This text is excerpted from Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review, Vol. 44 (2026).
As Russia’s war grinds on, Europe faces a test of stamina, narrative, and resources. Ilan Berman, Senior Vice President of the American Foreign Policy Council (Washington, DC), argues that Central and Eastern part of Europe is mobilizing in earnest while parts of Western Europe remain less seized by the urgency; that information power is as vital as battlefield success; and that Washington’s ask for Europe to “do more” is both appropriate and strategically necessary. Questions by Linas Kojala.
Linas Kojala: You wrote that “in Europe today, there’s a near-universal consensus about the need to confront Russian aggression. But a number of states aren’t doing the hard part.” How durable do you think Europe’s support for Ukraine actually is in the long term?
Ilan Berman: It has been a long time coming, but I think Europe is finally awake to the threat posed by Russia – and the need to resolutely stand against it. The mobilization that’s now visible in Eastern Europe and the Baltics is real, and serious.
It reflects the gravity of the danger posed by a Neo-imperial Russia to countries on its periphery. Unfortunately, not all countries on the continent are equally seized with the immediacy of the problem. For Western European states, the danger is perceived as being more distant, and that has a bearing on long-term support for Ukraine – and for the cohesion of Europe as a whole. More work needs to be done here to explain to Western European states not just the gravity of the threat, but the need for a rapid, cohesive response that can adequately deter the Kremlin.
Linas Kojala: You have argued that “information truly is power… the ability to shape perceptions, to win hearts and minds, and to define the terms of national debate is as important as battlefield success.” Given Russia’s ongoing influence operations, now effectively in the United States using this dimension of power today? Where do you see the biggest gaps – and how can partners such as Lithuania help close them?
Ilan Berman: I wish the news was better in this regard, but America is very much missing in action in the information sphere at the moment. Since taking office earlier this year, the Trump administration has worked to systematically dismantle the organs of U.S. international broadcasting, such as VOA and Radio Free Europe, and to turn out the lights at their parent agency, the U.S. Agency for Global Media. The result has been a massive constriction of U.S. broadcasting – and an increasing informational void abroad, which Russia (as well as actors like China and Iran) are at present actively working to fill. This retrenchment leaves American allies more vulnerable to Russian disinformation. Countries like Lithuania need to fill the void by expanding their own messaging, and by improving the robustness of their own responses to Russian disinformation, until such time as America hopefully gets back into the informational game.
internationally, where allies are being asked to take on more responsibility. How should Washington recalibrate its presence in the Russia-Ukraine theater to maintain influence without overstretching? What is the trade-off space?
Linas Kojala: More than three years into the full-scale war, how would you describe Russia’s strategic calculus? Is Moscow focused primarily on attrition and exhaustion, or on shaping conditions for a later strategic reset? What does that mean for U.S. and European policy planning in 2026?
Ilan Berman: I think it’s now abundantly clear that Vladimir Putin isn’t seeking an off-ramp in his war on Ukraine. Rather, Russian policy clearly envisions the complete subjugation of Ukraine as its strategic objective. Moreover, Putin has staked so much on this military adventure that it’s hard to imagine how a compromise might materialize – short of massive economic pressure, ongoing military aid to Ukraine, and a concerted effort to decouple Russia from external partners like China and Iran. Both Washington and European capitals need to adapt accordingly for the coming year.
Linas Kojala: The U.S. global role is being tested both domestically – budgetary pressures, political polarization – and internationally, where allies are being asked to take on more responsibility. How should Washington recalibrate its presence in the Russia-Ukraine theater to maintain influence without overstretching? What is the trade-off space?
Ilan Berman: President Trump’s demands that Europe “do more” for its own defense are entirely appropriate, insofar as many European states have long relied on the U.S. to serve as the guarantor of continental security. We are now seeing at least some European states shoulder a greater share of the burden for continental defense. That is appropriate, and welcome in Washington. The more they continue to do so, the easier it will be to convince this Administration – and the next one – that ongoing American involvement in funding European defense writ large is a good bargain, and nets substantial dividends.
Linas Kojala: Energy and trade dependencies continue to provide Russia with financial resilience. In your October 2025 analysis, you noted that Europe’s purchases of Russian energy have “assisted – even if only modestly – in perpetuating Russia’s war effort.” What practical steps should the United States, Lithuania, and other NATO members prioritize to close these remaining vulnerabilities?
Ilan Berman: This should be a matter of urgent attention. Things like accelerating plans for a ban on Russian LNG, for instance, would help reduce revenues still flowing into the Russian economy. Additionally, proposals under consideration for using frozen Russian assets for the defense of Ukraine would provide a quick way to augment aid already flowing to Kyiv while simultaneously serving as a punitive lesson for Moscow.
Linas Kojala: For Lithuania and the wider Baltic region, the war in Ukraine is not simply a regional conflict – it is core to national security. How do you see U.S. strategy shifts aligning with Baltic security concerns, and what are the most important strategic messages Vilnius should be conveying to Washington?
Ilan Berman: The most important strategic message for American audiences is that Ukraine is not an isolated conflict, but a potential bellwether of things to come. The more U.S. policymakers and the American public at large understand that Russia, under Putin, is a revisionist neo-imperial state that is actively seeking to revise and undermine the Western-led democratic order, the better. At the moment, that message resonates in some corners in Washington. However, it needs far more amplification. Ultimately, what Americans need to understand is that the Kremlin’s war on Ukraine is part of a broader effort to remake Europe – and if Putin isn’t stopped there, he’ll need to be stopped elsewhere, at far greater cost.
Linas Kojala: Finally, looking beyond Europe: how will the evolving U.S. global role – particularly in the Indo-Pacific and the Middle East – shape the future of the war in Ukraine? To what extent will decisions made in those theaters indirectly determine Ukraine’s strategic position?
Ilan Berman: This is a key question. There is a real danger of the United States failing to connect the dots, so to speak, and continuing to treat Europe and the Indo-Pacific and the Middle East as separate, disconnected theaters. This would be a real miscalculation, because Russia, China and Iran are actively interacting and cooperating – and what happens in one theater will inform the strategic calculations of those countries in others. At the moment, there are still gaps in this understanding here in the United States. Those need to be clarified, and policymakers in Washington need to comprehend that America’s adversaries are actively collaborating and learning from one another. In other words, what happens in Europe will have tremendous bearing on stability in the Indo-Pacific and the Middle East, and vice versa.
Read the full publication here.
