical cooperation.

Indeed, a special political body, the NATO-Russia Council, was created in 2002. There were countless exchanges at the political level; political dialogue; practical cooperation on counterterrorism. In other words, the policy point I’m making: NATO did extend a very open door to political engagement and strengthening the relationship with Russia.

We did that at a time in which, of course, there was the hope that in the post-Cold War security arrangement we could all agree to abide by the same principles: respect for territorial integrity, sovereignty, and refraining from the use or threat of force. We all agreed on the same principles. On that basis, we started to build a constructive, security-based relationship.

Yet Russia changed its mind over what it wanted from the post-Cold War security order. President Putin made it very clear as early as 2007 at the Munich Security Conference. If you do not want to listen to the words, listen to the deeds: the war in Georgia in 2008; the illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014. They did not believe the post-Cold War architecture, based on respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, and the defence of each country, worked for Russia.

What Putin wanted was the redrawing of borders and the re-establishment of spheres of influence, returning to a world in which Russia could control, directly or indirectly, its neighbours and not respect their free and sovereign choices, including their foreign policy.

Clearly, that’s not a position compliant with international law, the UN Charter, or compatible with our desire to live in a continent that is stable and peaceful, with each country free to conduct its foreign policy, make its own alliances, and have its sovereignty fully respected.

So, we changed our relationship in response to the change in behaviour from the Russian Federation, and that was a gradual process. After 2014, we established a no-business-as-usual policy with respect to Russia after its illegal annexation of Crimea, whereby we stopped all practical cooperation but continued with dialogue, thinking that maybe through dialogue we would resolve our differences and return to compliance with international law.

It didn’t work. To the contrary – this is my personal opinion, not an official one – I think our attempt to appease led us to a security situation where we are now less secure, and where President Putin mistook our attempt to find a resolution for weakness and escalated with a full-fledged war of aggression that started in 2022.

In the future, if Russia fundamentally changes its course then we will have a conversation accordingly. However, the best way to ensure that war ends with a just and lasting peace, where Ukraine is sovereign, secure, prosperous, and independent.

Linas Kojala: Finally, there’s anxiety about the state of transatlantic ties, debates about U.S. commitment to NATO. How do you see the way forward?

Benedetta Berti: Yes, there are changes. We know that there is a changing course in the nature of the transatlantic bargain, quote unquote. The result must be that, within a strong transatlantic framework – with a strong U.S. commitment to European security, to Article 5, and to extended nuclear deterrence – there still needs to be a shift. That shift needs to ensure the Europeans take a primary role for conventional deterrence and defence of Europe and of our territory over time. So that’s a shift of the burden, so to speak, where we have a Europe-led NATO.