The Yerevan-Baku “Peace” Deal and the Fate of the EU’s Mission in Armenia

A ‘peace deal’ between Azerbaijan and Armenia is slowly taking shape. The agreement’s text, allegedly including 17 articles, is ready for signature. The two sides have made considerable political-diplomatic progress to find a common ground under conditions of low mutual trust. The long chain of military actions carried out by Azerbaijan, starting with the Second Karabakh War of 2020 to restore its territorial reintegration, shattered Armenia’s post-Soviet security architecture. When Azerbaijani forces took control of Karabakh in September 2023, the outflow of more than 100,000 ethnic Armenians from the region, due to three decades of mutual painting as enemies, damaged Azerbaijan’s international reputation. The regional shift in power balance and the fact that Baku spoke of bridging with its Nakhichevan region through the Zangezur corridor for a long time prompted fears about Azerbaijani militarized goals against Armenia. Azerbaijan’s repeatedly proven military supremacy and the warming strategic ties of Baku with Moscow pushed the Armenian side to seek Western support. This led to the inception of the EU mission in Armenia (EUMA) in February 2023.

The deployment of EUMA has the features of a light form of deterrence against Baku. The EU’s mission is civilian, but even so, Armenia could use it to testify against any threats coming from the borders with the Azerbaijani side. Simultaneously, Russia’s security commitments to Armenia are still officially in place and are linked to the Russian 102nd military base, which has a mandate until 2044, last renewed in 2011 Moscow’s lack of resolve to prevent Azerbaijan from taking control of its territories claimed from Armenia prompted Yerevan to seek security alternatives in Brussels. The 2008 strategic partnership upgraded by Presidents Ilham Aliyev and Vladimir Putin with “allied relations” in 2022 makes Russia more reliable for Baku, which knows Russia has a military base on Armenian soil. The EU mission in Armenia introduces a new geopolitical actor, the EU, into the region’s security dynamics, making Azerbaijan uncomfortable because it cannot have a say in the mission’s functioning. Consequently, Baku seems determined to attach the progress towards a peace deal to the exclusion of the EU’s civilian mission from Armenia. This casts uncertainty over the future of the EU mission (EUMA) in Armenia despite its recently renewed mandate until February 2027.

What is Baku’s negotiation position?

Azerbaijan’s list of demands in its peace talks with Armenia includes three blocks. The first matter revolves around the full return of its territories in line with Soviet borders. This is followed by dismantling the conflict settlement format dedicated to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, which would attest to Azerbaijan’s status as free from separatism. Lastly, the Azerbaijani side desires to end legal cases brought up by Yerevan at international institution, such as the International Court of Justice.

Regarding territorial requests, as early as May 2024, Yerevan agreed to revise its borders in favor of Baku’s regaining control of several villages (Baghanis Ayrum, Ashaghi Askipara, Kheyrimli and Ghizilhajili) in Armenia’s Gazakh district. Despite numerous anti-government protests, Yerevan retroceded four villages to Baku’s control. As part of the territorial claims, Baku’s standing objection is the Armenian Constitution’s reference to the 1990 Declaration of Independence because the latter mentions the “reunification” with Karabakh. Azerbaijan refuses to agree to a peace agreement and resumption of normal bilateral relations until the Armenian constitution is amended to exclude territorial claims. If a peace deal is to be reached, it should be based on the full restoration of the borders within which Armenia and Azerbaijan outlined in the Alma-Ata 1991 Declaration, enabling the establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States, to which both still belong.

Dismantling the OSCE Minsk Group, after 33 years of functioning, is the culmination of the only post-Soviet “frozen conflict” solved so far. The Azerbaijani side calls the format “obsolete” and “dysfunctional”. Armenia does not oppose this proposal either. The US, French and Russian Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group published their last statement in December 2021. The aspects of humanitarian aid and conflict settlement around the now nonexistent Karabakh issue, as transpires from the latest statements of the OSCE format, are outdated. The closure of the conflict settlement process on the OSCE platform automatically excludes the US and France from the regional security-building framework. This results in Russia and the EU being the only geopolitical players with military and civilian, respectively, roles in the region (beyond Georgia). The “geopolitical cocktail” is possible due to Armenia, which hosts Russia’s military base and the EU’s mission.

Equally important for Baku is to halt any international legal proceedings initiated by Armenia, especially after the exodus of Armenians from Karabakh, which has been compared to “ethnic cleansing.” Both sides are supposed to convene to withdraw their claims from the European Court of Human Rights and the International Criminal Court.

If fulfilled, Azerbaijan’s requests regarding the final text of the peace deal could provide Ilham Aliyev with greater reputational gains. Restoring Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity is an integral part of Aliyev’s legacy. Crafting a positive image of a post-conflict country for the outside world should also offset the domestic clampdown on local journalists and Western-educated critical academics.

Three ways to go for the EU’s mission in Armenia

Baku also requests that the Armenian side refuse to deploy “third-party forces” at the borders. This demand directly targets the 209 EU civilian personnel monitoring the bilateral borders from seven locations in Armenia. The question is whether Armenia can afford to be left without the EU’s monitoring eyes. Baku has consistently accused Brussels of allegedly using the mission to spy on Azerbaijan, referring to this as a form of “binocular diplomacy.” Armenia suggested that the EUMA be relocated to the areas where border demarcation is finalized. This does not resolve the issue for Baku, which perceives the EU’s mission as a threat, disregarding its current civilian nature and limited mandate.

The EUMA can and will survive if Armenia finds a formula that serves its sovereign choice over relations with the EU while addressing Baku’s concerns. One working scenario could be Armenia agreeing to recall its request to the EU over EUMA at the end of the renewed mandate in 2027. A second feasible approach is to keep the EU’s mission until all bilateral issues between the two sides are resolved (borders, corridors of communications, etc.). This approach would also include that the EU mission provides technical assistance in areas such as trade, the movement of people, and more. Such competencies are part of the EU Border Assistance Mission job description in the cooperation between Ukraine and Moldova regarding the Transnistrian region. A third potenial solution could be to keep the EUMA for as long as the EU deems necessary and, until then, to establish mixed trilateral groups involving trilateral groups involving Armenia, the EU, and Azerbaijan. In the same framework, regular visits for Azerbaijani stakeholders would be arranged to the EUMA to eliminate suspicions about the mission’s activity.

As things stand today, the peace arrangements are likely to impact the EU Mission in Armenia. It may need to change its mandate to remain useful to Yerevan without disturbing Baku. The cessation of the EUMA will be perceived as a step back against Armenian sovereignty, welcomed by both Azerbaijan and Russia, which understand that more EU presence in Armenia means more “engines” for the region’s Europeanization.