Introduction
This report analyses the changing role of Russian information operations across Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Germany, and Poland, bringing together eight country-focused studies into a single analytical policy paper. It examines how the Russian Federation and other actors use propaganda and disinformation as part of a broader strategy of influence, presenting both the techniques and channels employed as well as the dominant narratives tailored to respective country’s context. In doing so, the report provides a comparative perspective (see Summary), identifying not only cross-country similarities but also the ways in which influence operations are adapted to local political, social, and informational environments. It places Russian activities alongside the growing, though distinct, influence efforts of other authoritarian actors such as Belarus and China, whose approaches differ in scale, scope, intensity, and intent but increasingly overlap within the same information space.
The growing importance of information as a tool of state power is not accidental. In 2013 already, General of the Army Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, argued that the “rules of war” were changing, with non-military means, especially information, becoming key to achieving strategic goals. This way of thinking has since become deeply embedded in Russian political and military discourse. It shows a broader understanding of conflict in which influencing debates and opinions, as well as weakening opponents’ societal unity, can be as effective as the use of military force. These ideas have been further reflected in official doctrinal documents of the Russian Federation and echoed by influential figures within Russia’s state-controlled media ecosystem, including RT (Russia Today) editor-in-chief Margarita Simonyan, who has openly advocated for the importance of information warfare.
Over the past two decades, Russia has steadily developed this approach. What began as a relatively fragmented set of influence activities in the early 2000s has evolved into a more coordinated and adaptive system. Key turning points were the colour revolutions in Yugoslavia, Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan, as well as the Russo-Georgian War, which once again reinforced the Kremlin’s view that information space is a critical arena of competition.
Since then, the Kremlin has invested heavily in its global communication capabilities, most visibly through launching state-backed outlet RT, but also through a wide range of less visible and obvious channels to better its image and “tell its own story”.
While Russian information activities are global, they are particularly pronounced in Northern, Central, and Eastern Europe. These regions are not only geographically close to Russia but also politically and historically significant, making them especially relevant targets for influence operations. For example, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, as well as Poland, are still often referred to as the “blizhneye zarubezhye” (“near abroad”) — a term showing that Moscow still considers these countries as belonging to its sphere of influence. Adding to that, since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, these efforts have intensified further, with many analysts noting a sharp increase in both the volume and sophistication of disinformation campaigns. National threat assessments across the eight selected countries consistently identify Russia as the primary or, at the very least, one of the two most serious adversaries, with little indication that this will change in the near term, instead signalling toward a sustained, coordinated, and adaptive long-term challenge.
What makes the current Russian influence operations unique is its combination of continuity and adaptation. Many techniques — such as narrative framing, the use of proxies, and the exploitation of social divisions — have clear roots in Soviet-era practices. At the same time, these old methods are now reinforced by modern technologies, for example by algorithm-driven amplification, coordinated online behaviour (bots), and the use of artificial intelligence. Recent campaigns like “Doppelgänger” showed how these tools can be used to imitate credible sources and blur the line between authentic and manipulated content. The scale and sophistication of such operations make this analysis particularly timely, as “Doppelgänger” is widely considered one of the most extensive and impactful pro-Russian disinformation campaigns identified to date. Meta has classified “Doppelgänger” as an advanced persistent threat (APT) and emphasised the campaign’s adaptability and longevity.
Several key questions guide the analysis:
Across the countries examined in this report, Kremlin influence operations rarely rely on a single message or narrative. Instead, they work by affecting the whole information environment by creating confusion, uncertainty, and gradually eroding trust. Rather than attempting to persuade audiences of a specific version of reality, contemporary Russian propaganda increasingly seeks to erode the very idea of objective truth. In contrast to Soviet-era propaganda, whose goal was to demonstrate the correctness and superiority of its claims, current Kremlin communication operates on a more relativistic logic — suggesting that truth is subjective, contingent, and dependent on perspective. By creating ambiguity and competing interpretations, these actions make it harder to distinguish fact from fiction, while simultaneously exploiting existing societal tensions related to history, identity, economic pressures, or migration.
For this reason, the report treats propaganda not as isolated messages, but as a systemic practice that has evolved from persuasion toward the deliberate production of doubt and epistemic uncertainty. Despite differences in methods across countries, the objectives are widely assessed to include weakening trust in democratic institutions, undermining support for Ukraine and Euro-Atlantic cooperation, and deepening social divisions. These efforts also tend to intensify during periods of crisis, such as elections or economic shocks, when societies are more vulnerable to manipulation.
Under these circumstances, the report not only explains how Russian information influence works, but also how different countries respond to it. It analyses national approaches ranging from institutional coordination and strategic communication to media literacy and legal measures, showing both strengths and persistent gaps. By comparing these experiences, the report identifies lessons for strengthening resilience at both national and regional levels.
Purpose and Research Questions
This policy paper builds on the country studies by taking a comparative approach to hostile information influence in these countries. Its focus is not limited to narratives alone but extends to the broader ecosystem in which influence takes place — covering actors, channels, and techniques. The aim is to better understand how coordinated Russian influence operations shape the public debate, use vulnerabilities, and affect resilience of the society.
• How do contemporary techniques — such as coordinated amplification or AI manipulation — affect societal vulnerability?
• How are narratives embedded within specific political, historical, and linguistic contexts?
• How do influence operations contribute to broader hybrid strategies aimed at fostering distrust, polarisation, and decision-making paralysis?
• What steps can countries take to move from reactive responses toward more proactive and systemic approaches, including whole-of-society resilience models and early-warning mechanisms?
The report also places national experiences within a wider regional perspective. While each country faces distinct challenges, many of the dynamics are shared. By comparing how states identify threats, organise responses, and build resilience, the paper highlights opportunities for closer coordination and mutual learning. In doing so, it gives practical recommendations to strengthen collective defence against information threats and to scale effective countermeasures across the region.
The publication can be found in English HERE.