Bulgaria’s Snap Parliamentary Elections: Key Takeaways

On April 20, GSSC hosted a conversation on Bulgaria’s snap parliamentary elections. Here are the key insights from the discussion.

Bulgaria’s latest snap parliamentary election resulted in a clear victory for former President Rumen Radev’s Progressive Bulgaria, which won nearly 45% of the vote and is expected to secure around 130 of the 240 seats in parliament. It means that Radev will be able to form a government on his own. Former Prime Minister Boyko Borissov’s centre-right GERB-SDS (EPP) came a distant second with just 13.3% of the vote, or roughly 39 seats, reflecting a sharp erosion of its electoral support. It was followed by the liberal-reformist We Continue the Change–Democratic Bulgaria (Renew) coalition, which obtained 12.6% and an estimated 37 seats. Further behind, DPS-NN, associated with the Turkish minority electorate and led by U.S.-sanctioned Delyan Peevski, captured 7% of the vote, while the pro-Russian Revival party (ESN) narrowly cleared the parliamentary threshold with 4.3%, equivalent to around 13 seats. Most notably, BSP-United Left (S&D) failed to enter parliament, marking the first time since Bulgaria’s democratic transition that the socialist left has been excluded from the legislature.

Radev wins, everyone else loses

Former President Radev’s victory was widely expected and anticipated by most pre-election polling, which placed him at around 30–35% of the vote. What was not expected, however, was a landslide that would leave him with a governing majority of his own. With 45% of the vote, Radev can now form a government without relying on coalition partners. Moreover, given that turnout rose by more than 10–15 percentage points compared with previous snap elections between 2021 and 2025, Radev’s success amounts to more than a simple electoral victory: it gives him a genuine political mandate to implement his programme.

Radev’s victory also implies the defeat of all other political forces. He did not simply benefit from higher turnout and the mobilisation of previous abstentionists; he also appears to have drawn support from across the political spectrum. First, he attracted voters from traditional mainstream parties, most notably the Bulgarian Socialist Party, which failed to cross the threshold for the first time in its history. He also seems to have won over parts of Boyko Borissov’s centre-right GERB electorate. Second, Radev managed to appeal both to supporters of ultranationalist movements such as Revival and to some reformist-liberal voters previously aligned with We Continue the Change (more than with Democratic Bulgaria). In that sense, everyone other than Radev lost on Sunday’s elections. Borissov and his allies lost power and recorded their worst result in decades. Peevski may see his influence within the Bulgarian system reduced if not vanished and also posted a mediocre result. The liberal reformists failed to capitalise on the large-scale protests they had helped lead only a few months ago, while the nationalists did not confirm their recent rise in Bulgarian politics.

Radev: an anti-system figure from within the system

Radev’s success is relatively easy to explain. Like several other parties or political figures in recent Bulgarian elections, he was able to harness political momentum. One may think here of Trifonov and ITN, or of We Continue the Change under the Petkov–Vassilev duo, both of which previously won support by embodying hopes for change in Bulgarian politics. Unlike them, however, Radev not only won the election: he has potentially secured the means to govern for the next four years without the instability of coalition politics.

His success can largely be explained by his ability to distance himself from mainstream politics while skilfully using the institutional authority of the presidency and capitalising on the popularity he demonstrated in 2016 and confirmed in 2021. Over the past four years of political instability, Radev sought to present himself as the “adult in the room”, criticising both mainstream parties and reformist forces for their behaviour and for their perceived disregard for voters. He denounced what he described as a “cartel of parties” and translated this posture into a political campaign after leaving the presidency: to bring change to Bulgaria, to dismantle entrenched systemic corruption, and to rid the country of what he called a political mafia. With this agenda, he was able to tap into the protest movements that have formed the background to Bulgarian politics in recent years and that peaked again in December 2025.

More broadly, Radev has been able to bridge the deep divisions that have complicated coalition-building in Bulgaria over the past several years. Contemporary Bulgarian politics can broadly be understood through two separate axes: pro-status quo versus pro-reform, and pro-EU versus pro-Russia. Radev managed to convince voters that he stood against the status quo without alienating those who are sceptical of liberal reform. At the same time, he presented himself as a figure who puts domestic priorities first, while treating foreign policy as a secondary issue for a country like Bulgaria, which in his view must remain pragmatic in any case.

That said, it is important to recall that Radev is himself a product of the Bulgarian system, which raises legitimate questions about both his willingness and his ability to reform it. First, he emerged from mainstream politics: he was originally selected and elevated by the Bulgarian Socialist Party in 2016 and supported again in 2021. Second, he has been part of the political system and its dysfunctions for nearly a decade through his role as a president. He is not an outsider to the system – he is a part of it. He appointed caretaker governments, at times shaped or constrained negotiations, and was fully involved in the workings of Bulgarian politics as well as controversial behaviour such as rising tensions around the adoption of the euro currency. Yet he was clever enough to portray himself as an agent of change.

With a parliamentary majority, Radev is now technically in a position to implement at least part of his agenda. Whether he will do so is another matter. He has promised rapid changes concerning judicial independence and the appointment of a new Prosecutor General. To achieve this, however, he will need to secure compromises with other political forces in order to obtain a supermajority of 160 seats. Will he work with mainstream parties or with liberal reformists? The answer will provide an early indication of how serious he is about reform. The risk is that Bulgaria may end up with a leader who opposes the status quo not because he seeks to dismantle it, but because he was not its main beneficiary – and who may therefore attempt to reshape the system not in order to reform it, but to redirect its benefits. And when someone is so close to Moscow, how can he be trusted to destroy one of the most strategic tools of Russian influence in the country?

Radev: a pro-Russian asset?

Radev played an important and often controversial role in foreign policy during his presidency. Even if he has been less overtly provocative than figures such as former Czech President Miloš Zeman, Croatian President Zoran Milanović, or Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, he has nevertheless defended a controversial line grounded in the language of pragmatism and peace. In this regard, his posture at times resembles that of Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico. It should be noted that Slovakia and Bulgaria share some similar societal characteristics in terms of foreign policy attitudes. In both countries, a significant part of the population is sceptical of the West – including EU membership, NATO membership, and U.S. security guarantees – while remaining more open to relations with Russia on the basis of specific historical narratives and perceived shared values. Russia has long been adept at operating in such environments, relying on pan-Slavic narratives and on the idea that it played a decisive role in the independence of these nations (against Turkey in the case of Bulgaria).

Radev has clearly played on nationalist sentiments in Bulgaria and, to some extent, on a pro-Russian register – and therefore, since 2022, on an implicitly anti-Ukrainian one as well. Over the past few years, his positions and statements have included the non-recognition of Crimea as unquestionably Ukrainian territory, opposition to Ukraine’s EU accession, opposition to military support for Ukraine, and repeated calls for dialogue with Russia and Vladimir Putin. During the closing rally of his campaign, he displayed a photograph of himself with Putin. Was this merely a get-out-the-vote tactic designed to maximise support among nationalist voters? Perhaps. Perhaps it is more than this.

Radev’s links to Moscow have also surfaced in a number of files and investigative reports. The most important remains the so-called “Reshetnikov case”. According to investigative reporting, Radev was identified in 2016 as an ideal candidate both for the BSP and for Moscow in the presidential election, which he went on to win a few months later. Based on sociological studies allegedly conducted by Russian intelligence agents, including Mr. Reshetnikov, “on behalf” of the socialists, Radev’s profile was seen as matching the common objectives of both sides. As a military figure with no prior partisan career, he was an ideal candidate to elevate to the presidency and integrate into the political system. Additional links within military, diplomatic, and energy circles also point to connections with Russian networks. One particularly important issue to monitor during the first months of his mandate will be his position on whether Bulgaria should further reduce – or maintain – its energy dependence on Russia through the Turkish Stream and energy operators in the country.

A new Orbán?

This is the question many in Brussels and elsewhere are now asking after Radev’s clear victory. It is a legitimate question, but it should not become the central one. Radev is not Orbán and is unlikely to become an Orbán-like figure for two simple reasons: Bulgaria is not Hungary, and Radev does not possess the same level of power, ideological coherence, or political skill as Orbán.

Bulgaria has not traditionally behaved as a vocal or disruptive player within the EU, nor does it appear to have any strong ambition to do so. On the contrary, Bulgarian governments have generally preferred to remain within the consensus in order to protect national interests and maintain access to EU benefits. One notable exception remains Bulgaria’s continued veto posture towards North Macedonia’s EU accession process. This is likely to continue, as it has become an important domestic issue for a broad share of the Bulgarian electorate, not just for the nationalist fringe.

More broadly, however, Bulgaria is likely to remain cautious about obstructing EU decisions or initiatives related to Ukraine, especially if doing so would isolate the country and potentially affect access to cohesion funding or defence-related instruments such as SAFE. In the defence sphere, even if Radev is likely to play the “peace card” for domestic purposes, the defence industry remains a lucrative sector, and restricting arms-related activity would be difficult for any politician, and more so due to Radev’s military background. In that respect, he is likely to follow something close to the Borissov doctrine in EU–Bulgaria relations: behave well in Brussels in order to preserve freedom of action at home, even when domestic governance does not fully align with EU standards and values.

At EU level, Radev also lacks clear allies. His party is only a few weeks old and does not yet belong to an established European political family. It will be interesting to see whether he signals moderation by aligning with the Socialists and Democrats, thereby maintaining the legacy of the BSP, or whether he opts for a more sovereigntist and confrontational grouping such as Patriots for Europe. Even in that case, however, Radev is nowhere near Orbán’s level in terms of networks across the European sovereigntist right, let alone transatlantic connections with MAGA circles.

In summary, Radev will very likely be more a problem for Bulgarian democracy and independence rather than for EU politics.

What to watch?

In the coming weeks, several issues will deserve close attention.

• First, the composition of the new government will be highly significant. Will Radev appoint largely technocratic figures tasked with delivering concrete changes in the judiciary and the rule-of-law system? Or will he instead nominate overtly political figures who promote a more hardline sovereigntist narrative at home, combined with Eurosceptic and Kremlin-friendly rhetoric aimed at satisfying parts of his electorate and sending signals internationally? An early test will be whether he attempts to reassert control over the Prosecutor General’s office, and if so, with which parliamentary partners.
• Second, it will be important to observe how Radev exercises leadership over his own party. At this stage, there is little clarity about the true nature of his electorate: he managed to assemble 45% of the vote on the basis of a largely populist platform with limited programmatic precision. Nor is there much certainty about how cohesive his parliamentary group will prove to be, since many of his MPs come from different backgrounds and may behave quite differently once in office. The unity and durability of Radev’s movement will therefore be tested quickly, even if a four-year mandate now appears possible on paper. Local elections in a few months’ time will offer a first important indication.
• Finally, it will become clear quite rapidly how Radev chooses to balance rhetoric and practice in relation to the EU and NATO. Will he adopt a more confrontational tone externally in order to satisfy nationalist voters and perhaps signal to external supporters such as Russia? Or will he remain broadly consensual in Brussels and within NATO structures in order to safeguard Bulgaria’s strategic and financial interests, while reserving harder rhetoric for domestic politics?