This text is excerpted from Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review, Vol. 44 (2026).
Tomoyuki Yoshida, Chief Executive Director at the Japan Institute of International Affairs, discusses Japan’s defense buildup, extended deterrence, alliance politics with the United States, links with Europe and Lithuania, and the risks surrounding Taiwan. Questions by Linas Kojala.
Linas Kojala: Japan is on course to raise defense spending to around 2 percent of GDP by early 2026. What are the primary drivers behind this shift? To what extent is it motivated by regional threat perceptions, alliance expectations, or domestic strategic rethinking?
Tomoyuki Yoshida: The primary driver of Japan’s decision to double its defense spending is the growing threat, as stipulated in the National Security Strategy adopted in 2022. Regional security environment, though, continues to deteriorate. China is proceeding with a rapid military buildup, including its nuclear arsenal. Maritime assertiveness in the East and South China Seas is intensifying. Large-scale military drills are often conducted around the Taiwan Strait and beyond. Chinese jet fighters intruded into Japanese territorial space, too. Aircraft carriers navigated into the Pacific Ocean across the island chains including Japan for the first time. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and its military cooperation with North Korea further increase DPRK’s threat to the region.
North Korea may have acquired technical assistance from Russia which may contribute to its military development program. North Korean soldiers learned modern warfare such as drone attacks, spoofing and electromagnetic wave tactics etc. through the battlefield experience in Russia. All these pose new existential threats.
Against this backdrop, Prime Minister Takaichi who took office in October 2025 decided to meet 2 percent of GDP target by the end of this fiscal year, moving up two years from the original plan of 2027. She also instructed the government and ruling party to examine amendment of the National Security Strategy and related documents. There is also growing public support for these moves.
These decisions came just before the visit of President Trump to Japan in late October. While the defense spending and national security policies are independently determined, the direction aligns with the U.S. expectation for Japan to bear more responsibilities. The 2 percent target reflected a benchmark by NATO.
While it is not a matter of numerical target but that of substantive capability to address deteriorating security environment, it is argued that 2 percent is not enough in near future.
Linas Kojala: The global non-proliferation regime is under pressure, with North Korea advancing its arsenal and Iran complicating monitoring efforts. How do these developments shape Japan’s security planning? Is the debate on Japan’s own deterrence posture evolving?
Tomoyuki Yoshida: Surrounded by countries possessing nuclear weapons, and facing multiple hotspots such as the Taiwan Strait, the Korean Peninsula, the East China Sea, and the South China Sea, this region’s security environment is the most serious in the world. Preserving national security of the country heavily depends on the U.S. extended deterrence.
However, amid deteriorating power balance, plus the shift of the U.S. defense priority, Japan should pursue fundamental strengthening of its own defense capabilities. While Japan forgoes its own nuclear arsenal, to address the rapid evolution of Chinese nuclear capabilities as well as development of North Korean weapons of mass destruction, Japan should drastically enhance deterrence and response capabilities.
By proactively fulfilling its own defense responsibilities, Japan aims to move away from the traditional “under the umbrella of the U.S.” extended deterrence and toward a more equal and mature alliance relationship, thereby improving the deterrence and response capabilities of the entire alliance.
The National Security Strategy of 2022 has specified the measures in this respect, including the possession of “counterstrike capabilities.” In accordance with the Defense Buildup Plan, the Japanese Self Defense Forces developed its own long-range standoff missiles and are examining the deployment planning.
Simultaneously, Japan is transforming the SDF’s command and control system to respond more seamlessly to diverse threats, including gray-zone situations. Three independent pillars of land, maritime and air forces are integrated under a single operational command. Under the single operational command, the SDF further establishes cross-domain structure including cyber, outer space, and electromagnetic domains. Japanese SDF also promotes the establishment of a seamless joint response mechanism with the U.S. forces to explore more effective and coordinated operation between two forces.
Japan also extends close defense cooperation with like-minded countries in the region such as Australia, South Korea, and the Philippines to build bilateral and mini-lateral security arrangements. They are also U.S. allies and share similar security concerns. If these mini-lateral defense arrangements develop into a formation of a lattice-like network in the future, it will generate a robust security structure to supplement and enhance regional deterrent capabilities.
Linas Kojala: President Trump’s autumn 2025 visit to Japan reaffirmed cooperation, but questions remain regarding burden-sharing and strategic priorities. How would you describe the current dynamics in the Japan–U.S. alliance? What are Japan’s core priorities in managing it going forward
Tomoyuki Yoshida: President Trump’s visit to Japan took place shortly after Prime Minister Takaichi took office. It was a golden opportunity for Japan to build personal trust between two leaders. It is widely assessed that the first encounter was quite successful and substantial.
President and Prime Minister reaffirmed their recognition that the Japan–U.S. alliance is the foundation of peace and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region and agreed to elevate the alliance to “even greater heights.” They also shared the importance of the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” concept and strengthen the framework for regional cooperation. There is a general consensus of shared security priorities that the alliance should address.
As for the burden-sharing expectations of the U.S., the President appreciated the intention of Japan to drastically strengthen its defense capabilities and explanation of the independent decision made to achieve 2 percent of GDP defense spending target immediately. Both leaders agreed to advance a broad range of security cooperation in order to further enhance the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan–U.S. Alliance. As a result, the burden-sharing aspect did not become an outstanding subject of the discussion.
On the other hand, there were various concrete outcomes in the field of economic security and economic cooperation. They reaffirmed the swift and continued efforts by both sides regarding the agreement on tariffs between two countries. Prime Minister and President signed a document on critical minerals and rare earths which promotes secure and resilient supply of strategic materials through mining and processing.
They also concurred to strengthen economic security initiatives, including critical technologies such as AI and shipbuilding as well as critical minerals and rare earths. Economic security policies are also main priorities of Takaichi government.
Linas Kojala: U.S. intelligence assessments suggest that Beijing aims to ensure the PLA is capable of a Taiwan contingency by 2027, though capability does not necessarily imply intent. Do you see the risk of military confrontation increasing, and how is Japan preparing for potential scenarios?
Tomoyuki Yoshida: U.S. intelligence assessments indicate that China aims to ensure the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is capable of reunification of Taiwan by 2027. This capability milestone, however, does not inherently mean that Beijing has determined to carry out military aggression by a specific date. China repeatedly emphasizes Taiwan is the most essential core interest. While the probability of contingency should not be overestimated, political resolve of Chinese leadership should not be underestimated.
China is rapidly expanding its military capabilities. They are holistic, including naval, amphibious, cyber, and space assets. China enacted the law to integrate coast guard vessels into military logistics. The PLA is conducting frequent, sophisticated military exercises around Taiwan, including simulated blockades and air and naval incursions.
While analysts recognize the risk of military confrontation grows as China’s military buildup changes the power balance and its assertive behavior is getting provocative, they also stress that credible deterrence is most crucial to prevent the worst-case scenario. The essential core of such deterrence is U.S. commitment in this region.
Economic quarantine under the grey zone situation may cause serious disruption of critical supply chains, including energy, food and critical assets like semiconductors. Therefore, the recent Japan–U.S. leaders meeting opposed unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force or coercion and reiterated the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. Japan has been primarily promoting diplomatic responses to outreach a number of likeminded counties including Europe while calling for China to solve the issue in peaceful manner without resorting the use of force.
Linas Kojala: Although geographically distant, Japan and Lithuania have strengthened ties based on democratic values. Where do you see the strongest areas of alignment, and why are these ties strategically important today between European and Asian countries?
Tomoyuki Yoshida: Japan and Lithuania share basic universal values such as democracy, human rights and freedom of expression. Both countries also commit to a rule-based international order.
Based upon this shared trust, Lithuania and Japan established Strategic Partnership in 2022. Under the partnership, substantial cooperation and dialogue have been conducted.
Security: As both Lithuania and Japan are neighbors of Russia, security perceptions of the severe geopolitical environment are quite similar. Strategic dialogue is mutually beneficial. As likeminded countries, both countries also collaborate by carrying out sanctions on Russia and extending substantial support to Ukraine.
Economy: Both countries deepen economic ties through trade, investment, tourism, innovation, and agricultural products. Sustainable energy security of Lithuania is a promising area of collaboration.
Culture and history: The legacy of Chiune Sugihara is a strong foundation of friendship between two countries. People-to-people exchanges are expanding including at the local and grassroots levels. Lithuania graciously participated in Kansai Osaka Expo this year and many Lithuanian high-level persons paid official visits to Japan.
Lithuania is a trusted partner for Japan to jointly promote reinforcement of multilateralism and global governance. Japan appreciates Lithuanian support and understanding of Free and Open Indo-Pacific concept. Lithuania and Japan also share the perspective of close linkage between the security of the Euro-Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific. To respond to the common challenges, particularly inspired by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, both countries should deepen strategic communication communication at all levels.
Linas Kojala: Japan’s decision to send officers to Lithuania for demining training in support of Ukraine signals an evolution in its security role. Why does the future of European security, and Ukraine’s outcome in particular, matter for Japan’s long-term strategic interests?
Tomoyuki Yoshida: Japanese government announced that Japan will dispatch Ground Self-Defense Force’s officers to Lithuania and conduct demining training to Ukrainian soldiers. This is a part of a Demining Capability Coalition of Ukraine Defense Contact Group. At the same time, this initiative is an implementation of Japan–Lithuania strategic partnership initiated in 2022. The presence of SDF officers s still at a modest level but it is expected that the SDF will learn and bring back their experience in Vilnius for further consideration of future expansion of missions.
Demining is essential for reconstruction of Ukraine and Japan pledges itself to play a critical role in the recovery of the country once the situation is ready.
The future of European security and the outcome of the war in Ukraine substantially matter for Japan’s strategic interests because Japan views security in the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific regions as closely interconnected. If the war is terminated in favor of the unlawful invader, it further undermines already precarious rule-based international order. It will also set a dangerous precedent that could encourage similar aggressive actions elsewhere on the globe. This is Japan’s serious concern. Therefore, former Prime Minister Kishida expressed that “Today’s Ukraine may be tomorrow’s Asia.”
Linas Kojala: What developments in global politics will you be watching most closely in 2026? Which trends or decisions are likely to shape the next phase of the regional and international security environment?
Tomoyuki Yoshida: The year of 2025 may be remembered as a historical turning point of global order in distant future. Post-war rule-based liberal international order is seriously shaken. The superpower which has founded and advocated the present international order does not wish to maintain it and rather desires to reshape.
Geopolitical competition and rise of economic security will continue to be a notable current in 2026. International society will be more fragmented and multilateral global architectures will almost stand still. “Peace through strength” lingers on as primal behavior in international conflicts. Weaponization of economic dependence plays as effective leverage to achieve political objectives.
The consequence of the war in Ukraine is uncertain. Despite President Trump’s enthusiasm, both Ukraine and Russia will not accept the present status-quo. Stalemate situation may continue, despite expectation. Completing four years since 2022, the West may struggle with protracted war fatigue. Solidarity and collective efforts are required to prevent slowdown of military and material support.
It is anticipated that the upcoming review of the U.S. National Defense Strategy is likely to place the highest security priority to the U.S. homeland and Western hemisphere. If so, substantial U.S. military assets will be redeployed to the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific at the expense of existing U.S. forces deployed elsewhere.
The U.S.–China competition continues to be tense but both sides avoid direct collision and maintain managed coexistence. As a result of U.S.–China summit meeting in October, both sides mutually withdrew retaliatory measures such as additional tariffs and export restrictions on rare earths. Furthermore, President Trump is supposed to visit Beijing next spring. Given such economic truce, it is plausible that controversial issues like Taiwan will be low-profile.
While the U.S. does not change its basic policy to Taiwan, China continues to raise pressure on Taiwan. Recent settlement revealed the limited effect of the reciprocal tariffs against the economic giant like China. U.S. tariff policy may be required to shift from holistic coverage to more targeted to specific critical sectors. Sectoral tariffs like pharmaceutical products and chips may pose different challenges and affect the allies and friends more severely.
Strategic sectors like semiconductors, AI, rare earth and critical minerals, supply chain realignment will be further promoted for risk reduction. Fragmentation of political parties is a common feature in many democracies. Populist and nationalist parties gain an electoral advantage by provoking electorates with anti-immigration or protectionist rhetoric. Taking advantage of this vulnerability in democracy, adversary states will wage cognitive warfare by spreading disinformation.
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