This text is excerpted from Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review, Vol. 44 (2026).
Europe and Asia are facing many of the same pressures today. War, rising military budgets, new regional alignments, and uncertain great-power leadership are reshaping how states think about security. In a recent conversation, Dr. Lee Sungwon of the Sejong Institute and Dr. Konstantinas Andrijauskas of the Geopolitics and Security Studies Center shared their views on how these forces are reshaping cooperation between South Korea and Europe. Their exchange circled around three main themes: Europe’s renewed defense buildup and its meaning for the Indo-Pacific, and the ambiguous policy of the U.S.
Europe Rearms, and the Indo-Pacific Matters
Dr. Lee noted that Europe is in the middle of a major shift. With Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, “Europe’s security environment has become increasingly complex,” and European states now feel a stronger need to defend themselves and invest in military readiness. The European Union’s “Readiness 2030” initiative signals long-term planning rather than just short-term response. But this raises a question: Will Europe still stay engaged in the Indo-Pacific, a region where European views have become more active in recent years?
For the past half decade, European governments have sent ships to the region, taken part in exercises, and released Indo-Pacific guidelines describing the region as strategically important. Yet Dr. Lee pointed out that much of this activity has been limited and mostly symbolic. Many missions focused on piracy patrols and humanitarian roles rather than sustained military presence. As he put it, “Europe’s military presence in the Indo-Pacific has never been substantial enough to change China’s calculus.”
However, he suggested that cooperation may shift toward defense industry, supply chains, and joint production. The Indo-Pacific now accounts for roughly one-fifth of global defense spending, and Lee described the region as “a growing opportunity for cooperation” rather than a distant arena. South Korea and Europe share similar threat concerns and a need to diversify defense production. This gives real ground for partnership, especially with countries like Poland and Lithuania.
Dr. Andrijauskas agreed and pointed to the recent South Korea–Poland defense partnership as evidence that cooperation can expand quickly when strategic needs align.
Russia, China, and North Korea: A Tightening Triangle
Both scholars expressed concern at the closer coordination among Russia, China, and North Korea. Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has revealed a new level of cooperation: Russia turning to North Korean artillery and missiles, China helping Russia economically and diplomatically, and all three standing together in their broader opposition to the West.
But Dr. Lee was clear about the limits of outside influence. “Neither Europe nor South Korea possesses sufficient leverage to create a meaningful distance among them,” he said. Even when countries share concerns, they do not always share a strategy. Within Europe, some states see China as a direct security challenge; others still see it as an economic partner.
This makes it difficult to send one consistent message to Beijing or Pyongyang. Dr. Andrijauskas added that Russia’s war in Ukraine is at the heart of how this alignment develops. If Russia succeeds or even maintains its current occupied territories, it will reinforce authoritarian confidence in other regions. What once felt like separate regions now feel directly linked. As he put it, “How many people expected that we would have North Korean troops less than a thousand kilometers from where we sit now [in Vilnius]?” – referring to North Korean personnel aiding Russia.
For both scholars, the key response is not to try to break the alignment, but to strengthen cooperation among democratic partners themselves: clearer deterrence, better coordination, and political steadiness.
An Unpredictable United States and the Case for Closer Korea–Europe Ties
The third theme was the uncertainty surrounding American foreign policy. The U.S. remains the most important security partner for both Europe and South Korea. Yet the direction of U.S. strategy is less predictable today than in the past. Middle powers must prepare to rely more on themselves and on one another. South Korea has already increased defense spending and widened its security role. Central and Northern European states are doing the same. In this sense, closer ties between Europe and South Korea are not just possible – they are practical.
One promising area is cyber and undersea infrastructure protection, where both regions face constant pressure. Lee noted that South Korea experiences daily hacking attempts from North Korea: “Every week, I get a call saying I’ve been hacked and need to change something.” Lithuania, too, has faced cyberattacks, airspace pressure, and disinformation attempts. These are areas where cooperation can be built immediately, without waiting for grand strategy.
Conclusion
Europe and Asia may be far apart, but their security challenges are increasingly connected. Both face revisionist neighbors, shifting alliances, and uncertain signals from the world’s leading power. What Dr. Lee and Dr. Andrijauskas made clear is that cooperation is no longer a diplomatic slogan – it is a practical necessity shaped by shared reality.
Read the full publication here.
